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Like lawyer-bashing, Congress-bashing seems never to go out of 
style. As every newspaper reader knows, and as public opinion surveys 
confinn,1 the public's regard for the legislative branch has been discour­
agingly low for years. One of the incidents that has done most to fuel 
this mood is the Keating Five affair.2 The Senate Ethics Committee's 
1. See, e.g., Janet Hook, Voters' Hostility Is Shaping the Business of Congress, 52 
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 785 (1994); Richard Morin & David S. Broder, Six Out of 10 
Disapprove of Way Hill Does Its Job, WASH. POST, July 3, 1994, at Al. The turnover 
of party control of Congress in 1994 did not dispel the citizens' mistrust. See R.W. 
Apple Jr., Poll Shows Disenchontment with Politicians and Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
12, 1995, at Al. 
2. See Michael Waldman, The S&L Collapse: The Cost of a Congress for Sale, 2 
STAN. L. & POLY. REv. 47, 47-48 (1990) (referring to public opinion research indicat­
ing a ten-point decline from 1989 to 1990 in public's assessment of congressional eth­
ics, with Keating Five incident cited in focus groups as a prime factor). 
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decision in the Keating case, which has been called "the ultimate meta­
phor for political corruption,"3 provides a fitting prologue for this arti­
cle's theme: the ethical dimensions of intervention by members of Con­
gress into administrative agency proceedings. 
Charles H. Keating, Jr., was the controlling figure in Lincoln Sav­
ings and Loan, a California thrift institution that was under investiga­
tion by officials of the Federa1 Home Loan Bank Board in the mid-
1980s.4 He successfully prevailed on five senators - Alan Cranston, 
Dennis DeConcini, John Glenn, John McCain, and Donald Riegle - to 
press Bank Board officials to take his concerns more seriously, or at 
least to expedite their handling of the Lincoln case. The pressure 
reached its climax at two meetings held in April 1987 between the five 
senators and Bank Board officials, including the Board chainnan, 
Edwin Gray. When regulators disclosed that Lincoln would be the sub­
ject of a criminal investigation, most of the senators curtailed their in­
volvement in the matter. 
What made the case sensational was that Keating had raised 
around $1.5 million for the senators' campaigns and political causes. 
Senator Cranston and his affiliated groups had received most of this 
money, but all of the other senators, or organizations associated with 
them, had received $70,000 or more. The country's growing awareness 
of the costs of bailing out failed savings and loan associations made the 
events seem all the more scandalous.5 
In the fall of 1989, after the press had reported many of the facts 
about the five senators' interventions, the Ohio Republican Party, Com­
mon Cause, and others filed complaints against the senators with the 
Senate Ethics Committee. That committee launched preliminary inquir­
ies against the five senators. In February 1991 the Committee an­
nounced that it would take no further formal action against DeConcini, 
Glenn, Riegle, and McCain, although it criticized them for poor judg­
ment and, in Riegle's and DeConcini's cases, unseemly appearances.6 
At the same time the Committee concluded that it had enough evidence 
3. For Sale: One U.S. Capitol, ST. PE'I'ERsBURG TlMEs, Mar. 1, 1991, at A24. 
4. Except as otherwise specified, all facts in the following account are taken from 
the Senate Ethics Committee's report on the Keating case. See SENATE SELECT 
COMM. ON ETHICS, lNvEsTIGATION OF SENATOR ALAN CRANSTON, S. REP. No. 
102-223 (1991) [hereinafter KEATING REPORT]. For an engaging account of the pro­
ceedings by the Committee's vice chairman, see WARREN B. RUDMAN, COMBAT: 
TwELVE YEARS IN THE U.S. SENATE 195-241 (1996). 
5. See generally Symposium, Savings & Loan Crisis: Lessons and a Look Ahead, 
2 STAN. L. & POLY. REv. 21 (1990) (presenting several perspectives on the crisis, in­
cluding those of Gray and Keating). 
6. See KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 17-19. 
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of impropriety by Senator Cranston to warrant further proceedings. 
When the Committee finally rendered its decision on Cranston in No­
vember of 1991, it stopped short of recommending censure. It devised 
an unprecedented intermediate sanction: a "reprimand" issued on the 
Committee's authority but delivered in the presence of the full Senate.7 
The Committee explained that Cranston had "engaged in an impermis­
sible pattern of conduct in which fund raising and official activities 
were substantially linked. "8 The Committee based its decision on no 
specific acts of misconduct, but rather on "the totality of the 
circumstances. "9 
• 
Editorial reactions to the Committee's decisions in the Keating 
case were caustic. The dominant view was that the Committee had been 
far too lenient.1° Commentators also were troubled by the vagueness of 
the Committee's explanation.11 The Committee seemed far more ready 
to acknowledge that congressional intervention in agency proceedings 
has ethical limits than to specify what they are. Each of the five sena­
tors had depicted his conduct as fundamentally similar to the "constitu­
ent service" that all senators and representatives provide to individuals 
who have disputes with federal agencies. The Committee's failure to set 
forth a clear explanation for its actions suggested that it did not know 
quite how to respond to that claim. 
· 
The Committee's decision in 1995 to recommend expulsion in the 
case of Senator Robert Packwood suggests that a pattern of leniency in 
congressional ethics adjudication may now be nearing an end. If so, 
however, the lack of clarity as to the substance of congressional ethics 
rules can only become more troublesome. Nevertheless, post-Keating 
proceedings in Congress have made little further progress in defining 
7. See Phil Kuntz, Cranston Case Ends on Floor with a Murky Plea Bargain, 49 
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3432, 3433 (1991). Senator Jesse Helms did not join in the re­
port, relying instead on a public statement that he had released the previous August, 
calling for Cranston's censure. See KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 2, 76 (separate 
views of Sen. Helms). That statement was, in fact, a slightly revised version of a draft 
that Robert S. Bennett, the Committee's special counsel, had prepared as a proposed 
committee report. See Richard L. Berke, Cranston Censure Urged by Counsel, N.Y. 
TIMEs, Aug. 5, 1991, at Al. 
8. KEATING REPoRT, supra note 4, at 20. 
9. Id. at 35. For elaboration, see infra section IY.B. 
10. See, e:.g., Kuntz, supra note 7, at 3436 (quoting the Long Beach Press­
Telegram: "The wholly unsatisfying message is that in the Senate, the enforcement of 
ethical standards is loose and lax and roundheeled."); Senator Riegle's Duty, N.Y. 
TIMEs, Nov. 26, 1991, at A20 ("The committee's spineless response • . •  damaged its 
reputation, as well as that of the Senate."); infra note 20. 
11. See, e.g., The Keating Outcome, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1991, at A24 (con­
tending that the committee left "the dividing line between right and wrong. . . . as 
blurry as before"). 
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the legitimate limits of constituent service. Meanwhile, new, if less dra­
matic, controversies continue to arise.12 
Given the manifest lack of a consensus on the issue, now seems an 
auspicious time for an inquiry into the proper limits of intervention by 
members of Congress into administrative proceedings. To that end, this 
article offers a survey and critique of Congress's past and possible fu­
ture responses to ethics issues in constituent service.13 One of the prin­
cipal conclusions of the article is that those issues are much closer -
and less amenable to easy answers - than most editorial writers seem 
to have assumed. 
Part I offers a theoretical framework, revolving around the con­
flicting responsibilities inherent in the legislator's role: members of 
Congress are supposed to pursue the public interest, but they also are 
supposed to act as advocates for individuals. This conflict helps to ac­
count for the difficulty of the ethics issues in the constituent service 
realm. Part II offers a more empirical perspective on the realities of 
congressional advocacy of constituents' interests before administrative 
agencies. It delves into the political science literature in order to pro­
vide a factual description of the casework system. This Part also re­
views the debate in the literature over the intrinsic value of that system, 
noting the views of defenders as well as detractors. 
With that conceptual and empirical groundwork laid, Part m ad­
dresses the ethics questions that arise out of claims that an individual 
legislator's advocacy of constituent interests in an administrative forum 
embodies an element of "pressure" or "undue influence." The Keating 
ca8e did not turn directly on this issue, but in other recent ethics cases 
the theme has played a quite prominent role, most notably in the pro­
ceedings brought against Speaker Jim Wright in the House of Repre­
sentatives a few years earlier. A considerable body of administrative 
law bears indirectly on this issue, and a major objective of this Part is 
to treat judicial doctrine on undue influence as a basis for principles 
that the congressional ethics committees could employ for guidance and 
enforcement purposes. 
Finally, Part IV turns to the narrower but more visible issue of 
money influence on congressional constituent service. The discussion 
analyzes the Keating case and its aftermath in Congress, as well as the 
criminal law's role in reconciling the need to permit legitimate cam-
12. See, e.g., infra notes 358-61 (concerning Speaker Gingrich), 362-69 (concern­
ing Sen. Lautenberg), 375 (concerning Sens. Daschle and Dole) and accompanying text. 
13. This article will focus primarily on legislative ethics at the national level. For 
a roundup of state ethics reform developments, see Garry Boulard, Pluperfect Purity, 
STATE LEGISLATURES, Jan. 1995, at 29. 
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paign finance with the need to curtail corruption of legislators. Against 
that background, this Part evaluates some of the most visible proposals 
for reducing the risks of congressional favoritism toward campaign con­
tributors. Part N also critiques the beguiling but troublesome notion of 
regulation based on an "appearance of impropriety." 
This article concentrates on the substantive rules of congressional 
conduct and does not inquire into the related question of how, if at all, 
the House and Senate should reform the procedural machinery by 
which they administer these rules.14 The latter theme is a highly topical 
matter, having been the subject of a task force appointeil by the House 
and Senate leadership during the last Congress.15 One commonly dis­
cussed proposal, for example, is to entrust major portions of the en­
forcement process to former members of Congress or other individuals 
who are not currently serving in the legislature.16 Any procedural re­
forms, however, should complement, not displace, continued attention 
to fundamental substantive questions. It is too easy to argue that the 
problems of the Keating scandal would take care of themselves if only 
the cases were placed in the hands of adjudicators with sufficient forti­
tude. Philosophical questions about the proper roles of members of 
Congress as constituent advocates remain deeply controversial today, 
and only if Congress and the country can reach something approaching 
a consensus on those questions will the ethics committees be able to 
discharge their responsibilities in this area in a coherent and credible 
fashion. 
I. CONGRESSIONAL ADVOCACY AND LEGISLATIVE Ennes 
THEORY 
On first inspection, the vagueness, defensiveness, and caution 
marking the Senate's response to the Keating problem do not seem sur­
prising. One might shrug them off as just more evidence of the cor­
rupting power of incumbency. After all, congressional ethics enforce­
ment has historically been known for its leniency, with serious 
sanctions imposed only when unavoidable.17 Any number of explana-
14. Those issues have been addressed by other scholars contributing to the project 
for which this study was prepared. See Congressional Process Symposium, 48 ADMIN. 
L. REv. 33 (1996). 
15. See JOINT CoMM. ON THE ORO. OF CONG .• FINAL REPORT, S. REP. No. 
103-215 & H.R REP. No. 103-413 (1993). 
16. See id. pt 2, at 123-29. 
17. See Richard Allan Baker, The History of Congressional Ethics, in REPRESEN· 
TATION AND REsPONSmILITY: ExPLORING LEGISLATIVE ETHICS 3, 3 (Bruce 
Jennings & Daniel Callahan eds., 1985). For historical surveys of congressional ethics 
regulation, see generally CONG. Q .• CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS: HISTORY. FACTS, AND 
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tions for this heritage have been offered, including the practical need of 
members to work together over time and the human difficulties inherent 
in disciplining one's peers. A perhaps more principled justification is 
that Congress regards the accountability of members to the public as 
something of a substitute for vigorous enforcement activities by the eth­
ics committees.18 
But no explanation rooted in generic characteristics of congres­
sional ethics regulation can be entirely satisfactory, because from time 
to time the ethics committees have overcome these obstacles and en­
dorsed stiff punishments.19 Moreover, the Senate committee certainly 
had no reason to be surprised by the bad press it received over the 
Keating incident. Vehement denunciations of the five senators, and calls 
for severe punishment, had been prominent for months.20 One might 
wonder, therefore, whether any distinctive characteristics of the Keating 
case help to account for the Senate committee's hesitant and equivocal 
response to the issues in that case. 
Part of the explanation may be that the problem in the Keating 
case was itself a hard one. In certain ways, it was more analytically 
challenging than most questions the ethics committees have confronted 
through the years. More specifically, the case highlighted a tension be­
tween conflicting responsibilities of the senators involved. In the partic­
ular context, the conflict was between their responsibility to promote ef­
fective enforcement of the banking laws and their responsibility to act 
on behalf of an aggrieved citizen. In retrospect, most observers have 
concluded that at least some of the senators struck the balance insensi-
CONTROVERSY (1992) [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL Ennes], and Baker, supra. The 
Jennings and Callahan volume, which will be cited frequently in the next few pages, is 
an invaluable symposium prepared under the auspices of the Hastings Center. See also 
HAsTINGS Cm., THE Ennes OF LEGISLATIVE LIFE (1985) [hereinafter ETiilCS OF 
LEGISLATIVE LIFE] (a report stemming from the same symposium). 
18. Thoughtful outsiders have found substance in this argument. See SPECIAL 
COMM. ON THE FED. CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAWS, AsSN. OF THE BAR OF THE 
CITY OF N.Y., CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND FEDERAL SERVICE 15 (1960) [hereinaf­
ter CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND FEDERAL SERVICE]; Steven G. Calabresi, Some 
Structural Consequences of the Increased Use of Ethics Probes as Political Weapons, 
11 JL. & POL. 521, 531 (1995); Vera Vogelsang-Coombs & Larry A. Bakken, The Con­
duct of Legislators, in Ennes. GOVERNMENT, AND PuBuc POLICY: A REFERENCE 
GUIDE 79, 93-94 (James S. Bowman & Frederick A. Elliston eds., 1988). 
19. See CONGRESSIONAL Ennes, supra note 17, at 15-45 (summarizing pre­
Packwood cases in which severe sanctions have been imposed). 
20. See, e.g. , Robert F. Bauer, Law and Ethics in Political Life: Considering the 
Cranston Case, 9 JL. & PoL. 461, 482-83 n.52 (1993) (noting that the Committee's de­
cision to drop proceedings against four of the senators elicited such editorial page epi­
thets as "a farce," "a political charade from its inception," and "a craven abdication of 
responsibility, a contemptible white-wash, a self-serving, tortured exoneration"). 
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tively, perhaps corruptly; but this consensus does not itself belie the dif­
ficulty of pinning down the precise differences between the senators' 
conduct and more legitimate varieties of congressional intervention in 
agency proceedings. This Part explicates some of the complexities in 
the very concept of representation that the case exposed: first by fram­
ing the issue in theoretical terms, and then by tracing the general failure 
of the literature dealing with the practical problems of legislative ethics 
enforcement to come to grips with that issue. 
A. Legislators as Advocates 
Theorists of legislative ethics widely agree on a premise that lies at 
the heart of the difficulty: although members of Congress have a duty 
to articulate and promote the interests of the nation as a whole, they 
also have a duty to speak and act for more limited constituencies at 
times.21 This role has been described as a "broker" function.22 Mem­
bers of the House and Senate spend their time mediating among com­
peting social interests, "representing" a bewildering variety of interests 
in diverse ways. Residents of the state or district that elected a given 
member may be the most common beneficiaries of this broker function, 
but the function can legitimately be extended to people who are not 
constituents in a literal sense.23 In a sense, this role is built into the 
structure of our government, which presupposes that the clash of inter­
est against interest, faction against faction, will be conducive to the 
public good, or at least will minimize the risk of domination by any 
particular interest 24 
21. See, e.g., Ennes OF LEGISLATIVE LIFE, supra note 17, at 15-16; ROBERT s. 
GETZ, CONGRESSIONAL Ennes: THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST ISSUE 5, 45, 54-56 
(1966); Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, The Theory of Legislative Ethics, in REP­
RESENTATION AND REsPONSIBILITY, supra note 17, at 167, 168, 170-71; Harry w. 
Jones, Political Behavior and the Problem of Sanctions, in THE ETHIC OF POWER: 
THE INTERPLAY OF RELIGION, PHILoSOPHY AND POLITICS 193, 201 -02 (Harold D. 
Lasswell & Harland Cleveland eds., 1962); John D. Saxon, The Scope of Legislative 
Ethics, in REPRESENTATION AND REsPONSIBILITY, supra note 17, at 197, 204. But 
see EDMUND BURKE, Speech to the Electors of Bristol, in 1 BURKE'S WORKS 442, 
448 (1854) ("If the local constituent should have an interest, or should form an hasty 
opinion, evidently opposite to the real good of the rest of the community, the member 
[of Parliament] for that place ought to be as far, as any other, from any endeavour to 
give it effect."). 
22. GETZ, supra note 21, at 54-56. 
23. See ETHICS OF LEGISLATIVE LIFE, supra note 17, at 30-31; Gutmann & 
Thompson, supra note 21, at 170. 
24. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (Madison); Bruce Jennings, Legislative Ethics 
and Moral Minimalism, in REPRESENTATION AND REsPONSmILITY, supra note 17, at 
149, 158-60. 
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To be sure, people who have a serious interest in public policy -
a description with which most readers of this article would probably as­
sociate themselves - tend to mistrust this role. When members of Con­
gress angle for funding of highway projects in their districts, or de­
nounce proposals to close military bases there, or press for subsidies for 
the locally grown crop, the normal response of the intellectual commu­
nity is that these legislators really ought to try to rise above parochial 
politics and put the national interest first.25 This attitude is certainly apt 
in particular contexts,26 but an across-the-board dismissal of the legiti­
macy of the advocacy role is simply not in keeping with the nature of 
our government. 
On the other hand, most readers of this article are probably also 
lawyers by training, and in that regard they may be particularly able to 
empathize with the legislator's advocacy role. Those schooled in the 
norms of an adversarial legal system are in a good position to recognize 
that a legislator who by turns articulates the sometimes conflicting per­
spectives of a variety of interest groups is not necessarily a hypocrite. 
To be sure, in both the legal and political arenas, some methods of ad­
vocacy do lack integrity and deserve condemnation; but an effort to 
make the strongest defensible case on behalf of a "represented" party 
can also possess a kind of professionalism that members of the bar 
should find familiar.21 
The advocacy dimension of the legislator's responsibilities comes 
to mind most readily in connection with lawmaking, the most familiar 
and visible role a senator or representative plays. But, as the next Part 
will discuss, it also finds important and appropriate expression when 
members intervene before administrative agencies on behalf of individ­
uals. The "broker" function takes on a different coloration in this con­
text, because in lawmaking one legislator's factional advocacy is offset 
by that of others, while in constituent service the legislator normaily 
25. Much may depend on whose ox is gored, however. See Legislators Against the 
Arts, N.Y. TIMEs, July 19, 1995, at A18 (editorial declaring it "astonishing" that House 
members from the New York area, the home of many struggling artists, would vote to 
terminate the National Endowment for the Arts, thus "selling their constituents down 
the river"); see also infra note 125. 
26. For the distinctly contrarian view that pork-barrel politics can serve the public 
interest, see John W. Ellwood & Eric M. Patashnik, In Praise of Pork, PuB. lNTEREsT, 
Winter 1993, at 19; Abner J. Mikva, Foreword to Symposium on the Theory of Public 
Choice, 74 V A. L. REV. 167, 172 (1988). 
27. This is not to overlook significant differences between the representative roles 
of lawyers and legislators. For example, an attorney is generally expected to refrain 
from simultaneously representing multiple clients who have directly adverse interests, 
see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a) (1995), but that obliga­
tion could never be imposed on members of Congress. 
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acts alone. Thus, the checks and balances implications of congressional 
intervention in agency proceedings must instead be weighed in terms of 
the competitive relationship between the legislative and executive 
branches. The general point, however, is that proposed ethics rules to 
regulate members' contacts with agencies should be assessed from the 
perspective of whether they might prevent members from acting effec­
tively as constituent advocates. 
That constraints on congressional intervention have a potential to 
suppress legitimate advocacy is not, of course, a reason for Congress to 
eschew all ethical regulation in this area. By itself, it does not even ar­
gue for leniency. Subsequent sections of this article will argue that the 
Keating affair, although far from commonplace in its factual details, 
does highlight some dangers in the sphere of constituent service that the 
ethics committees ought to police. After all, congressional constituent 
advocacy can serve both public and private ends simultaneously. A leg­
islator who intervenes in the affairs of an administrative agency on a 
citizen's behalf may be performing a public servfoe, but he can also be 
seen as cultivating the beneficiary's gratitude, which the latter can ex­
press through her vote or, as in Keating's case, through campaign con­
tributions. Moreover, to the extent that the member's tactics for garner­
ing political support are in question, a characterization of the situation 
as involving a conflict of public responsibilities looks overly argumen­
tative - or at the very least debatable - because his campaign for re­
election serves the public interest in one sense but in another sense 
serves his own. Ethics regulation is a logical tool for counteracting the 
temptations stemming from the self-interested aspects of constituent ser­
vice. Nevertheless, any proposals for new proscriptions in this area 
should be studied carefully to gauge their impact on representation. 
In a thoughtful commentary on the Keating case, Professor Dennis 
F. Thompson has proposed a mode of analysis that resembles the one 
advanced here. Thompson offers the notion of "institutional corrup­
tion," which he defines as "the improper use of public office for pri­
vate purposes [in a manner that] undermines institutional purposes or 
damages the democratic process. "28 He wishes to look beyond a simple 
conclusion that constituent advocacy is either always corrupt or never 
corrupt "The individual member's contribution to the corruption is 
filtered through institutional practices that are otherwise legitimate and 
may even be duties of office. "29 Thus, when a form of political behav­
ior is called into question as possibly constituting "institutional corrup-
28. DENNIS F. THOMPSON, Ennes IN CONGRESS 7 (1995). 
29. Id. 
October 1996] Congressional Ethics 11 
tion," one must assess its impact on Congress and the democratic pro­
cess in order to decide whether to condemn it. 
Applying this frame of reference, Thompson finds much to criti­
cize in the behavior of the Keating Five. Indeed, as we shall see, he ul­
timately does not seem to believe that stricter controls on constituent 
service would suppress legitimate practices, and thus he does not dis­
cern a serious problem with conflicting responsibilities in this context. 
Nevertheless, Thompson's conceptual framework helpfully draws atten­
tion to the need for analysts in this area to engage in a wide-ranging 
and discriminating inquiry that scrutinizes the specific manner in which 
political activities such as constituent service are conducted and avoids 
condemning legitimate political advocacy. Although institutional cor­
ruption may reveal a "dark side of American politics," he says, "we 
can still try to recognize degrees of darkness. We should aim for a kind 
of moral chiaroscuro. "30 
B. The Ethics Enforcement Background 
Because it implicates competing claims on legislators' allegiances, 
the task of devising ethical rules to govern congressional contacts with 
agencies calls for a more complex analysis than one usually encounters 
in discussions about the practical issues of ethics enforcement. Most of 
the House and Senate ethics rules aim to prevent members from ex­
ploiting the powers of their office for their private benefit - usually fi­
nancial gain.31 Familiar examples are statutes and rules regulating mem­
bers' acceptance of gifts, honoraria, paid travel, outside earned income, 
or employment subsequent to their service in Congress.32 
30. Id. at 170; cf. Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government 
Yet?: An Answer from Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. lLL. L. REv. 57, 78 (arguing that al­
though governmental ethics regulation should in general track private-law concepts of 
fiduciary responsibility, "[p]ragmatic concerns about the actual consequences of impos­
ing fiduciary duties will limit their application in ways that cannot easily be explained 
on a purely theoretical level"); Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Inter­
mediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. REv. 784, 784-85, 805-06 (1985) (arguing that 
"corrupt intent," as used in the bribery laws, should be determined in light of "interme­
diate political theory" evaluating the consequences of the defendant's conduct for the 
political system). 
31. See Jennings, supra note 24, at 151. 
32. The House and Senate have recently adopted comprehensive measures banning 
most gifts to their members. See H.R. Res. 250, 104th Cong., 141 CONG. REc. H13,078 
(daily ed. Nov. 16, 1995) (enacted) (amending H.R RULE Lll); S. Res. 158, 104th 
Cong., 141 CONG. REc. SI0,897 (daily ed. July 28, 1995) (enacted) (amending S. 
RULE XXXV). For an earlier survey of restrictions on financial gain, including some 
rules not displaced by the 1995 measures, see A.B.A. SEC. OF ADMIN. LAw & REG. 
PRACTICE, THE LoBBYING MANuAL 159-71 (Thomas M. Susman ed., 1993). For pur­
poses of the present discussion, rules requiring disclosure of personal financial interests 
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By their nature, such provisions will usually not give rise to con­
flicts of responsibilities such as those suggested in the preceding sec­
tion. No one would condemn a member for being too scrupulous to 
avoid making a personal profit from public service, nor would anyone 
suggest that the member's failure to engage in the proscribed activity 
would harm society in any direct fashion.33 Debates about such restric­
tions as bans on gifts or honoraria typically center on questions such as 
whether the rule is unnecessary, overly stringent, or clumsily drafted, 
rather than on whether the rule proscribes conduct that affirmatively 
serves the public interest. For this reason, the questions of representa­
tion theory that scholars have broached on an academic level, and that 
were highlighted in the previous section, have rarely been explored in 
this context. 
For essentially the same reasons, the questions of representation 
theory in the Keating case are normally not presented by ethics cases 
raising so-called "lifestyle" issues - sexual improprieties, drug or al­
cohol abuse, and so forth.34 The most prominent current example in­
volves the sensational sexual harassment allegations that led to the fall 
of Senator Packwood. Such cases may involve difficult issues, but they 
generally do not involve conflicting responsibilities. Perhaps the stan­
dards of sobriety, sexual ethics, and so on, that a senator must observe 
are higher than those applicable to other citizens, but they certainly are 
not lower. No one would argue that a member of Congress is supposed 
to take sexual liberties as part of the job. 
In at least one context, however, a type of ethics rule that is in­
tended to prevent officials from exploiting their official positions for 
private financial gain does directly implicate the process of representa­
tion. That context, which obviously deserves particular attention here, 
involves the House and Senate disqualification rules. Those rules, if not 
can be lumped together with rules proscribing primary activity in pursuit of those 
interests. · . 
33. Arguably, stringent efforts to curb the personal benefits of public service do 
cause harm to society - they can deter good people from entering government work, 
drive other good people out of government, or dampen the morale of those who remain. 
See A.B.A. Comm. on Govt. Standards, Keeping Faith: Government Ethics and Gov­
ernment Ethics Regulation, 45 ADMIN. L. REv. 287, 294 (1993) (Cynthia Farina, Re­
porter) [hereinafter Keeping Faith]; Beth Nolan, Public Interest, Private Income: Con­
flicts and Control Limits on the Outside Income of Government Officials, 87 Nw. U. L. 
REv. 57, 84-88 (1992). That result, however, would be only an incidental and unin­
tended consequence of such rules; they should be distinguished from rules that by their 
terms forbid members of Congress from engaging in advocacy activities that are 
deemed unethical but arguably ought to be preserved. 
34. See generally CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 17, at 85-96 (summariz­
ing past cases involving sex or alcohol abuse). 
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completely toothless, are certainly far narrower in scope than !}le corre­
sponding rules governing the executive and judicial branches. Basically, 
a member is permitted to cast a vote that will directly enhance the value 
of an investment asset she owns, if she is one of a large number of in­
vestors who also own that type of asset.35 Legislators, defending their 
reluctance to endorse more stringent conflict of interest principles, have 
argued that if every member of Congress were forbidden to vote on 
bills that could affect any of his or her financial interests, it would be 
impossible to muster a quorum on numerous measures on which Con­
gress must act.36 
The responses of students of legislative ethics to Congress's dis­
qualification rules are revealing. 1\vo contrasting reactions are nicely il­
lustrated by a pair of reports prepared by committees composed of emi­
nent members of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 
(NYCBA). One committee, reporting over three decades ago in an in­
fluential book-length study on Conflict of Interest and Federal Service, 
made numerous recommendations to clarify the rules regarding prohib­
ited conflicts of interest in the executive branch. But the committee de­
clined to propose anything regarding Congress, in part because it 
35. Rule VIlI of the House of Representatives states that a member should not 
vote on an issue if he has "a direct personal or pecuniary interest" in the matter. De­
spite the facial breadth of this language, Speaker James G. Blaine ruled in 1874 that the 
rule applies only to measures that would affect a representative as an individual - such 
as loss of a seat. Thus, a representative may vote on matters that would affect his inter­
ests as a member of a class. See GE'I'Z, supra note 21,  at 57-59. This interpretation has 
stood for over a century. Moreover, when the Senate codified its ethics rules in 1977, it 
expressly adopted the essence of the Blaine position. See SENATE RULE XXXVI1(4) 
(providing that a senator shall not introduce or promote legislation "a principal purpose 
of which is to further only his pecuniary interest [or that of] a limited class of persons 
[to which he belongs]"). The drafters of this rule explained that it does not, for exam­
ple, prevent a senator who owns a dairy farm from promoting a bill that provides price 
supports for dairy farmers generally; the "limited class" language refers only to the sort 
of very small classes that might typically be the subject of a private bill. See S. REP. 
No. 95-49, at 42 (1977). 
36. See GE'I'Z, supra note 21,  at 58-59. This reasoning is similar to the "rule of 
necessity" that pennits judges or administrators to decline to recuse themselves in a 
case if the result would be that no one could hear the case. See United States v. Will, 
449 U.S. 200 (1980) (holding that Justices could hear a challenge to validity of law that 
increased all judicial salaries). An interesting but logical exception to the general pat­
tern occurred in the Keating case itself: Senator Jeff Bingaman recused himself from 
participating in the Ethics Committee's proceedings because his wife's law firm had 
worked for associates of Cranston. See Phil Kuntz, Cranston Decision Delayed by Con­
flict of Interest, 49 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2051 (1991). Congressional recusal is less 
problematic in this situation than in most others, because members of the ethics com­
mittees sit in an adjudicative capacity and do not "represent" constituencies in any sig­
nificant sense. 
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thought the notion of conflicts of interest was so different in the legisla­
tive sphere: 
We would think odd a fishing state congressman who was not mindful of 
the interests of the fishing industry - though he may be in the fishing 
business himself, and though his campaign funds come in part from this 
source. 'This kind of representation is considered inevitable and, indeed, 
generally applauded. Sterile application of an abstract rule against acting 
in situations involving self-interest would prevent the farmer senator 
from voting on farm legislation or the Negro congressman from speaking 
on civil rights bills. At some point a purist attitude toward the evils of 
conflicts of interest in Congress runs afoul of the basic premises of 
American representative government 37 
A subsequent NYCBA committee, specifically established to ad­
dress issues of congressional ethics, tried more assiduously to devise a 
workable formula for regulation of congressional conflicts of interest, 
but in the end drew back from urging Congress to extend the ideal of 
conflict avoidance to the limits of its logic. The committee ultimately 
endorsed a rule that would urge legislators to consider voluntary recusal 
on a discretionary basis, but at the same time acknowledged that a rule 
of mandatory disqualification would be unworkable.38 
Similar ambivalence is evident in a very recent report by another 
distinguished ad hoc panel, the Committee on Government Standards of 
the American Bar Association. This committee made detailed recom­
mendations for reform of the standards for financial disqualification for 
officials in the executive branch. As to members of Congress and their 
staffs, however, the committee limited itself to urging that these offi­
cials be held to the same conflicts standards as other government em­
ployees "to the greatest extent practicable. "39 One of the reasons for 
the cautious tone of this recommendation was the committee's belief 
that a broad recusal requirement would cause problems of its own: "to 
disable an elected official from acting on a matter is effectively to 
silence the voice of the constituents who chose him as their 
representative. "40 
This brief discussion is not intended to take sides on the difficult 
issue of congressional disqualification because of financial interest -
37. CONFLICT OF INTEREsT AND FEDERAL SERVICE, supra note 18, at 14-15. 
38. See SPECIAL COMM. ON CONG. ETHICS, AssN. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY 
OF NEW YORK, CONGRESS AND THE PUBuc TRUST 71-72 (1970) [hereinafter CON­
GRESS AND THE PUBuc TRUST]. 
39. Keeping Faith, supra note 33, at 302-03. 
40. Id. at 301. The committee did, however, maintain that members of Congress 
should make broad public disclosure of potentially compromising financial interests. 
See id. at 302, 304. 
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an issue that remains controversial in its own right.41 The point is sim­
ply that, in a subject area that is not too far removed from this article's 
principal concerns, the literature on legislative ethics has recognized the 
tension between ethics regulation and the process of representation,42 
but has seemed decidedly perplexed about how to resolve that tension. 
In view of the hesitation these authorities have shown where the tension 
has involved economic self-interest, one should hardly be surprised that 
the Senate Ethics Committee had such trouble reaching consensus in the 
far murkier area of political self-interest, in which the spheres of public 
and private responsibility are even harder to separate.43 Subsequent 
Parts of this article will attempt to shed at least some light on that 
problem. 
II. CONSTITUENT SERVICE 
Part I of this study suggested that any attempt to place ethics limits 
on the conduct of legislative business must take into account the multi­
ple and conflicting responsibilities that are the essence of legislative 
life. If this premise is correct, one cannot expect to devise sound ethical 
principles to govern the constituent service process without a reliable 
understanding of the nature and significance of that process. In general, 
however, the services that senators and representatives perform for indi­
vidual constituents are far less visible and less familiar to the public 
than, say, congressional lawmaking. It will be useful at this point, there­
fore, to investigate the realities of constituent service - or casework, as 
it is also known. 
This Part has both a descriptive and a normative component. The 
descriptive aspect will provide the factual underpinnings for all of the 
analyses to follow. The normative aspect is necessary because consider­
ation of potential restrictions on congressional casework inevitably pre-
41. See Clark, supra note 30, at 91 (arguing that current congressional rules are 
"entirely inadequate"); Bernie Sanders & Maurice Hinchey, Divest Now! Members 
Should Purge Stock Portfolios of Conflicts, ROLL CALL. July 13, 1995, available in 
LEXIS, Legis Library, Rollcl File (discussing bill to require members to divest most as­
sets or put them into blind trusts). 
42. See also Nolan, supra note 33, at 62 n.8 (choosing, in article about restrictions 
on government officials' outside income, to confine discussion to executive branch is­
sues, in part because of complications attributable to legislators' representative 
functions). 
43. Indeed, the NYCBA Special Committee on Congressional Ethics avoided that 
subject completely, defining conflicts of interest exclusively in terms of members' eco­
nomic interests. See CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST, supra note 38, at 38-39, 42-
43. Moreover, the committee specifically declined to give any attention in its 238-page 
study to the questions of legislative ethics that arise out of congressional intervention in 
administrative proceedings. See id. at xxii. 
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supposes background assumptions about the intrinsic value of constitu­
ent service. Those who approve of this function will presumably want 
to ensure that ethical rules or other restrictions leave ample breathing 
room for it Those who are more skeptical of the value of casework will 
presumably be readier to impose restraints, notwithstanding risks that it 
might be chilled. In other words, if the congressional practice of doing 
favors for constituents does not serve the public interest anyway, one 
would not need to worry about the possibility that the imposition of 
new ethical norms could impair the performance of this practice. 
The universe of scholarship available on constituent service is 
fairly small. The major empirical study in the political science literature 
was published by John R. Johannes in 1984.44 He presents a largely flat­
tering picture. Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina have pro­
vided a more skeptical book-length study addressing this issue,45 al­
though their work focuses primarily on the electoral and policy 
implications of constituent service. Both of these books draw upon 
broad-based surveys of members, congressional staff, and the general 
public, supplemented by extensive interviews in congressional offices. 
Several works published in the 1960s and 1970s are also helpful, pro­
vided one keeps in mind that the passage of time may have impaired 
the validity of their findings.46 From these accounts, and from a small 
number of additional articles and journalistic pieces, a realistic depic­
tion of constituent service begins to emerge. 
A. Description of the Process 
Congressional offices are continuously engaged in providing a va­
riety of services for constituents who claim that administrative agencies 
are treating them improperly or are not giving them what they deserve. 
The subjects of these interventions range from individual complaints -
44. JOHN R. JOHANNES, To SERVE THE PEOPLE: CONGRESS AND CONSTITU· 
ENCY SERVICE (1984). 
45. BRUCE CAIN ET AL., THE PERSONAL VOTE: CONSTITUENCY SERVICE AND 
ELECTORAL INDEPENDENCE (1987). These authors also provide detailed analysis of 
casework in Britain, but only their findings regarding the United States Congress will 
be discussed here. 
46. See, e.g., CHARLES L. CLAPP, THE CONGRESSMAN: His WORK AS HE SEES 
IT 50-55 (1963); WALTER GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN (1966); WAL­
TER KRAVITZ, CASEWORK BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS: A SURVEY OF THE LITER· 
ATURE (Lib. of Cong. Legislative Reference Serv. No. GGR-150, 1968); Robert Klo­
noff, The Congressman as Mediator Between Citizens and Government Agencies: 
Problems and Prospects, 16 HAR.v. J. ON LEGIS. 701, 705-08 (1979); T. Edward Wes­
ten, The Constituent Needs Help: Casework in the House of Representatives, in To BB 
A CONGRESSMAN: THE PROMISE AND THE POWER 53 (Sven Groennings & Jonathan 
P. Hawley eds., 1973). 
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regarding, for example, social security bep.efits, veterans' benefits, or 
unemployment compensation - to larger-scale matters such as helping 
state and local authorities with grant applications.47 Although the major­
ity of requests, like the ones just mentioned, involve efforts to obtain 
affirmative benefits from the federal government, congressional offices 
also handle many cases in which a constituent wants help resisting ef­
forts by agencies to enforce regulatory statutes. 'fypical of this category 
are cases in the tax, immigration, and environmental protection areas.48 
In short, the institution of congressional casework covers _much of the 
same terrain as might be handled through an "ombudsman" system in 
other nations.49 
The magnitude of this enterprise is not easy to gauge, but Johannes 
has estimated that in the Ninety-fifth Congress the workload exceeded 
four million cases per year.50 All agree that casework has grown dra­
matically since the 1960s and early 1970s.51 The growing size of the 
federal welfare state is commonly cited as a contributing factor in this 
increase; another is the growing sophistication among citizens about the 
availability of programs for which they might qualify.52 
47. See CAIN ET AL., supra note 45, at 58-59, 71; JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 
18-24. Constituent service performed for employers, state or local governments, or other 
large institutions is sometimes called "high-level casework." See Westen, supra note 
46, at 68-70. Others describe such favors as "federal projects assistance," preferring to 
limit the term "casework" to activities on behalf of individuals. See JOHANNES, supra 
note 44, at 2. One theme of this article is that for purposes of ethics regulation the two 
varieties of constituent service shade into each other, and ethics rules must recognize 
this continuity. Generally, therefore, this article uses both "casework" and "constituent 
service" in a broad sense, referring to any actions that congressional offices take as in­
termediaries between federal agencies and constituents. This usage does not, however, 
include efforts by a senator or representative to promote constituent or district interests 
through legislation. 
48. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 20-21. 
49. 
The ombudsman is an institution frequently used in other countries, and increas­
ingly used in this country, as a means of inquiring into citizen grievances about 
administrative acts or failures to act and, in suitable cases, to criticize or to make 
recommendations concerning future official conduct . . • In cases involving the 
agencies of the government, an ombudsman may deal with complaints arising 
from maladministration, abusive or indifferent treatment, tardiness, unresponsive­
ness, and the like. 
The Ombudsman in Federal Agencies (Recommendation 90-2), 55 Fed. Reg. 34,209, 
34,211 (Admin. Conf. of the U.S. 1990) (footnote omitted). For discussion of proposals 
to institute an ombudsman-like entity within Congress, see infra notes 1 15-22 and ac­
companying text 
50. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 35. 
51. See id. at 36; cf. GELLHORN, supra note 46, at 93 (estimating 200,000 cases 
annually in 1996). 
52. See CAIN ET AL., supra note 45, at 217; JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 36-39. 
One measure of the expansion in constituent service is the increase in the number of 
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Most casework is handled at the staff level.53 The caseworker typi­
cally forwards a constituent's letter to the agency involved, accompa­
nied by a cover letter, or perhaps only a "buck slip" - a form letter 
requesting that the agency take prompt action. More significant or diffi­
cult cases may dictate contacting the agency by telephone instead.54 
Agencies usually respond quickly to "congressionals."55 Relations be­
tween staff at the agency and the congressional offices are usually co­
operative, but prolonged negotiation, cajolery, and browbeating are by 
no means unheard of.56 Sometimes, especially if the agency seems to be 
acting unreasonably, the casework staff will appeal to higher authorities 
in the agency before giving up.s1 
Senators and representatives spend relatively little time contacting 
agencies themselves.58 They do, however, spend time supervising and 
conferring with staff about how to handle cases, and intermittently they 
will participate personally. They are especially likely to do so on major 
cases - for example, a project that could benefit many residents of the 
home district - or when an aide feels that the member's personal clout 
will be helpful in overcoming bureaucratic resistance.59 Finally, Johan-
staff members assigned to it In 1978, according to Johannes, an average of seven staff 
members were regularly involved in casework in House offices, and about ten in Senate 
offices; half of each group were casework specialists. See id. at 63. By 1990, the num­
ber of House staff positions in district offices, which are primarily service-oriented, had 
increased to 3027 from a 1972 level of 1 189; the comparable increase for Senate staff 
was 1293, compared with a 1972 level of 303. See Larry Liebert, Hill's Growth Indus­
try: Constituent Service, 52 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1758 (1994). The shortage of office 
space in Washington is one reason for this dispersal of staff. See id. 
53. For discussions of routine casework procedures, see, for example, JOHANNES, 
supra note 44, at 98-100; RICHARD H. SHAPIRO ET AL., CONG. MGMT. FOUND., 
FRONTLINE MANAGEMENT: A GUIDE FOR CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT/STATE OF­
FICES 98-131 (1989) [hereinafter FRONTLINE MANAGEMENT]; Klonoff, supra note 46, 
at 704-08. 
54. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 99-100; see also CAIN ET AL., supra note 
45, at 67 (suggesting that caseworkers sometimes use an "informal signaling system" 
to let agency officials know which cases the congressional office thinks deserve the 
closest attention). 
55. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 100, 114. 
56. See id. at 101-05. 
57. See id. at 1 10-1 1. 
58. See CAIN ET AL., supra note 45, at 62 ("When asked to estimate the amount 
of time the congressman personally spends on casework, 47% of the administrative as­
sistants said that the Congressman rarely spends any time on casework, and only 9% 
said that the Congressman spends more than 10% of his time on casework."). The find­
ings of other researchers are similar. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 109, 151-53; 
Klonoff, supra note 46, at 708 & n.28. 
59. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 153; see also id. at 139 ("Usually the goal 
[of personal action by the member] is to impress on an administrator that the matter is, 
in fact, important"). 
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nes notes, "one in six respondents [in the author's Capitol Hill inter­
views] indicated that congressmen handle cases personally when the 
constituent is important a relative, friend, or local VIP. "60 We shall re­
turn later to the equity questions implicit in this last comment The 
guiding assumption, however, is that even when the member is not per­
sonally involved, credit or blame for the staff 's work will reflect on the 
member himself or herself. 
B. Positive Appraisals of Constituent Service 
Casework is a benign and valuable institution - or at least that is 
what members of Congress would have us believe. Members them­
selves are among the strongest boosters of constituent service. They and 
other proponents of casework maintain that the ombudsman role is ba­
sic to the job. of being a member of Congress - an essential aspect of 
what it means to "represent" one's constituents, and a direct outgrowth 
of the constitutional right to petition Congress for redress of grievances. 
The comments of former Speaker Jim Wright are typical: 
We can disparage the ombudsman function [of the congressman] if we 
will, but I am absolutely convinced that it is an altogether honorable 
function. For many millions of private citizens, their elected representa­
tive is the only person whom they remotely know in the federal govern­
ment He is their only intercessor when they encounter difficulties. This 
particular relationship between a congressman and the individual constit­
uent, struggling for opportunity, is a very sacred one, not to be despised. 
It is, in fact, essential if we are to keep government accessible and to 
keep government human.6t 
One might at first be inclined to discount these remarks as uniquely 
self-serving, because former Speaker Wright was himself a target of 
ethics committee proceedings because of his alleged abuse of the con­
stituent service role.62 Other legislators, however, say much the same 
thing - usually less floridly - in their own writings63 or when sur­
veyed.64 A few scholars have also joined in the positive portrayal that 
60. Id. at 154. 
61. Colloquy, Incumbency Advantage and Accountability: The Question of Cam­
paign Finance, Congressional Perquisites, and Constituent Service, 23 CuMB. L. REv. 
61, 67-69 (1993) (remarks of former Speaker of the House Jim Wright). 
62. See infra Part ill. 
63. See PAUL H. DOUGLAS, Ennes IN GoVERNMENT 85-88 (1952); DAVID E. 
PRICE, THE CONGRESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: A Vmw FROM THE HILL 1 17-19 (1992); 
Lee H. Hamilton, Constituent Service and Representation, PuB. MANAGER. Summer 
1992, at 12. 
64. See CAIN ET AL •• supra note 45, at 88; JOHANNES. supra note 44, at 16; 
KRAVITZ. supra note 46, at 29-33 (quoting several members of Congress); Klonoff, 
supra note 46, at 709 & nn.30-31. 
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Wright's statement evokes.65 The idea that citizen access to a congres­
sional troubleshooter "humanizes" government recurs frequently in 
these accounts. They depict the congressional office as the champion of 
ordinary citizens who cannot effectively protect themselves against the 
occasionally arrogant bureaucracy. 
Just how much benefit constituents actually derive from casework 
is difficult to gauge. Caseworkers and agency staff almost uniformly 
agree that a congressional inquiry will probably induce the agency to 
expedite the constituent's case and to give the case a closer look, per­
haps at a higher level in the bureaucracy.66 Whether constituents receive 
more favorable substantive outcomes when a member of Congress in­
tervenes is more controversial. Typically, members and their staffs vig­
orously assert that their participation does help, but agency staff some­
times assert the contrary.67 Independent analysts tend to favor the 
congressional side of this argument, although estimates of the extent of 
the benefit vary widely.68 Even when the legislative intervention is un­
successful, casework generally serves the useful function of giving the 
constituent a feeling that someone has taken action on his or her behalf. 
When asked, most requesters report favorable assessments of the con­
gressional office's assistance.69 
Members also claim that the practice of casework keeps them in 
touch with the real-world concerns of their constituents. Casework can 
serve as an early warning system for problems that might not come to 
their attention through the usual political channels.70 As an example, 
Representative Barney Frank has noted that the human costs of the 
Reagan administration's intensive review of social security disability 
claims became clear to Congress because of complaints reaching mem­
bers' offices.71 
65. See, e.g., JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 225-27; Klonoff, supra note 46, at 
718-19; AALS Section on Legis., Legislators at an Agency Door: The Ethics of Con­
stituent Service (Jan. 5, 1992) (tape of panel discussion, on file with author) [hereinafter 
Agency Door] (remarks of Prof. Otto Hetzel). 
66. See GELLHORN, supra note 46, at 70-71; JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 132. 
67. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 134. 
68. See CAIN ET AL., supra note 45, at 68 (congressional estimates range from 
10% to 90% ); GELLHORN, supra note 46, at 79-80 (reporting, and calling plausible, in­
terviewees' consensus that 10% of cases led to better outcomes for constituents in­
volved); JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 128 (stating that legislators and caseworkers 
claim success rates between 28% and 40%, although "these numbers could be inflated 
and self-serving"). 
69. See CAIN ET AL., supra note 45, at 52; JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 206-07. 
70. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 161-68; Hamilton, supra note 63, at 14. 
71. See Agency Door, supra note 65 (remarks of Rep. Frank). 
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Finally, members say that they engage in constituent service be­
cause they enjoy helping people. In contrast to the lawmaking process, 
with all its frustrations, constituent service is a domain in which mem­
bers can regularly get results and know that someone is better off as a 
result of their efforts.72 
C. Criticisms 
For the most part, the academic community has been far less gen­
erous in its appraisal of constituent service than members of Congress 
have been. Moreover, the Keating scandal has given rise to scathing ap­
praisals of casework in the popular press.73 The three principal criti­
cisms in the literature are that casework (1) is better seen as self-serving 
than as altruistic, (2) serves to entrench incumbents and thereby sub­
verts the political system, and (3) is an inefficient method of improving 
the administration of justice. These critiques will be examined in this 
section. A fourth criticism is that casework induces legislators to en­
gage in ethically questionable behavior. Issues relating to that point will 
be considered in subsequent Parts in connection with the particular ethi­
cal lapses that have been alleged.74 
1. Casework as Reelection Stratagem: The Question of Motives 
Although some members of Congress may suggest that they en­
gage in constituent service solely beca)lse of a selfless desire to serve 
the public, contemporary political scientists, influenced by the "rational 
choice" school of scholarship,75 point to another incentive: legislators' 
expectation that casework will enable them to reap political advantages 
from appreciative constituents. Indeed, many members and staff them­
selves acknowledge that they regard an efficient constituent service op-
72. See PRICE, supra note 63, at 1 19. . 
73. See, e.g., Mark B. Liedl, The Bloated Disservice of Congress's Constituent 
Service, WASH. POST, Feb. 5-1 1, 1990, at 24 (natl. wkly. ed.); Robert Palmer, The Is­
sues Behind the Keating Five Case, S.F. CHRoN., Jan. 24, 1991, at A21; Michael Wald­
man, Quid Pro Whoa, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 19, 1990, at 22. 
74. As later discussion will attempt to demonstrate, improper behavior by mem­
bers does not appear to be nearly prevalent enough to constitute, in and of itself, a 
strong argument against the institution of casework. See infra notes 244-50, 300-05 and 
accompanying text 
75. For overviews of the rational choice school, which also goes by names such as 
"public choice" and "positive political theory," see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. 
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 12-33 (1991); 
Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72 
WASH. U. L.Q. l ,  52-80 (1994). 
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eration as critical to securing their political base.76 Morris Fiorina, a po­
litical scientist who is closely associated with this analysis, has noted 
that part of the special appeal of casework is that it offers political re­
wards without political risk. That is, taking stands on controversial is­
sues can result in both political gains and losses, but constituent service 
is "basically pure profit. "77 Moreover, a politician who claims credit for 
helping a constituent may be more credible than one who claims to 
have been instrumental in securing passage of a bill: most voters realize 
that the enactment process requires the concurrence of numerous legis­
lators and that no single individual is responsible for a given statute.78 
This is not to say that members are solely motivated by political 
self-interest when they engage in constituent service. In the words of 
Fiorina and his collaborators - who have done the most to uncover ev­
idence of the reelection motive behind casework - "only the most 
hardened cynic" would make so broad a claim.79 The relative influence 
of altruistic and selfish motives is impossible to investigate in a serious 
way, or perhaps the issue is better described as meaningless.8° For pres-
76. See CAIN ET AL., supra note 45, at 78-80; CLAPP, supra note 46, at 52-53; 
JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 13-14. An orientation manual for new House members 
once advised: "as viewed by most Congressmen, job security and constituency service 
are like love and marriage - you can't have one without the other." DONALD G. 
TACHERON & MORRIS K. UDALL, THE JOB OF THE CONGRESSMAN 62 (1966). More 
recently, 56% of House administrative assistants who responded to a 1989 survey iden­
tified constituent services as "the most important factor in solidifying your Member's 
political base," compared with only 1 1  % (!) who chose the member's legislative record. 
See FRONTI.INE MANAGEMENT, supra note 53, at 94. 
77. MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON EsTAB­
LISHMENT 35-36, 42-43 (2d ed. 1989); see also Jorm HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST 131-32 (1980) (arguing that legislators delegate too many of their lawmak­
ing duties to agencies, because doing errands for constituents is easier and politically 
safer than resolving divisive policy issues themselves). 
78. See FIORINA, supra note 77, at 43. 
79. CAIN ET AL., supra note 45, at 84-85. One could, of course, beg this question 
by simply positing that members of Congress are motivated solely by a desire to be re­
elected. Much academic writing by the so-called public choice scholars rests on just that 
premise. See, e.g., DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 
13 (1974). The premise has, in turn, been debunked as reductionist by other writers. 
See, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 75, at 21; Mikva, supra note 26, at 168-70. 
This article does not inquire into how much explanatory power the public choice 
school's root premise may possess as a general matter, because it relies on direct evi­
dence from empirical investigators who have studied constituent service in particular. 
Their work confirms what common sense would suggest that the electoral motive is a 
significant factor but not the whole story. 
80. To make a confident statement about even one case, one would have to resort 
to circumstantial evidence, or else decide how seriously to take the assurances of people 
who are in the business of putting the best face on things. Even if an individual were to 
be judged sincere, one would have to allow for the possibility of self-deception and ra­
tionalization. Then one would have to consider the fact that individuals can have differ-
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ent purposes it is enough to posit that, in general, reelection is at least a 
significant motivating factor behind members' casework activity. 
The evidence for that relatively cautious proposition is quite 
strong, even putting aside the admissions of members themselves. The 
electoral incentive seems to be the best explanation of why some mem­
bers go out of their way to solicit cases, thus multiplying the number of 
constituents whom they can serve and who will be in a position to re­
member their protectors' efforts on election day.81 Moreover, several 
studies have found that congressional representatives from vulnerable 
districts do more constituent service than those from safe districts. The 
obvious explanation is that these members feel they need more protec­
tion against defeat and believe that casework will provide that 
protection. 82 
The electoral incentive to engage in constituent service is highly 
relevant to the concerns of this article, because it suggests that mem­
bers' favorable evaluations of the practice may be a rationalization, or 
at least colored by self-interest. Legislators who believe they profit 
from casework may overlook, or be too quick to dismiss, some of the 
costs that casework imposes on our political system, and - more to the 
point - some of the ethical hazards it poses. In fact, the electoral in­
centive increases the resemblance between the ethical pitfalls of the 
casework system and the traditional subjects of legislative ethics regula­
tion, which, as we have seen, generally implicate claims that a member 
has elevated self-interest over the public interest.83 Thus, disinterested 
observers should be prepared to look skeptically at members' own per-
ceptions about the proper limits of casework. 
· 
On the other hand, political motives are not evil in themselves. 
They are indispensable to democratic government, because the very no­
tion of congressional accountability assumes that legislators must take 
actions that they believe will engender political support.84 In the end, 
therefore, the question of the extent to which ethical rules should ac­
commodate an institution such as constituent service should turn prima-
ent motives at different times and that the motives of a few members may not be those 
of all 535. 
81. See CAIN ET AL., supra note 45, at 63-64; JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 39-
42. 
82. See CAIN ET AL., supra note 45, at 95-96; FIORINA, supra note 77, at 89-90; 
JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 45-47. On the other hand, the fact that all offices, includ­
ing those of members with safe seats, do some casework suggests that politics is not the 
only consideration. 
83. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text 
84. See ETIIlCS OF LEGISLATIVE LIFE, supra note 17, at 35; THOMPSON, supra 
note 28, at 30, 66-67, 109. 
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rily on the value of that institution to society. not on the political mo­
tives that may underlie it.ss If casework is worthwhile on its own terms, 
the expectation of political gain is not, by itself, a reason to condemn 
the practice - any more than the existence of popular support for a bill 
is a reason for criticizing a legislator who votes for the measure.s6 If a 
case against constituent service is to be made, it must rest on a showing 
that casework has harmful consequences for society. not on the mere 
fact that a member's pursuit of political interests could conflict with 
those of the public. 
2. Casework as an Unhealthy Political Influence 
The linchpin of the rational-choice scholars' argument that constit­
uent service is detrimental to the body politic is that legislators not only 
intend to use casework as a reelection tool, but also are successful in 
using it for that purpose. In the 1989 edition of his book Congress: 
Keystone of the Washington Establishment, Fiorina suggested that an in­
cumbent's track record as an effective provider of constituent service 
can improve the member's electoral support by five or more percentage 
points.87 That much payoff would go far toward turning a marginal con­
gressional district into a safe one.ss Fiorina argued that, insofar as 
casework renders members less vulnerable to electoral defeat, it damp­
ens the political responsiveness of Congress as a whole because na­
tional trends in public opinion about policy issues are less likely to be 
reflected in turnover of legislative seats. s9 
85. Although the discussion at this point considers only whether casework in gen­
eral should be condemned because of the motives that normally lie behind it, one 
should also keep in mind the desirability of constructing rules that do not require proof 
of motives in particular cases. Issues regarding an actor's state of mind, which usually 
must be established through circumstantial evidence, are an uncomfortable basis for eth­
ics regulation in any context, and even more so in a political arena in which the adjudi­
cators have their own partisan reasons to want to exonerate or condemn the accused. 
86. Conversely, of course, the fact that a member "means no harm" is not an ade­
quate excuse for acts that do more to subvert than to nourish the democratic process. 
See THOMPSON, supra note 28, at 23-24 (arguing that an ethical standard that identifies 
corruption on the basis of objective circumstances, without undue attention to motives, 
is essential to democratic accountability). 
87. See FIORINA, supra note 77, at 87, 99. 
88. See id. at 50-51,  98-99. 
89. See id. at 93-94. Fiorina acknowledges that members are highly attuned to cur­
rents in public opinion and constantly in search of ways to adapt to it. In that sense, 
they are highly responsive. See id. Nevertheless, he argues, individual members rarely 
alter their political philosophies drastically over time. Thus, only turnover in seats can 
effectively bring the views of the legislature into line with the views of the country. See 
id. at 14, 134-35. 
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Fiorina did not attempt to extrapolate this critique into a broad as­
sertion that constituent service does more harm than good, and any such 
use of his thesis would be open to question on several levels. First, and 
most conspicuously, recent political developments make his indictment 
of Congress less compelling than it once seemed. Writing in 1989, he 
directed his critique most pointedly at the House of Representatives, 
which at that time had remained under the control of the Democratic . 
Party for almost forty years, despite many ebbs and flows in political 
opinion during that interval.90 But, of course, in 1994 the Republican 
Party did win control of both the House and Senate ·_ and did so 
largely by highlighting national issues, thus overcoming the erstwhile 
truism that "all politics is local." Indeed, the image of the "permanent 
Congress," which was so rhetorically appealing only a few years ago, 
has lost much of its force now that half of all members of Congress 
have won their offices within the last three election cycles . .  
Even in the 1980s, when reelection rates seemed to lend so much 
more support to his argument, Fiorina took pains not to exaggerate the 
strength of the causal relationship he had identified. He freely acknowl­
edged that he could not rigorously demonstrate that casework actually 
does improve a legislator's chances of reelection.91 He also noted that 
his thesis did not apply very forcefully to senators, whose campaigns 
for reelection generally depend much more on incumbents' issues, ac­
complishments, and personal characteristics than on their records of fa­
vors for individual constituents.92 In addition, he cautioned against any 
90. See id. at 134-39. 
91. See id. at 94-95. Fiorina addresses this difficulty most comprehensively in his 
collaboration with Cain and Ferejohn. See CAIN ET AL., supra note '45, at 121-23. Re­
luctant to dispute the politicians' broad consensus that a connection between casework 
and electoral success does exist, see id. at 123, the authors point to reasons why such a 
connection is inherently difficult to investigate rigorously. One problem is that all con­
gressional offices engage in some casework; no one can test empirically what would 
happen to a member who did none. An additional complication is that members who 
feel electorally threatened tend to engage in casework more assiduously than those who 
believe themselves safer. See supra note 82 and accompanying text Thus, high levels of 
casework correlate poorly with electoral success because the most active offices are 
those of members who were unusually vulnerable from the outset See CAIN ET AL., 
supra note 45, at 123-34; FIORINA, supra note 77, at 95-97. According to the authors, 
reliable data does at least demonstrate that casework contributes to a favorable image of 
the member in the public's mind. See CAIN ET AL., supra note 45, at 148-53. They ar­
gue, not implausibly, that such an image is somewhat helpful on election day. But see 
JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 187-211 (questioning the asserted connection between 
casework and votes). 
92. See FIORINA, supra note 77, at 1 16. 
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assumption that casework is the only source of House incumbents' elec­
toral advantages.93 
This is not to say that the tendencies that Fiorina discerned are 
nonexistent. Indeed, he could argue that the newly dominant Republi­
cans are now in a position to exploit constituent service to perpetuate 
their own reign.94 However, changing political circumstances have 
tended to blunt the force of the normative premise underlying his cri­
tique: that the incumbent-protective effects of constituent service are ex­
cessive. As anyone who has paid attention to the ongoing national de­
bate over term limits can attest, the argument over the clfilmed need for 
increased turnover has two sides: Fiorina's side emphasizes the need for 
responsiveness and fresh ideas; the other side argues that the ability of 
incumbents to survive in office improves the legislature by virtue of 
their experience, institutional knowledge, and ability to develop rela­
tionships of mutual trust. That debate continues, but the waning for­
tunes of the term limits movement95 suggest that society is unlikely to 
turn its back on constituent service because of a desire to promote 
greater congressional turnover. 
In their book on constituent service, Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 
offer a more subtle, but perhaps more broadly acceptable, version of the 
political entrenchment argument. They claim that, because it strengthens 
a member's electoral base, casework contributes to the ability of legisla­
tors to be independent entrepreneurs who have weak ties to their party 
leaders and who, therefore, have little incentive to work together in the 
development of coherent national policy.96 "Once members can assure 
their return to office independently of the course of national events and 
national performance, the parties must rely on shared views and moral 
suasion - which are better than nothing, but not much to depend on 
when the chips are down."97 Similarly, the electoral support that 
casework generates makes members less likely to cooperate with the 
President, because their own survival depends less on his.98 Decentrali-
93. See id. at 99-101. Other contributing factors include the ability to ascertain and 
adapt to voters' issue stands and the superior access of incumbents to campaign financ­
ing. These factors not only strengthen the incumbent's own campaign, but also serve to 
ward off strong challengers. See id. 
94. See Eric Felton, The Siren Song of Constituent Service, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 
17, 1994, at A21 (warning against this possible development). 
95. Both the House and Senate have rejected term limits proposals during the cur­
rent Congress. See Vote Blocks Term-Limit Bill; Political Echoes May Linger, N.Y. 
TlMEs, Apr. 24, 1996, at A18; see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 
1842 (1995) (holding state limits on congressional terms unconstitutional). 
96. See CAIN ET AL., supra note 45, at 3, 13-14. 
97. Id. at 14. 
98. See id. at 16, 205-06. 
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zation makes it "more difficult to formulate decisive, coherent pol­
icy. "99 In short, the autonomy that legislators derive from cultivating a 
personal electoral base, independent of party, contributes to parochial­
ism and fragmentation in Congress.100 
Much in this appraisal has the ring of truth, but the extent to which 
constituent service must bear the blame for congressional fragmentation 
is debatable. Certainly, as Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina note, other forces 
contribute to the same result, including the simple fact that members 
represent territorially defined districts.101 In any case, the authors do not 
contend that the impact of casework on fragmentation in national poli­
cymaking justifies a condemnation of the constituent service system as 
a whole. They acknowledge that citizens have a legitimate need for an 
advocate in Washington, and that legislators must fill that role. In short, 
constituents make a variety of valid demands on the political system, 
ranging from personal and locally important needs to genuinely national 
ones, and "[i]n the end, some tension is inescapable."102 
3. Casework as a Flawed Grievance System 
Criticisms of constituent service on public administration grounds 
tend to fall into two categories. The first is that casework is a waste of 
time, distracting legislators from their "primary," or at least constitu­
tionally prescribed, task of lawmaking. In the words of Walter Mondale, 
who served twelve years as a senator before his term as Vice President, 
"There are only 100 of you in the Senate that can deal with (national) 
issues. There's thousands who can deal with Social Security."103 In con­
cept, this argument opens up interesting theoretical issues about the rel­
ative importance of various ways in which a legislator can serve a8 a 
"representative." In reality, however, the criticism seems ill-founded 
for a simple reason: casework is primarily a staff function, and most 
99. Id. at 21. 
100. See id. at 197-98; ETHICS OF LEGISLATIVE LIFE, supra note 17, at 44-45 
(casework and other forces have "made the legislative environment less supportive of 
legislative duties of institutional responsibility"). 
101. See CAIN ET AL., supra note 45, at 19, 209-10. 
102. Id. at 229. 
103. Karen Foerstel, Reform Panel Moves to Next Stage, RoLL CALL, July 5, 
1993, at 2; see, e.g., CLAPP, supra note 46, at 54-55; KRAvrrz. supra note 46, at 13-
15; Lied!, supra note 73, at 24; cf. Liebert, supra note 52, at 1758 (quoting Rep. Don 
Edwards's comment, in mild reproof of representatives' current priorities, that "going 
home [to tend the grass roots] is wonderful, but the work's here. We're getting paid to 
be here."). 
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members spend little time on it.104 The "waste of time" argument may 
have had more validity a generation ago than it has now. The amount of 
time that members spend on constituent service seems to have de­
creased in the past few decades, 105 even though caseloads themselves 
have increased sharply during the same time period. The expansion of 
staff resources devoted to casework has apparently allowed members to 
use their time more efficiently.106 
The second, more substantial criticism is that casework is a clumsy 
and haphazard approach to improving the administration of federal pro­
grams. One of the nation's foremost administrative law scholars, the 
late Walter Gellhorn, made a strong case for this position in his 1966 
book When Americans Complain.101 When a member of Congress ob­
tains a result that is satisfying from a particular constituent's perspec­
tive, Gellhorn argued, the member has not necessarily promoted the na­
tional interest. The legislator's intervention does not improve the overall 
delivery of services to the public and may well cause a delay in the 
processing of other, equally deserving citizens' cases.108 Moreover, to 
the extent that a congressional inquiry causes the agency to use its dis­
cretion to favor the citizen about whom the request was made, it under­
mines the evenhandedness of the particular agency's system.109 Instead 
of focusing on individual cases, Gellhorn maintained, legislators should 
104. See FIORINA, supra note 77, at 91 (conceding that he had previously erred in 
arguing that congressional offices' increased emphasis on casework is at the expense of 
legislative work); JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 156-59; supra note 58. But see Fred 
Barnes, The Unbearable Lightness of Being a Congressman, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 15, 
1988, at 18, 18 (describing how one idealistic "Reagan revolutionary" was trans­
formed, after his election to the House, into "a workaholic with little time for what he 
calls 'macro issues' and an obsession with the parochial interests of his district • • .  like 
nearly everyone else in the House"). 
105. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 149-50. 
106. To be sure, casework does take at least some of members' time - including 
the time they spend supervising their staff - and a minority of representatives do 
choose to spend significant amounts of time on constituent service. See supra note 58. 
Still, no one really kllows how much of the time currently spent on casework would 
otherwise be devoted to studying and resolving great questions of national policy, as 
opposed to being spent on other forms of advocacy of local district interests, see 
Barnes, supra note 104, or on self-promotional activities such as campaigning, fundrais­
ing, or "show-horse" position-taking. 
107. See GELi.HORN, supra note 46. 
108. See id. at 77-78; JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 71, 135-36 
(1983) (Social Security Administration); Abraham D. Sofaer, The Change-of-Status Ad­
judication: A Case Study of the Informal Adjudication Process, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 
383-84 (1972) (Immigration and Naturalization Service). 
109. See MASHAW, supra note 108, at 135-36; Sofaer, supra note 108, at 383-84. 
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concentrate on getting agencies to do their work right the firs� time, or 
to fix problems themselves when the need arises.U0 
Not surprisingly, the idea that casework is actually an impediment 
to effective administration finds favor with more than a few agency of­
ficials.1 1 1  What looks like "overcoming bureaucratic arrogance" from 
the standpoint of congressional caseworkers will, of course, often look 
like "legislative interference" from the agency's standpoint. 
Nonetheless, these are relatively isolated voices. Casework has in 
general been a popular and effective practice that serves with some fre­
quency to rectify genuine problems in administration. One can readily 
appreciate the logic of Gellhom's central insighLthat the casework sys­
tem is founded on advocacy; the objective of improving the overall sys­
tem is at best incidental to the more central objective of securing relief 
for the requester.112 In this sense, there might very well be more effi­
cient ways to upgrade deficient administrative operations. Congres­
sional constituent service is, however, surely better than nothing. Agen­
cies do make mistakes, after all, and the dilemma of the citizen who 
does not know where to tum for relief is .not a fictitious one. Indeed, 
Johannes reports that a majority of the agency officials he interviewed 
had a favorable view of the present system.113 It is unlikely that either 
Congress or the public would accept the abandonment of the extant 
casework system unless some other form of external grievance machin­
ery were made available to citizens.114 
To be sure, Gellhorn did not favor such an abandonment. On the 
contrary, he, like others who have argued in a similar vein, paired his 
critique with a suggestion that Congress should explore the possibility 
of instituting an ombudsman program that would substitute, at least in 
part, for the congressional role.115 Indeed, over the past thirty years a 
1 10. See GELLHORN. supra note 46, at 80-81, 124-25, 128. 
1 1 1. See also JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 94 (indicating that program adminis­
trators sometimes look upon casework inquiries as a headache). A more benign view, 
however, prevails in congressional relations offices in the larger agencies. See id. at 87-
89. 
1 12. See GELLHORN, supra note 46, at 216-17. 
1 13. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 89-92. 
1 14. This assumes that judicial review, standing alone, is not a sufficient check on 
administrative agencies. Congressional casework serves many citizens who do not have 
the nerve or the money to resort to the courts, or who have grievances that the judici­
ary, with its limited scope of review, will not rectify. See Klonoff, supra note 46, at 
718-19. In any event, even if one accepts the criticism that congressional intervention 
helps the fortunate few without improving administration for the many, one should also 
recall that judicial review has been criticized for doing exactly the same thing. See 
MAsHAW, supra note 108, at 138-39, 185-86. 
1 15. See, e.g., GELLHORN, supra note 46, at 128-30, 218-32; Wtlliam B. Gwyn, 
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' 
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few members of Congress themselves have offered a variety of propos­
als for an "office of constituent assistance" or another ombudsman-like 
entity that would be located in the legislative branch but detached from 
individual member offices.116 These proposals, however, have been al­
most entirely ignored. As already explained, members believe that the 
current system serves their political interests, a perception that may help 
to account for Congress's hesitation to try something new. Regardless of 
the reasons, however, no movement toward adoption of such a proposal 
can be discerned. 
The general lack of interest in ombudsman plans as an alternative 
to constituent service does not, of course, prove that the idea is not 
worth pursuing. Nevertheless, if the purpose of seeking reform is to 
minimize the possibility of incidents like the Keating episode, this is al­
most certainly not the right solution. All of the most visible proposals 
for a congressional assistance office have contemplated that the 
ombudsman would receive cases only by voluntary referral from a 
member's office.117 Members would remain entirely free to handle cases 
in the traditional way if they chose. Presumably, ethical lapses such as 
favoritism or the exercise of undue influence are most likely to occur in 
cases in which a member has decided, for whatever reason, to make an 
unusual display of clout. Almost by hypothesis, members would be un­
likely to view such cases as good candidates for referral to an 
ombudsman.118 Accordingly, although an ombudsman arrangement may 
58-59 (Stanley V. Anderson ed., 1966). For a defmition of the ombudsman concept, see 
supra note 49. 
1 16. See FREDERICK M. KAISER, A CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE OF CONSTITU­
ENT AsSISTANCE: PROPOSALS, RATIONALES, AND POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS (Cong. 
Res. Serv. No. 91-893 GOV, 1991); Klonoff, supra note 46, at 724-33. 
1 17. See GELLHORN, supra note 46, at 87 (describing proposal by Rep. Henry 
Reuss); KAISER, supra note 1 16, at 4-5 (describing plans proposed by Rep. Wayne 
Owens and Sens. Vance Hartke and Dennis DeConcini); Klonoff, supra note 46, at 723 
(Reuss plan), 725 (author's plan). The political logic behind this aspect of the plans is 
that members value their ability to claim credit for casework activities. See supra notes 
76-82 and accompanying text. Such credit-claiming contributes to their image as help­
ful, effective representatives, but could not occur if constituents were free to bring cases 
directly to the ombudsman. For this and other reasons, observers have agreed that an 
ombudsman system that would totally displace congressional offices' constituent service 
could never be enacted. See GELLHORN, supra note 46, at 93-94 (arguing that both po­
litical realities and caseload volume preclude transfer of all casework business to 
ombudsman); JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 214, 216); Klonoff, supra note 46, at 723-
24. 
1 18. The only visible congressional proponent of an ombudsman plan in recent 
years has been Senator DeConcini, one of the Keating Five respondents. He argued that 
the creation of a constituent assistance office would enable benignly motivated legisla· 
tors to refer politically sensitive inquiries to the ombudsman office and thereby avoid 
being accused of excessive partisanship or favoritism. See 137 CONG. REc. Sl2,205 
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well be worth a try for the sake of such public administration values as 
efficiency, coordination, and breadth of vision in routine cases, its util­
ity as a tool of ethics reform is much more questionable.119 
Proposals to replace congressional constituent service with a more 
neutral ombudsman would also face bona fide objections on the merits. 
Johannes reports that both congressional caseworkers and agency offi­
cials are deeply skeptical about the idea.120 Possible managerial 
problems aside, they doubt it would be very effective without the "per­
sonal touch," the sense of commitment to the constituent's cause that 
congressional offices bring to their work.121 Indeed, one suspects that 
the American temperament finds something distinctly more attractive 
about placing one's trust in an adversarial system than in what would 
inevitably be perceived as "another bureaucracy."122 Members of the 
public recognize the same political realities as Congress does - that 
legislators are more immediately responsible to them than an 
ombudsman could ever be. While the overall desirability of an 
ombudsman scheme cannot be analyzed in any depth here, the widely 
held perception that an ombudsman office would not succeed because it 
would lack the elected official's sense of advocacy deserves emphasis, 
because it highlights the close connection between casework and our 
culture's conceptions of a member's role as advocate. 
D. Interim Conclusions 
The discussion in this Part suggests why rules of ethics that would 
circumscribe the constituent service function have the potential to create 
a dilemma for the conscientious member of Congress. Casework is now 
a deeply entrenched element of congressional life. It responds to legiti­
mate interests of citizens who have grievances against an administrative 
agency and in many cases have no other readily available advocate to 
champion their interests. It functions fairly smoothly most of the time 
and improves agency accountability in many cases. 
Critics make valid points when they· call attention to the resource 
costs that casework imposes on both agencies and congressional offices, 
(daily ed. Aug. 2, 1991) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini). The premise of this argument ­
that members would pass along requests from people like Keating to an ombudsman -
seems questionable. At least the senator did not suggest that he himself would have 
availed himself of that option during the famous events of 1987, had it been available. 
1 19. See Glenn R. Simpson, Post-Keating-5 Report on Constituent Service Awaits 
Mitchell Action, ROLL CALL, Feb. 24, 1992, at 10 ("[f]he ethical benefits to Congress 
of an Office of Constituent Service might be minimal."). 
120. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 214. 
121. See id. at 214-15, 218. 
122. See DOUGLAS, supra note 63, at 87-88. 
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or when they note the ways in which casework can aggravate tenden­
cies toward opportunism, parochialism, and fragmentation. Yet none of 
these critiques appears to rise to the level of showing that casework is 
on balance detrimental to society's interests. Furthermore, the option of 
establishing an institutional alternative to casework, such as an 
ombudsman office, seems remote and perhaps not even a good idea. 
This appraisal of the constituent service system provides a back­
ground perspective with which we can evaluate contemporary pressures 
on Congress to reform itself in the wake of the Keating scandal. As a 
practical matter, external pressure to clean house is surely the main fac­
tor spurring current interest in ethics reform. Ethics reform is touted as 
a means by which Congress can combat cynicism and restore public 
confidence in the legislative branch. 
Public opinion,. however, is a two-edged sword. Studies have con­
sistently shown broad public support for congressional casework. In a 
1978 survey, an overwhelming majority of citizens considered casework 
important, and about eleven percent considered it a representative's 
most important function - a figure in the same ballpark as the nineteen 
percent who said the representative's lawmaking function was most im­
portant 123 To be sure, these fmdings predated the Keating scandal, but 
there is little evidence that the current high levels of disillusionment 
with Congress have significantly eroded this ·support for casework.124 
Talk show hosts continually deride Congress, but rarely if ever do they 
condemn its constituent service function. One hears various politicians 
pledge to oppose salary increases, decline PAC money, or serve no 
more than a few terms, but seldom does one hear a candidate for Con­
gress pledge not to go to bat against recalcitrant agencies in behalf of 
his constituents. 125 
123. See CAIN ET AL., supra note 45, at 38. 
124. Fulfilling a pledge in the "Contract with America," the House of Representa­
tives in the 104th Congress reduced the size of its committee staffs by a third; but re­
ductions in representatives' personal staffs, which handle most casework, were neither 
promised nor adopted. See Gabriel Kahn, House Votes Overwhelmingly to Slash Com­
mittee Budgets, Staff by One-Third, Rou. CALL, Mar. 16. 1995, available in LEXIS, 
Legis Library, Rollcl File. 
125. One who did was ex-Representative Michael Hufftngton, in his unsuccessful 
1994 race to unseat Senator Dianne Feinstein of California. A defense contractor, in ap­
plying for a waiver from the State Department that would allow it to sell equipment to 
Taiwan, had sought Huffington's assistance; when he refused to help, the contractor en­
listed Feinstein's aid and ultimately received the waiver. Hufftngton's campaign boasted 
of his principled stand against special interest government, pointing out that Feinstein 
had accepted a political contribution from the contractor at about the time of her inter­
vention. Press comment, however, praised Feinstein's efforts (which had preserved Cali­
fornia jobs), dismissing Huffington's stance as peculiar and contrary to the state's best 
interests. Editorialists remembered, but chose not to be swayed by, the experiences of 
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At most, one might describe the public as ambivalent about con­
stituent service in the wake of. the Keating scandal. Citizens may want 
"Congress" to be more restrained in pressuring administrative agencies, 
but at the same time they presumably want their own senators and rep­
resentatives to continue to be vigorous advocates for local interests.126 It 
is not clear whether a significant curtailment of the role of members as 
advocates would cause greater satisfaction or dissatisfaction among the 
electorate. Indeed, to articulate the dilemma in its starkest terms, the 
public has come to expect its representatives to provide generous 
casework services. Members believe, with good reason, that voters will 
retaliate if they do not run an effective constituent service operation.127 
Ethics reformers would likely argue that this discussion is beside 
the point, because their goal is not to revamp routine casework func­
tions but to curb the actions of legislators who display undue influence 
or favoritism on behalf of wealthy special interests.128 Even to define 
those evils, however, one needs to take account of the role that congres­
sional constituent advocacy plays in our system of goveriunent. This 
Part's analysis of the casework system as a whole has been designed to 
illuminate the nature of that role. Furthermore, any new restrictions that 
may be proposed should be evaluated not only in terms of the corrup­
tion they would suppress, but also- in terms of the legitimate activity 
that they would incidentally prevent. To the extent the reader accepts 
the proposition that the social benefits of constituent service outweigh 
its costs, the grounds for concern about possible overbreadth in any 
suggested reform measure will be augmented. 
This Part's elaboration of some of the potential complications at­
tending this branch of congressional ethics reforms is not intended to 
make the case for doing nothing. Indeed, even if the Keating scandal 
and the public clamor resulting from it had never occurred, there would 
have been good reasons for Congress to reappraise the ethics of constit­
uent service. Casework has burgeoned in recent years, and with ex­
panded activity comes a greater risk of misconduct. Moreover, in view 
of the political payoffs that members · expect to reap from aggressive 
California's recently retired senator, Alan Cranston. See, e.g., Gerry Braun, Huffingion's 
Hands-Off Stance Baffles Analysts, SAN DIEGO UNION-Tum., Aug. 1 1 ,  1994, at 8; 
John Jacobs, Huffington's Political "Purity," SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 22, 1994, at 
B6; Debra J. Saunders, The Clueless Philosopher-Candidate, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 21, 
1994, at A23. 
126. Political scientists have frequently pointed out that voters tend to have a far 
higher opinion of their own representative than of Congress as a whole. See, e.g., CAIN 
ET AL., supra note 45, at 198-203. 
127. See id. at 85-86, 21 1.  
128. See, e.g., Waldman, supra note 73, at 23. 
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and vigorous pursuit of casework activities, one has to wonder whether 
legislators are likely to give the ethical pitfalls in the process the atten­
tion they deserve. 
The real task is to identify principles that will address the tempta­
tions that create ethics problems in constituent service without any real 
impairment of members' legitimate functions as advocates. To that task 
we now tum. 
ill. IMPROPER CONTACTS AND UNDUE INFLUENCE 
Narrowly viewed, the Keating case dealt with the ethical problems 
that arise when a member of Congress intervenes in an administrative 
proceeding on behalf of a campaign contributor. Those problems will be 
considered in Part rv. This Part, however, will address an antecedent 
question: whether, and under what circumstances, congressional constit­
uent service can be improper because it acts as an "undue influence" 
on an agency, even in the absence of money as a complicating factor. 
This question was not a contentious issue during the Keating proceed­
ings, apparently because no one on the Senate Committee was prepared 
to argue that the five senators' behavior would have been improper if 
campaign contributions had not been involved.129 Nevertheless, undue 
influence problems - which have been controversial in other cases -
will be examined here in order to clarify the boundaries of accepted 
practice and set the stage for consideration of the issues of money influ­
ence that were central to the Keating scandal. 
The discussion looks initially to authorities that have directly ad­
dressed the undue influence issue in the context of legislative ethics. 
However, because ethics committees have rarely addressed this topic, 
the discussion will tum to judicial doctrine. Indeed, the subject of un­
due influence has generated an extensive case law, much of which is fa-
129. See KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 8-9, 15, 16. At the outset of the 
Committee's hearings, the Committee's special counsel, Robert Bennett, intimated that 
he might make an issue of overly aggressive conduct by the five senators in the case. 
See 1 Preliminary Inquiry into Allegations Regarding Senators Cranston, DeConcini, 
Glenn, McCain & Riegle, and Lincoln Savings & Loan: Hearings Before the Senate Se­
lect Comm. on Ethics, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 74-75 (Nov. 15, 1990) [hereinafter Keating 
Hearings; references herein to these hearings include specific dates, because each day's 
transcript is separately paginated]. Ultimately, however, he apparently abandoned this 
stance and concentrated his attack on the links between the senators' conduct and their 
receipt of campaign assistance from Keating. See, e.g., 6 id. at 192 (Jan. 15, 1991) (con­
ceding during closing argument that Senator Riegle's actions in setting up the April 2, 
1987, meeting were proper if not influenced by money). 
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miliar to administrative lawyers.130 These surveys of past cases will then 
provide a basis for analysis of possible new ethics rules. 
A. Ethics Enforcement Cases 
Undue influence is a relatively new subject on the agendas of the 
congressional ethics committees. As recently as a decade ago, there had 
never been a disciplinary case raising the issue, and even advisory gui­
dance was quite limited. 
For many years, the most authoritative pronouncement on point 
was Advisory Opinion No. 1 of the House Ethics Committee.131 Issued 
in 1970, the advisory opinion seemed largely devoted to setting forth a 
strong defense of congressional casework. The Committee added only a 
few qualifying admonitions; for present purposes, the most relevant of 
these was that "[d]irect or implied suggestion of either favoritism or re­
prisal in advance of, or subsequent to, action taken by the agency con­
tacted is unwarranted abuse of the representative role." 132 The House 
has subsequently published and periodically updated an ethics manual, 
which primarily summarizes existing legal limitations on casework, but 
also contains brief advice as to its proper exercise.133 
In addition, Congress has long had available the highly regarded 
and thoughtful writings of the late Senator Paul H. Douglas. The sena­
tor initially published his ideas in a report that he wrote in 1951 on be­
half of a special subcommittee looking into ethical problems of govern­
ment at large.134 He elaborated on the subject in lectures published 
130. The literature contains several helpful surveys of the case law, including 
MORTON ROSENBERG & JACK H. MAsKELL, CONGRESSIONAL INTERVENTION IN 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS: LEGAL AND ETIIlCAL CONSIDERATIONS (Cong. 
Res. Serv. No. 90-440A, 1990); Mark E. Solomons et al., Agency Diplomacy: Relations 
with Congress and the White House, and Ethics in the Administrative Process, 4 An­
MIN. LJ. AM.. U. 3, 27-38 (1990) (comments of David M. Klaus) [hereinafter Klaus]; 
Brett G. Kappel, Comment, Judicial Restrictions on Improper Congressional Influence 
in Administrative Decision-making: A Defense of the Pillsbury Doctrine, 6 JL. & POL. 
135 (1989). 
131. Advisory Opinion No. 1, House Comm. on Standards of Official Conduct, 
1 16 CONG. REc. 1077 (1970) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion No. 1]. 
132. The opinion also cautioned that "[t]he overall public interest . . •  is primary 
to any individual matter," and that "[a] Member's responsibility in this area is to all his 
constituents equally • . •  irrespective of political or other considerations." Id. at 1078. 
The former admonition is discussed briefly infra at notes 197, 208 and accompanying 
text; the latter is discussed in Part IV. 
133. HOUSE COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, 1020 CONG., 2o 
SESS., ETIIlCS MANuAL FOR MEMBERS, OFFICERS, AND EMPLOYEES OF THE U.S. 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 241-62 (1992) [hereinafter HOUSE ETIIlCS MANuAL]. 
134. SUBCOMMITfEE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR & PUB. WELFARE, 
820 CONG., lST SESS., PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF ETIIlCAL STANDARDS 
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under the title Ethics in Government the following year.135 Jn these writ­
ings he vigorously defended the practice of constituent service, but also 
commented on the ethical obligations that he thought should accompany 
the.practice, including trying to find out the merits of the case, avoiding 
financial conflicts of interest, and showing respect for agency officials. 
A numbei: of the senator's suggestions will be noted in the discussion 
that follows. For now it may simply be observed that these unofficial 
and highly personal reflections were, until the 1990s, the closest thing 
the Senate had to a code of ethics for constituent service. 
The undue influence issue came into much sharper
' 
focus in 1989, 
in conjunction with a complaint filed with the House Ethics Committee 
against then-Speaker Jim Wright. The special outside counsel appointed 
to investigate the case identified several assertions of "undue influ­
ence" as probable violations of House rules.136 He accused Wright of 
having gone beyond pennissible bounds in pressing officials of the Fed­
eral Home Loan Bank Board to be less aggressive in proceeding against 
Texans who were suspected of unsound practices in the management of 
savings and loan institutions. According to the special counsel, Wright 
had pestered bank regulators with numerous telephone calls and meet­
ings, demanded the ouster· of hard-line regulators, and induced the 
chairman of the Bank Board to appoint independent counsel to investi­
gate whether a particular respondent - a prominent fundraiser for the 
Democratic Party of Texas - had been mistreated. Most strikingly, per­
haps, Wright was accused of having placed a "hold" on a savings and 
loan bailout bill in order to pressure the Bank Board chairman to re­
place an official whom Wright considered "inflexible" in dealings with 
one of Wright's constituents. 
The Ethics Committee refused to proceed with the undue influence 
charges (although it did fmd reason to believe that Wright had violated 
several financial conflict of interest rules, and these fmdings led directly 
to Wright's resignation from the House). It gave the following brief 
explanation: 
. It is clear that under our constitutional form of government there is 
a constant tension between the legislative and executive branches regard­
ing the desires of legislators on the one hand and the actions of agencies 
IN' THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 28-30 (Comm. Print 1951) [hereinafter DOUGLAS 
REPoRT]. Although published for a subcommittee of five, the report is commonly asso­
ciated with Douglas, the subcommittee chair. 
135. See DOUGLAS, supra note 63, at 85-92. 
136. HOUSE COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, 101ST CONG., 
lST SESS., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL OUTSIDE COUNSEL IN THB MATTER OF 
SPEAKER JAMES C. WRIGHT, JR. 18-24 (1989). 
October 1996] Congressional Ethics 
on the other in carrying out their respective responsibilities. The assertion 
that the exercise· of undue influence can arise based upon a legislator's 
expressions of interest jeopardizes the ability of Members effectively to 
represent persons and organizations having concern with the activities of 
executive agencies. 
37 
Accordingly, while it may well be that Representative Wright was 
intemperate in his dealings with representatives of the Federal Home· 
Loan Banlc Board, the Committee is not persuaded that there is reason to 
believe that he exercised undue influence in dealing with that agency. In 
sum, such a finding cannot rest on pure inference or circumstance or, for 
that matter, on the technique and personality of the legislator, but, in­
stead, must be based on probative evidence that a reprisal or threat to 
agency officials was made.137 
' 
The states have made very few formal efforts to deal with the ethi­
cal dimension of legislators' "undue influence" on administration,138 
but one exception is In re Tuttle, an advisory opinion by the Maine Eth­
ics Commission.139 There, three state legislators had written to the 
Maine real estate commission, urging it to dismiss a pending license 
suspension proceeding against an individual. The Ethics Commission 
concluded that the letter had constituted an exercise of undue influence, 
particularly because the legislators, in seeking dismissal, had also com­
mitted themselves to seeking an expansion of the real estate. commis­
sion's statutory authority.140 The opinion found that the senator who had 
drafted the letter had been motivated "purely to assist a friend by hav­
ing a case against the friend dismissed," a motive tha� the Commission 
137. HOUSE COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, 101ST CONG .• 
l ST. SESS., STATEMENT IN THE MATTER OF REPRESENTATIVE JAMES C. WRIGHT, 
JR. 84 (1989). ' 
138. See Mark W. Lawrence, Comment, Legislative Ethics: Improper Influence by 
a Lawmaker on an Administrative Agency, 42 ME. L. REv. 423 (1990). The author of 
this exceptionally thorough and thoughtful Comment reports that he sent inquiries to 
legislative ethics authorities in all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and several ter­
ritories, municipalities, and Canadian provinces. Out of forty-five responses, the Maine 
Legislature and the U.S. House were the only entities that reported having dealt with 
the undue influence issue in any formal manner. See id. at 432 n.65. In 1993, however, 
the Kentucky legislature amended its ethical misconduct statute by adopting the second 
sentence of the following provision: "A legislator, by himself or through others, shall 
not use or attempt to use any means to influence a state agency in direct contravention 
of the public interest at large. Absent an express or implied threat of legislative reprisal, 
nothing in this subsection shall prevent a legislator from contacting a state agency on 
behalf of a person" KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6.744(1) (Michie Supp. 1994) (emphasis 
added). 
· 
139. In re Tuttle (Maine_ Commn. on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 
Oct. 14, 1988) (on file with author), summarized in Lawrence, supra note 138, at 443-
48. 
140. See In re Tuttle at 4. 
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considered inappropriate.141 The other two legislators were deemed to 
have exercised poor judgment by signing the letter without knowing the 
specifics of the case. 142 
The Ethics Commission referred the matter to the legislature for 
possible disciplinary action; however, neither the House nor the Senate 
took any further action.143 It is worth noting here that the commission 
members were apparently not legislators themselves.144 Just as in the 
Wright matter, one observes in Tuttle a revealing disparity in perception 
between those who serve in the legislature and those who do not: "out­
siders" see an abuse where "insiders" see none. That saine pattern rep­
licated itself in the Keating case: although outsiders have viewed the 
case as an example of improper pressure tactics even apart from the 
senators' financial ties to Keating, 145 the Senate Ethics Committee, as 
noted above, 146 firmly rejected that view. In fact, to this day neither the 
Committee nor the full Senate has adopted any limits on the manner in 
which senators may intervene in administrative proceedings, 147 although 
the Committee has "encouraged" senators to "use House Advisory 
Opinion No. 1 as a source of guidance.''148 
B. Judicial Case Law 
One line of analysis that could help to bridge the gap between 
"outsider" and "insider" perceptions is to examine how the legal sys­
tem has responded to allegations of undue influence in legislative inter­
vention in agency proceedings. The courts have never had occasion to 
weigh the merits of the casework system as a whole, as might be neces­
sary if a serious separation of powers challenge to the system were 
mounted.149 They have, however, dealt tangentially with aspects of con-
141. In re Tuttle at 6. 
142. See In re Tuttle at 5. 
143. See Lawrence, supra note 138, at 445-46. One reason may have been that the 
senator who wrote the letter was defeated for reelection soon after the commission deci­
sion. Id. 
144. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit l ,  § 1002(2) (West 1989). 
145. See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 73, at A21; Waldman, supra note 73, at 22. 
146. See supra note 129 and accompanying text 
147. See infra section IY.C. (discussing the Senate's new Rule XLilI). 
148. See KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 11 .  
149. A full-scale attack on congressional constituent service on separation of pow­
ers grounds would probably not succeed. The most likely basis for a challenge would be 
the premise that, under our constitutional system, the executive branch alone should im­
plement the laws and the legislative branch should do nothing but write them. This 
highly formal model of the constitutional allocation of powers would find a degree of 
support in modem cases in which the Court has struck down what it regarded as con­
gressional efforts to exceed a lawmaking role. See Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. 
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stituent service in the course of reviewing agency actions that stem 
from the proceedings in which the interventions occurred. Much of this 
case law deals with congressional contacts that might more naturally be 
described as "legislative oversight" than as "constituent service." As 
the following analysis will show, however, those two components of 
legislative life are closely intertwined and can be considered together 
for purposes of discussion. 
1.  Formal Proceedings 
The state of the law is most easily described in the context of so­
called "formal" administrative proceedings - those decided on the ba­
sis of trial-type, "on-the-record" hearings. In this setting, discussion of 
congressional intervention has long been dominated by Pillsbury Co. v. 
FTC,150 decided by the Fifth Circuit in 1966. The case is so well known 
that the entire case law on undue influence is often known as the Pills­
bury doctrine. 
Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991); Bowsher v. 
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); see also Kappel, 
supra note 130, at 147 (asserting that Congress may not use informal oversight mecha­
nisms to circumvent Chadha). 
On closer inspection, however, all of these cases dealt with actual or threatened 
congressional attempts to override executive actions through nonstatutocy controls that 
purported to have the force of law, or at least were deemed equivalent to de facto con­
trol. Thoughtful analysts have recognized that the formalist model of separation of pow­
ers cannot plausibly be extended to condemn all informal congressional "influences" 
on the execution of the laws. See Susan Low Bloch, Orphaned Rules in the Administra­
tive State: The Fairness Doctrine and Other Orphaned Progeny of Interactive Deregu­
lation, 16 GEO. LJ. 59, 1 18-22 (1987); H. Lee Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at 
Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CAL L. REv. 983, 1061-63 (1975). Their 
work need not be duplicated here, but one could add that the Justices have taken note of 
casework on several occasions without intimating that these activities are all unconstitu­
tional. See, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972); Brewster, 408 
U.S. at 557 (White, J., dissenting); Johnson v. Avecy, 393 U.S. 483, 491 (1969) 
(Douglas, J., concurring). 
Alternatively, one could imagine a more subtle challenge to constituent service, 
predicated on the so-called "functional" approach to separation of powers analysis, 
which requires a highly contextual judgment about whether a given practice unduly 
strengthens or weakens one of the branches of government. See Nixon v. Administrator 
of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (using functional analysis). In this vein one 
could argue that casework - at least in some manifestations - upsets the checks and 
balances system by intruding too far on the executive branch's ability to execute the 
law. Defenders of constituent service, however, would likely reply that such interven­
tion promotes checks and balances by curbing overreaching by the executive branch. 
The clash between these two views replicates the policy debate over the merits of 
casework; just what insight would be gained by conducting that debate in constitutional 
terms is not apparent. 
150. 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966). 
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The case began in 1953, when the FI'C rendered an interlocutory 
decision in a merger case brought against the Pillsbury Company, en­
dorsing a "rule of reason" approach to mergers under the Clayton Act. 
Soon afterwards, the chairman of the FI'C attended an oversight hearing 
at which senators took him to task for the FI'C's failure to adopt a rule 
of "per se" illegality instead. The senators repeatedly criticized the 
Pillsbury ruling by name during the hearing. Five years later, after trial 
on the merits, the Pillsbury case again reached the Commission, which 
ordered divestiture. The chairman who had been questioned during the 
oversight hearing had long since left the Commission, but other com­
missioners who had attended the hearing joined in the order. 
The court set the order aside, asserting that the oversight hearing 
had tainted the agency as a whole. The panel acknowledged that Con­
gress may properly use oversight hearings to examine agency members 
on the positions they adopt pursuant to their "quasi-legislative" func­
tion, such as in policy statements or interpretative rules. ISi However, the 
court continued: 
when such an investigation focuses directly and substantially upon the 
mental decisional processes of a Commission in a case which is pending 
before it, Congress is no longer intervening in the agency's legislative 
function, but rather, in its judicial function. At this latter point, we be­
come concerned with the right of private litigants to a fair trial and, 
equally important, with their right to the appearance of impartiality, 
which cannot be maintained unless those who exercise the judicial func­
tion are free from powerful external influences.152 
Strikingly, the court seemed little interested in whether the interro­
gation had actually caused the Commission to reach a conclusion it 
would not otherwise have reached; indeed, the circumstances strongly 
suggested that there had been no such influence.153 As far as the court 
was concerned, such an inquiry was apparently irrelevant; the main 
concern was to preserve the integrity of the Commission's processes 
when it acted in a "judicial" capacity. 
151. See 354 F.2d at 963-64. 
152. 354 F.2d at 964. 
153. In particular, (1) five years elapsed between the oversight hearing and the 
challenged decision; (2) the chainnan had already disqualified himself, and the commis­
sioners who joined in the final agency order (and whose "appearance of impartiality" 
was in question) had not spoken or been questioned at the oversight hearing; (3) the 
FI'C had already spoken on the antitrust issue that the senators raised, and this issue 
was not even in controversy in the FI'C decision after remand; and, most important, (4) 
the FI'C did not adopt the senators' view at all, but instead adhered to the same position 
on the "per se" issue as it had taken originally. See 354 F.2d at 955-56; Pillsbury Mills, 
Inc., 57 F.T.C. 1274, 1390 n. 70, 1399 n. 71 (1960) (decision below). 
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In a sense, the Pillsbury holding has been subsumed within a 
broader statutory prohibition of ex parte contacts in formal agency pro­
ceedings. In 1976, as part of the Government in the Sunshine Act, Con­
gress added a new section 557(d) to the Administrative Procedure Act. 
According to this provision, "interested persons" outside an agency 
may not make any ex parte communication "relevant to the merits" of 
a formally adjudicated case to any agency official who will be involved 
in deciding the case.154 The term "interested person" was specifically 
intended to include members of Congress, according to the legislative 
history.155 Whether the Sunshine Act would apply directly to the facts of 
Pillsbury is debatable, because the Act defines "ex parte communica­
tions" to mean contacts that are "not on the public record" - a phrase 
that might not apply to an oversight hearing, which would not routinely 
be memorialized in the record of the agency proceeding, but which cer­
tainly occurs in public. At a minimum, however, section 557(d) reaf­
firms Pillsbury's fundamental premise that formal proceedings deserve 
a high degree of procedural regularity. Since the formal adjudicative 
process is often used to resolve accusations of wrongdoing and other 
highly particularized allegations about individuals, much can be said for 
congressional caution in this area. 
Yet, even in the realm of formal adjudication, the legal system has 
shown more flexibility than one might have expected from the Pillsbury 
opinion. Under section 557(d), prohibited ex parte contacts do not lead 
automatically to invalidation of an agency order; the court is expected 
to decide the scope of relief "to the extent consistent with the interests 
of justice and the policy of the underlying statutes." 156 Pursuant to this 
directive, courts have sometimes found congressional intervention in 
formal adjudication to be too marginal or inconsequential to justify set-
154. 5 u.s.c. § 557(d) (1994). 
155. "While the prohibitions on ex parte communications relative to the merits ap­
ply to communications from Members of Congress, they are not intended to prohibit 
routine inquiries or referrals of constituent correspondence." HR REP. No. 880, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 ,  at 21-22 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2203; see 
also Portland Audubon Socy. v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1544-46 
(9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the President was an interested person). The latter half of 
the quoted statement reflects the fact that § 557(d) applies only to communications "rel­
ative to the merits," and perhaps also the fact that the Act defines "ex parte communi­
cations" to exclude "requests for status reports." 5 U.S.C. § 551(14) (1994). 
156. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(l)(D) (1994); see Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org. 
v. FLRA, 672 F.2d 109, 1 12-13 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (holding that ex parte 
contact by private citizen violated § 557(d), but did not warrant immediate reversal be­
cause it did not prejudice the petitioner and had no apparent effect). 
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ting the agency action aside.157 Some such cases can be seen as adopt­
ing a sort of harmless error analysis: the congressional contact was im­
proper, although it did not warrant judicial intervention.158 Even that 
posture is a considerable departure from Pillsbury.159 Other cases, how­
ever, go further: they stress the importance of congressional oversight 
and treat it as another factor that justifies judicial flexibility.160 
More particularly, it has come to be understood that many agencies 
do some of their most important policymaking through the adjudicative 
process, and Congress needs some latitude to carry on oversight of this 
policymaking. A pragmatic principle of etiquette has emerged in the 
context of oversight hearings: Members who wish to question the legal 
positions that agency officials take during adjudication should if possi­
ble avoid referring to the individual cases by name; and in any event 
they should not discuss the facts of the cases, but only the legal princi­
ples announced there.161 A recent case illustrates the practice. In 
Monieson v. CFTC, 162 the Commodities Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) revoked a commodities broker's registration and ordered him to 
pay a $500,000 fine; thus, the proceedings had an accusatory flavor that 
157. See ATX, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Transp., 41 F.3d 1522, 1528-30 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994) (upholding DOT's denial of certification to airline despite heavy congres­
sional pressure, including letters from 125 senators and representatives; the court noted 
that agency decisionmakers had distanced themselves from the congressional contacts 
and had written a decision that the record strongly supported); Power Auth. v. FERC, 
743 F.2d 93, 109-10 (2d Cir. 1984) (ruling that ex parte contact did not pose "a serious 
likelihood of affecting the agency's ability to act fairly and impartially," because it con­
tained no new facts and opposing parties were able to rebut it); Gulf Oil Corp. v. FPC, 
563 F.2d 588, 611-12 (3d Cir. 1977) (relying on, inter alia, the facts that only a few rep­
resentatives commented, that the FPC did not alter its views as the representatives had 
urged, and that the issue was purely legal and thus subject to plenary judicial review}, 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062, and cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 91 1 (1978); cf. Paragon 
Cable Television Inc. v. FCC, 822 F.2d 152, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (finding 
that ex parte letters from senators and others, submitted before adjudication began, were 
harmless because they were promptly disclosed to petitioners). 
158. See Power Auth., 743 F.2d at 110 (criticizing letter and public statements in 
which four House members urged FERC to consider deleterious economic conse­
quences of reallocation of electric power). But see Municipal Blee. Utils. Assn. v. 
Conable, 577 F. Supp. 158, 164 (D.D.C. 1983) (opining that the same letter was 
"within permissible bounds of legislators who validly sought to represent the views of 
their constituents"). 
159. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
160. See Gulf Oil, 563 F.2d at 610, 612 (giving weight to "the importance and 
need for Congressional oversight"). 
161. See Peter L. Strauss, Disqualification of Decisional Officials in Rulemaking, 
80 COLUM. L. REv. 990, 1026-27 (1980). As a practical matter, staff members for the 
executive and congressional participants in the hearing can usually reach agreement in 
advance on the bounds of legitimate inquiry, because the two sides share a common in­
terest in avoiding sabotage of the underlying legal proceedings. 
162. 996 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1993). 
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warranted the utmost in procedural regularity. Nevertheless, the court 
brushed aside the petitioner's complaint that the senator who chaired 
the committee overseeing the CFfC had written to the agency expres­
sing concern about its enforcement policy. The court noted that the sen­
ator did not "take an interest in this case above all others," nor did he 
"lean on the CFfC to decide this case in a particular way." He only 
asked the chair "to respond to some general questions." Thus, his letter 
was "legitimate oversight, not overreaching."163 
For members of Congress to proceed by indirection in this fashion 
may seem a superficial solution to the due process problems presented 
by legislative oversight; but if one accepts the legitimacy of oversight 
itself, etiquette may well be considered the right level on which to 
"solve" this problem. Moreover, the principle is not entirely artificial: 
members who avoid direct references to pending cases are likely to 
avoid addressing themselves to disputes of adjudicative fact, as to 
which their prerogative to offer political guidanc� is much more 
questionable. 
In sum, neither the fame of Pillsbury nor the adoption of section 
557(d) has prevented the courts from seeking pragmatic ways to recon­
cile the principle of due process with Congress's interest in supervising 
administrative decisionmaking, even in the fairly strict domain of for­
mal adjudication. This accommodation, however, is overshadowed by 
the much greater degree of flexibility usually found in "informal" ad-
ministrative proceedings, to which this analysis now turns. 
· 
2. Informal Proceedings 
As has been mentioned, Pillsbury arose in the context of the Ad­
ministrative Procedure Act's framework for formal adjudication. For the 
most part, courts have confined its holding to that context. The key de­
cision explaining the basis for this limitation is D.C. Federation of 
Civic Assns. v. Volpe.164 
D.C. Federation involved a House subcommittee chairman who 
threatened to withhold funding for construction of the Washington, 
D.C., subway system until the Secretary of Transportation approved a 
bridge connecting Virginia with the District of Columbia. After the Sec­
retary granted the requested approval, citizens' groups petitioned for re­
view in the District of Columbia Circuit. The court remanded for rea­
sons unrelated to the present discussion, but it also addressed the issue 
of the congressman's threat. Judge Bazelon, writing for the court, rec-
163. 996 F.2d at 865. 
164. 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
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ognized that according to Pillsbury the mere appearance of bias or pres­
sure could be fatal to certain administrative decisions. The Pillsbury 
reasoning did not come into play in this case, however, because the 
Secretary's approval of the bridge "was not judicial or quasi­
judicial. " 165 By this the court meant that the Secretary "was not re­
quired to base it solely on a formal record established at a public hear­
ing." 166 The APA uses virtually the same criterion in delimiting the 
realm of formal adjudication.167 
Nevertheless, the court continued, the inapplicability of Pillsbury 
did not detract from the elementary proposition that an agency must 
not, in acceding to congressional pressure, decide a case on the basis of 
" 'considerations that Congress could not have intended to make rele­
vant.' " 168 In the court's view, the chairman's stance was not a factor 
that the agency could permissibly consider under the legislation in­
volved there; thus, the court admonished the Secretary that on remand 
he must reevaluate the bridge proposal without reference to congres­
sional pressure.169 
D.C. Federation has become the dominant judicial authority on 
congressional intervention into informal agency proceedings. Subse­
quent cases have adhered almost uniformly to Judge Bazelon's refusal 
to give an expansive scope to the Pillsbury position that congressional 
pressure in agency adjudication violates due process in and of itself. 
While the contours of the Due Process Clause may not depend directly 
on the APNs definition of formal proceedings, adjudications have not 
been considered "judicial" within the meaning of Pillsbury unless they 
involve highly structured, adversary litigation.170 Only a small fraction 
of administrative actions can be deemed "judicial" under this approach. 
165. 459 F.2d at 1246. 
166. 459 F.2d at 1247. 
167. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1994). Some have read the court's language as mean­
ing that the Pillsbury rule does apply to all proceedings that are "judicial or quasi­
judicial" in the sense of being adjudication as opposed to rulemaking. See, e.g., KEAT­
ING REPORT, supra note 4, at 9; THOMPSON, supra note 28, at 89. This is an untenable 
reading of the D.C. Circuit's opinion, because the agency action reviewed in D.C. Fed­
eration itself was adjudication, not rulemaking. 
168. 459 F.2d at 1247 (quoting United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 108 
F.2d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 1950)). 
169. Judge Bazelon was the only member of the panel who concluded that the 
Secretary had in fact been influenced by congressional pressure during the prior pro­
ceedings. The swing voter on the panel, Judge Fahy, expressed no opinion on that point, 
although he joined in the court's opinion insofar as it held that the Secretary would be 
required to eschew any such reliance during the remand proceedings to come. See 459 
F.2d at 1246. 
170. See DCP Fanns v. Yeutter, 957 F.2d 1 183, 1 187 (5th Cir. 1992); cf. Koniag, 
Inc., v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 601, 609, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (applying Pillsbury to adjudi-
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For all other agency proceedings, the critical questions have become, as 
in D.C. Federation, whether the legislative contact actually -influenced 
the decision, and, if so, whether the administrator's reliance on that 
contact was incompatible with the decisional criteria specified in the 
underlying statute. m 
The evidentiary burden of showing that congressional intervention 
had an actual impact on the agency decision has proved formidable. 
Usually courts are disinclined to find that a congressional contact has 
had such influence.172 In fact, with one arguable exception, 173 no appel­
late decision has sustained such a contention in the twenty years since 
D.C. Federation was decided. This evidentiary hurdle has been criti­
cized as having made it too difficult for litigants to challenge agency 
decisions by alleging congressional interference.174 To be sure, part of 
the basis for
. 
this burden of proof is the courts' tradition of presuming 
the regularity of administrative action.175 More fundamentally, however, 
the criticism reflects a misunderstanding of the underlying legal stan­
dard. D.C. Federation's actual impact test reflects a view that, except in 
cases that are "judicial" within the meaning of Pillsbury, the evil to be 
addressed is not congressional intervention as such, but rather a break­
down of the rule of law if the agency relies on it to reach an unautho­
rized result.176 
cation that was technically not covered by APA but did involve adversary litigation 
before an administrative law judge). 
171. See, e.g., Chemung County v. Dole, 804 F.2d 216, 222 (2d Cir. 1986) (hold­
ing that the test is whether political pressure was intended to and did influence agency 
to act for irrelevant reasons). 
172. See Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engrs., 714 F.2d 163, 170 
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (finding no proof that ex parte contacts by senator caine to the atten­
tion of the actual administrative decisionmaker); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 
409 n.539 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (concluding that single newspaper report of senator's hint 
that concessions in EPA rulemaking could bolster his support for administration's other 
policies was not substantial evidence of impropriety); American Pub. Gas Assn. v. FPC, 
567 F.2d 1016, 1068-70 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding no d4'ect evidence that hostile interro­
gation of agency chairman affected agency's decision, particularly since the Commis­
sion adhered to the specific proposition that the representatives had challenged). 
173. See Koniag, 580 F.2d at 610-1 1 (stating, in the context of rejecting plaintiff's 
request to disqualify Secretary of Interior from rendering a decision on remand, that a 
congressman's letter to the Secretary had compromised the appearance of impartiality); 
see also SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 1 18, 130 (3d Cir. 1981) (en 
bane) (remanding on the question of whether an SEC investigation had been prompted 
by legitimate concerns and not merely by a senator's pressure). 
174. See Kappel, supra note 130, at 154. 
175. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420-21 
(1971). 
176. See Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 714 F.2d at 169-70 (Bazelon, J.). But cf. Tex.as 
Medical Assn. v. Mathews, 408 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tex. 1976). Mathews contains many 
broad statements indicating that agency reliance on congressional pressure is improper 
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At least part of the reason why D.C. Federation has been followed 
so consistently is that some courts appear to entertain a distinctly sym­
pathetic attitude toward congressional participation in the administrative 
process. This support has been particularly evident in the context of 
agency rulemaking. In Sierra Club v. Costle, 177 environmental groups 
complained that Senator Robert Byrd had "strongly" expressed certain 
concerns to the Environmental Protection Agency during its develop­
ment of regulations that would profoundly affect the coal mining indus­
try. The court responded with a ringing endorsement of congressional 
participation in the rulemaking process: 
· 
Americans rightly expect their elected representatives to voice their 
grievances and preferences concerning the administration of our laws. 
We believe it entirely proper for Congressional representatives vigorously 
to represent the interests of their constituents before administrative agen­
cies engaged in informal, general policy rulemaking, so long as individ­
ual Congressmen do not frustrate the intent of Congress as a whole as 
expressed in statute, nor undermine applicable rules of procedure. Where 
Congressmen keep their comments focused on the substance of the pro­
posed rule - and we have no substantial evidence to cause us to believe 
Senator Byrd did not do so here - administrative agencies are expected 
to balance Congressional pressure with the pressures emanating from all 
other sources. To hold otherwise would deprive the agencies of legiti­
mate sources of information and call into question the validity of nearly 
every controversial rulemaking.11s 
To be sure, intervention by members of Congress in rulemaking 
does not fall within the narrowest definition of "casework." Neverthe­
less, such intervention can certainly have constituent service implica­
tions. The rulemaking proceeding in Sierra Club itself is illustrative. 
Although it was concerned with a general policy issue, not an individ­
ual constituent's situation, the D.C. Circuit did recognize in the above­
quoted language that the senator was promoting his home state's inter­
ests. In any event, judicial expressions of support for legislators' roles 
as representatives of district interests may be found in both rulemaking 
regardless of whether the legislator's view of the statute is sustainable. See 408 F. Supp. 
at 306-07, 310, 313. Those statements rest on a misreading of D.C. Federation. The 
holding of the case, however, was completely consistent with D.C. Federation: the 
court vacated professional standards review regulations because it found that a senator's 
pressure on HEW officials to alter the regulations had a major impact on their ultimate 
contents and was predicated on an erroneous interpretation of legislative intent. See 408 
F. Supp. at 313-14. 
177. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
178. 657 F.2d at 409-10 (footnote omitted). See also Environmental Defense Fund 
v. Blum, 458 F. Supp. 650, 653 (D.D.C. 1978); United States ex rel. Parco v. Morris, 
426 F. Supp. 976 (E.D. Pa. 1977). 
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and adjudication contexts.179 For example, a senator's effort to induce 
the Commerce Department to approve a commercial development grant 
for his home state would by no means implicate rulemaking, but this 
situation led one court to remark: "There is . . .  nothing improper in an 
elected federal official attempting to secure for his constituents a feder­
ally funded project for the area that he represents. Indeed, this is one 
reason why we send Representatives and Senators to the United States 
Congress." 180 
It would be an exaggeration to say that these sentiments are uni­
versally shared within the judiciary. One can find an occasional decision 
in which, although a plaintiff's challenge may be rejected for failure to 
meet the D.C. Federation standard, the court opines that congressional 
intervention was unseemly if not inappropriate.181 Nevertheless, it seems 
fairly well settled that, in informal proceedings, courts will tolerate or 
even endorse congressional contacts, so long as these contacts do not 
undermine the agency's adherence to the substantive law. 
179. See Blum, 458 F. Supp. at 662-63 (noting that representatives who "vigor­
ously" supported their state's request for regulation allowing use of pesticide "largely 
came from areas where the . . .  problem is severe and properly brought to the agency's 
attention the concerns of their respective constituencies"); accord Municipal Blee. Utils. 
Assn. v. Conable, 577 F. Supp. 158, 164 (D.D.C. 1983), quoted at supra note 158. 
Some of the literature takes a much more tolerant view toward congressional interven­
tion in rulemaking, in which an agency acts in its "legislative" capacity, than toward 
intervention in adjudication, in which the agency's role is said to be "judicial." See, 
e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 28, at 98-99. Pillsbury itself rested heavily on this distinc­
tion. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text The distinction has some force, in­
asmuch as a member of Congress can claim to speak with greater authority on issues of 
law and policy, the typical subjects of rulemaking, than on the facts of individual cases. 
Yet the importance of the distinction should not be exaggerated. See ROSENBERG & 
MASKELL. supra note 130, at 35-36. Administrative adjudications frequently implicate 
unsettled legal and policy issues that are seriously disputed and may even be the domi­
nant controversy in the case. Moreover, many of those issues are unlikely ever to be­
come the subjects of rulemaking proceedings. These realities help to account for the 
courts' unwillingness to bar members of Congress from intervention in all adjudicative 
cases. See supra notes 164-71 and accompanying text 
180. National Ctr. for Preservation Law v. Landrieu, 496 F. Supp. 716, 745 
(D.S.C.), affd. per curiam, 635 F.2d 324 (4th Cir. 1980). 
181. See American Pub. Gas Assn. v. FPC, 567 F.2d 1016, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
This 1977 case was decided during the heyday of judicial efforts to bring rulemaking 
proceedings into greater conformity with the procedural expectations traditionally asso­
ciated with formal adjudication. Since Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National 
Resource Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), the trend has run strongly in the oppo­
site direction. 
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The public scrutiny being directed at constituent service in the 
wake of the Keating scandal gives impetus to the question of whether 
the Houses of Congress should take new steps to discourage their mem­
bers' "undue influence" on administrative proceedings. The subject 
does not, however, lend itself to many easy answers. One must take se­
riously the House Ethics Committee's suggestion in the Wright case that 
the very concept of undue influence is in constant tension with the af­
firmative duty of a member to vigorously represent his or her constitu­
ents' interests. It would be incongruous to acknowledge that duty and 
then complain merely because a legislator fulfilled it effectively. The 
consequence of imposing an overly strict standard could be to deter 
members from effective performance of their representative roles. 
It does not follow, however, that legislators' advocacy must go 
completely unregulated. The legal profession exhorts attorneys to advo­
cate their clients' interests zealously within the limits of the law, yet 
also manages to circumscribe that duty with various ethical obligations. 
So, too, there may well be ways to identify excesses in congressional 
constituent service without impairing the core of the activity. At least, 
the idea that further reforms in this area might be helpful should not be 
dismissed without scrutiny of some of the specific proposals that have 
been offered in recent years. 
1. Formal Agency Proceedings and Other Sensitive Cases 
A logical place to begin the inquiry is with limitations pertaining 
to "formal" administrative proceedings, because the legal restrictions 
on congressional intervention are most clearly defined in that context. 
As previously explained, the ex parte contact provisions of the Sunshine 
Act, as well as the Pillsbury doctrine, make strong statements against 
legislative interference with formal agency proceedings. Those pro­
nouncements, however, will be effective only to the extent that mem­
bers are informed about them. Research indicates that, in general, legis­
lators and their staffs are aware of the governing principles.182 In view 
182. A survey of House members in the Ninetieth Congress (just after Pillsbury 
and well before the Sunshine Act) found broad awareness of the basic ground rules. See 
EDMUND BEARD & STEPHEN HORN, CONGRESSIONAL ETillcs: THE Vmw FROM 
THE HousE 76 (1975) ("Congressmen appear to appreciate the judicial nature of the 
work of the commissions; consequently, they hesitate to interfere. The impropriety of ex 
parte communications in these cases was mentioned often" in the authors' survey). Sig· 
nificantly, the same respondents claimed to be much more aggressive in nonjudicial 
cases. See id. at 74-76. For more recent evidence, see JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 
109, 126; Charles R. Babcock, Ex-Regulators: Few Improper Contacts, WASH. POST, 
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of the considerable growth in size of the legislative establishment in re­
cent decades, however, it is important for Congress to ensure that ex­
isting limitations on ex parte communications are clearly communicated 
to all. The House Ethics Manual contains fairly clear warnings on this 
score.183 The Senate, however, has no equivalent document compiling 
and synthesizing recognized ethical principles for the guidance of its 
members and their staffs. It ought to have one.184 
The logical next question is whether any other types of agency 
proceedings should normally be exempt from the intrusions of congres­
sional constituent advocacy. Proceedings that involve a criminal prose­
cution might be one such category. In the Keating Five case, the Senate 
Ethics Committee found that it was not improper, in and of itself, for 
three of the senators to have continued to intervene on Keating's behalf 
even after learning of the criminal referral in his case. At worst, said the 
Committee, this persistence reflected poor judgment.185 Others have 
taken a less generous view of such contacts. In fact, the Keating scandal 
has given rise to the suggestion that members of Congress should sim­
ply avoid "interf er[ing] with ongoing individual crlniinal investigations 
or prosecutions."186 Moreover, Senator Douglas strongly recommended 
against congressional involvement in individual criminal matters.187 
Several strong arguments militate in favor of an ethics rule that 
would forbid legislators from intervening in ongoing criminal proceed­
ings. In important respects, criminal proceedings resemble the formal, 
on-the-record administrative proceedings covered by section 557(d) of 
Nov. 29, 1990, at A25 (quoting former agency heads who recalled receiving improper 
communications from members of Congress occasionally but not frequently). 
183. See HousE Ennes MANuAL, supra note 133, at 242-47. 
184. The Senate Ethics Committee has provided this sort of guidance in response 
to individual requests. See, e.g., SENATE SELECT COMM. ON Ennes, 1030 CONG., 
lST SESS., INTERPRETATIVE RULINGS OF THE SELECT CoMM. ON Ennes No. 237 
(Comm. Print 1993) [hereinafter INTERPRETATIVE RULINGS] (advice to senator not to 
communicate with bankruptcy judge on constituents' behalf, other than through fonnal 
procedures). But a collection of individualized rulings is unlikely to be as effective an 
orientation tool as a clearly written synthesis of the controlling principles would be. 
185. KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 17, 56 (concerning Sen. DeConcini); id. 
at 18, 54-55 (concerning Sen. Glenn); id. at 16, 56 (concerning the same two plus 
Cranston). 
186. Waldman, supra note 73, at 22. 
187. 
There are some fields of administrative action which legislators would, on 
the whole, do well to avoid. The first is the field of criminal action. Unless legis­
lators are deeply convinced of the justice of their position, they certainly should 
not make any inquiries or recommendations about possible indictments or crimi­
nal prosecutions. 
DOUGLAS, supra note 63, at 91-92. 
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the APA - both are cases in which society's concern for procedural 
regularity is high. Since Congress has already accepted! a diminution in 
the scope of permissible constituent service with respect to formal adju­
dications, it should likewise be amenable to such a curtailment with re­
spect to criminal matters. A prohibition of this kind would also seem to 
be reasonably workable, because it would be triggered by relatively 
clear-cut, objectively determinable events.188 The prohibition might be 
framed in terms of directing members to refrain from pressing a constit­
uent's cause with prosecutors189 (which apparently was Douglas's spe­
cific point), as well as with administrators who are handling an enforce­
ment matter that will also be the subject of a criminal investigation, as 
the facts of the Keating case might suggest. 
Yet, just as practical approaches have evolved to reconcile the 
Pillsbury doctrine with the congressional interest in oversight, so too 
might the suggested ethical rule be framed or applied in a manner that 
leaves some scope for congressional constituent advocacy on behalf of 
what a member believes may be unjustified prosecution. General over­
sight activities that make no reference to the facts of particular cases, 
and preferably do not refer to specific cases at all, are presumably 
valid.190 Additionally, perhaps ethics rules should address only those sit­
uations in which members or their staffs contact agencies directly. Some 
leeway for political dialogue in the public arena must be allowed. After 
all, senators and representatives commonly use floor speeches and com­
mittee hearings to demand criminal investigations of suspected viola­
tors. Speeches urging an opposite outcome would seem to be equally le­
gitimate. If one legislator can legitimately accuse the executive branch 
of being too soft on flag burners or abortion protesters, should not other 
legislators, with different ideological commitments, be permitted to ac­
cuse the executive of being too harsh? Public pronouncements of this 
kind, which would not ordinarily be considered "ex parte contacts" and 
188. In marginal cases, however, ethics authorities might face difficulty determin­
ing just when a member actually learned that an alleged regulatory violation had been 
referred for criminal investigation. 
189. One of the most contentious of recent confrontations between Congress and 
Justice Department prosecutors involved efforts by Representative John D. Dingell, for­
mer Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, to expose what he con­
sidered the Department's mishandling of environmental criminal cases. Representative 
Dingell's office insisted, however, that the investigating subcommittee was interested 
only in cfosed cases, not open ones. See Jerry Seper, 'Partisan' Grab Seen in Environ­
ment Cases, WASH. TIMEs, June 6, 1994, at Al. This claim appears to reflect an ac­
knowledgment that pressure regarding a pending case would be improper. 
190. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying texf. 
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deprive no one of an opportunity to respond with an opposing point of 
view, presumably do not contravene principles of legislative ethics. 
Perhaps the trickiest problem in this area is to determine the cir­
cumstances in which a legislator may intervene in an administrative 
proceeding that might ripen into either a criminal investigation or a for­
mally adjudicated enforcement proceeding, but has not yet done so. 
When the possibility of enforcement action is on the horizon but not 
imminent, legislators have a relatively strong claim that their "represen­
tative" duties compel them to intercede on their constituents' behalf; as 
the likelihood of formal action looms larger, rule-of-law values press 
with increasing force toward restraint on the legislator's part. Where are 
the lines to be drawn? 
Section 557(d) of the APA suggests one guideline: the ex parte 
contact rule in formal adjudication generally comes into play at "the 
time at which a proceeding is noticed for hearing unless the person re­
sponsible for the [ex parte] communication has knowledge that it will 
be noticed."191 Reasonable minds might conclude,. however, that a 
broader prohibition should apply to members of Congress and their 
staffs - commencing, for example, when the congressional office be­
comes aware that formal proceedings are under active consideration.192 
Whatever standard may be chosen, the sensitivity of enforcement pro­
ceedings, both civil and criminal, justifies special caution from mem­
bers and their staffs who propose to intervene in them. Even where in­
tervention as such is not deemed improper, legislators should be 
particularly careful in these cases to make sure that they have checked 
out the facts and are not making untoward threats. Those are .sound 
guidelines under all circumstances, as will be discussed shortly, but 
they are especially good advice in the enforcement context, because of 
the public's special concern that these matters should be resolved ac­
cording to law.193 
191. 5 u.s.c. § 557(d)(l)(E) (1994). 
192. In DCP Farms v. Yeutter, 951 F.2d 1 183, 1 187 (5th Cir. 1992), the Agricul­
ture Department made an initial determination of abuse in the farm subsidy program, 
and the respondent appealed and requested a hearing. The court stated that Pillsbury re­
strictions would not come into play until the time of that hearing. That dictum seems in­
compatible with § 557(d)(l)(E), but the court was justified in refusing to apply Pills­
bury to a legislator's intervention that had occurred during the early stages of the 
department's investigation, even though an inspector general's report had left little 
doubt that the respondent might ultimately face formal proceedings. 
193. In the period prior to a criminal referral or notice of the commencement of 
formal proceedings, legislators should have relatively broad freedom to make contacts 
that take no position on the merits but merely prod the agency to reach a speedy con­
clusion in the constituent's case. Although, strictly speaking, such statements can be le­
gitimate even after enforcement activities have reached a more formal stage, see supra 
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2. Indiscriminate Advocacy 
We turn now to consider what substantive prohibitions should ap­
ply to legislative intervention outside the realm of formal adjudication. 
One simple guideline that bears exploration would be that a member 
should not intervene on behalf of a constituent unless the constituent's 
claim has some merit.194 Much of the literature suggests that members 
are not always so restrained - that many feel that their job is to advo­
cate the constituent's cause, right or wrong.195 Senator Douglas argued 
against this attitude: "A legislator should not immediately conclude that 
the constituent is always right and the administrator is always wrong, 
but as far as possible should try to find out the merits of each case and 
only make such representations as the situation permits."196 
To the extent it exists, the attitude that every constituent's case de­
serves to be pursued, regardless of its merits, seems at odds with the 
House Advisory Opinion's teaching that "the overall public interest . . .  
is primary to any individual matter."197 The ethics committees should 
consider elaborating on that precept by endorsing the proposition that 
every member should give some consideration to the merits before hon­
oring a request for intervention, instead of always taking the constitu­
ent's side against the bureaucracy.198 This article argued above that the 
advocacy dimension of the legislator's role is normal and inescapable.199 
Legislators are not solely advocates, however. They are also responsibie 
for promoting the public interest - which encompasses the interests of 
groups and individuals who lack the resources to press their case on 
Capitol Hill as effectively as highly organized groups can.200 That the 
obligation to consider an issue from multiple vantage points probably 
note 155, they run the risk of being construed as obstruction of a criminal inquiry or as 
covert pressure to decide the case in the constituent's favor. See S. REP. No. 354, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1975) (suggesting that requests for status reports should in "doubt­
ful cases" be regarded as falling within the scope of § 557(d)). 
194. See Waldman, supra note 73, at 23. 
195. Jn the Keating case, Senator DeConcini took this view: even constituents 
with a "lousy" case have "a right to have somebody stand up for them." 5 Keating 
Hearings, supra note 129, at 108 (Jan. 9, 1991). For evidence that this view is widely 
held, see BEARD & HORN, supra note 182, at 74-75 (quoting from survey responses by 
House members themselves); GELLHORN, supra note 46, at 71-72; JOHANNES, supra 
note 44, at 122. As one might expect, many agency officials agree that congressional 
offices often forward cases uncritically. See id. at 105. 
196. DOUGLAS, supra note 63, at 88. 
197. See Advisory Opinion No. 1, supra note 131.  
198. See THOMPSON, supra note 28, at 94-97. 
199. See supra section I.A. 
200. See Ennes OF LEGISLATIVE LIFE, supra note 17, at 47-48; David E. Price, 
Legislative Ethics in the New Congress, in REPRESENTATION AND REsPONSIBILITY, 
supra note 17, at 129, 136-38. 
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cannot be enforced does not mean that it should be ignored as an ethical 
iqeal. 
A rule or aspirational principle to the effect that members should 
pursue only cases with serious merit would have particular force if it 
entailed a duty to investigate the facts before intervening, so that the 
member would have some minimum level of confidence in the claim 
before pursuing it. However, any provision intended to codify a require­
ment of this sort would have to be carefully drafted so as to recognize 
that casework takes many fonns. Frequently a congressional office sim­
ply restates facts presented by the constituent, or forwaros the citizen's 
letter with a perfunctory cover letter attached.201 In these situations, the 
office is in little position to appraise the strength of the claim - nor is 
the agency really likely to believe otherwise. On this point the Senate 
Ethics Committee was persuasive: 
The Committee believes the duty of a Member to determine the merits of 
a case is related to the level of action he or she is going to take. For ex­
ample, a routine status inquiry would not require the same level of famil­
iarity with the merits of a case as would proposing a possible solution. 
The Committee also appreciates the fact that in the normal course of 
daily events a Senator's staff, without the Senator's knowledge or in­
volvement, provides many routine constituent services which by their na­
ture require little or no inquiry into the merits.202 
Moreover, casework is often an informal, interactive process: a 
caseworker may inquire whether there is anything to a constituent's 
grievance, an agency spokesperson explains why there is not, and the 
matter ends there.203 Such interchanges occur on too casual a level to 
warrant the kind of "Rule 1 1 "  obligations that accompany the filing of 
a civil lawsuit.204 
Yet, short of placing a burden of inquiry on members to determine 
the merits of every claim to which they lend assistance, one can suggest 
more modest guidelines: that members should avoid making affirmative 
representations without a reasonable basis,205 should refrain from press-
201. See, e.g., Klonoff, supra note 46, at 705-06. 
202. KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 10. 
203. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 100-01. 
204. See FED. R. CIV. P. ll(b) (requiring litigants filing court papers to certify, af­
ter reasonable inquiry, that their legal contentions are tenable and their factual conten­
tions have or are likely to have evidentiary support). 
205. See Houss Ennes MANuAL, supra note 133, at 249 ("As a matter of com­
mon sense, when communicating with an agency, Members and staff should only assert 
as fact that which they know to be true . . • .  A prudent approach in any communication 
would be to attribute factual assertions to the constituent"). A related technique that 
congressional offices sometimes use is to write a letter to the agency stating what the 
member expects it to do if the facts tum out to be as the constituent claims. 
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ing a cause that they know is invalid under controlling law, and should 
intervene only after making whatever inquiry is reasonable under the 
circumstances.206 
3. Threats of Reprisal on Unrelated Matters 
Another question is whether certain types of arguments should be 
off-limits - or at least strongly disfavored - when members of Con­
gress do casework for constituents. House Advisory Opinion No. 1 for­
bids suggestions of "favoritism or reprisal" directed toward the 
agency.207 The meaning of this prohibition is not entirely clear, how­
ever. Moreover, neither the Senate nor its ethics committee has ex­
pressly adopted any restriction in this area, although the committee has 
"encouraged" senators to look to the advisory opinion for "guidance." 
The subject of reprisal thus deserves close attention here. 
Of course, the House advisory opinion's admonition that the "pub­
lic interest" is paramount in constituent service activities208 would mili­
tate against the use of threats for some purposes - for example, pursuit 
of a personal feud - but certainly not for all of them. Sometimes a 
member might threaten a "reprisal" precisely in order to promote the 
public interest as he or she defines it. D.C. Federation,209 offers a useful 
illustration. Everyone in that case seemed to assume that the chairman 
sincerely believed that the bridge should be built; nothing suggested 
that he was threatening to hold up subway funding for any other reason 
than to advance that goal. Notably, the court pointedly refused to criti­
cize him for his conduct210 - perhaps because it felt that such a judg­
ment was beyond judicial competence, but possibly also because the in­
trinsic legitimacy of this behavior was unclear. 
A logical extrapolation of the court's decision would point toward 
congressional ethics rules expressly providing that members should re-
206. See FRONTLINE MANAGEMENT, supra note 53, at 212-13. For an example 
of the embarrassment and unfavorable publicity that can result from a failure to check 
one's facts, see Benjamin Sheffner, A Tale of Constituent Service Gone Awry, ROLL 
CALL, Jan. 23, 1995, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Rollcl File (describing how 
then-Representative Jon Kyl, at the request of a constituent, wrote a letter urging the 
Latvian parliament to cease denying a seat to a local politician; Kyl was chagrined 
when he later learned of the Latvian's criminal record as a racial extremist). 
207. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. Kentucky's ethical misconduct 
statute, although confusing, appears to endorse essentially the same principle. See supra 
note 138. 
208. See supra note 132. 
209. D.C. Fedn. of Civic Assns. v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see 
supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text. 
210. See 459 F.2d at 1249. 
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frain from attempting to influence administrative decisions by making 
threats or promises to talce action on an unrelated matter.211 Such a rule 
seems supportable even though vote-trading, exchanges of favors, and 
other sorts of "logrolling" are an integral part of congressional cul­
ture.212 The constituent service area differs from the typical struggle that 
talces place exclusively within the legislature, because an agency acts 
under a statutory mandate. For an administrator to rely on a factor ex­
trinsic to its mandate, such as the possibility of a legislator's retaliation, 
would normally render the agency's decision ultra vires. Thus, the rule 
would reflect the central concern of D.C. Federation: preventing 
agency actions that violate the rule of law. Theoretically it would oper­
ate before the fact to intercept approximately the same sort of com­
ments that, if the agency were shown to have acted on them, would 
support judicial reversal of the agency action after the fact. Moreover, it 
would serve as a remedy for some congressional pressures that the 
courts cannot effectively police because of justiciability limits. 
Such a rule also would fit well with existing ethics authorities, 
even if one regards the "favoritism or reprisal" language in Advisory 
Opinion No. 1 as inconclusive. Senator Douglas cautioned legislators 
that they should not "try to punish administrators for adverse rulings by 
withholding appropriations or by other punitive actions," nor should 
they threaten to do so.213 The Tuttle decision from Maine is easily justi­
fied on the basis of the suggested rule, although it involved a promised 
inducement rather than a threat. The holding of the Wright case appears 
at first glance incompatible with the rule, because one allegation there 
was that Wright had placed a "hold" on a savings and loan bailout bill 
in order to obtain more favorable treatment for Texans facing enforce­
ment actions.214 The House Ethics Committee's dismissal of this allega-
211. Such a rule might well apply to a recent incident in which a dozen members 
of Congress wrote to the National Labor Relations Board, urging it to settle charges 
pending against an employer, Overnite Transportation Company. Their letter warned: 
"All parts of the federal government are being reviewed for ways to cut spending." 
Describing the letter as a ploy, one representative explained: "I was trying to do 
whatever I could to offend them into some type of cooperation." Pro-Business Republi­
cans Cutting Agency Regulations (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 4, 1995), available in 
LEXIS, News Library, NPR File. 
212. See generally Daniel Hays Lowenstein, For God. for Country, or for Me?, 74 
CAL. L. REv. 1479, 1497-1500 (1986) (book review) (questioning notion that political 
logrolling is necessarily wrong). 
213. DOUGLAS, supra note 63, at 90. 
214. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
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tion, however, appears to have rested on a lack of probative evidence 
rather than a belief that such conduct is permissible.21s 
One commentator, however, has criticized D.C. Federation on the 
ground that statutes should generally be interpreted to permit agencies 
to consider congressional policy views as such, because this interpreta­
tion will promote the essential process of compromise between the two 
politically accountable branches.216 He suggests that in D.C. Federation 
the court should have read the statute as authorizing consideration of 
the chairman's views, because it did not explicitly foreclose reference to 
that consideration.217 
The answer is that an individual member is not the Congress and 
does not speak for the entire body. Indeed, it is doubtful that Congress 
could pass a law expressly ascribing relevance to the wishes of influen­
tial members as such.218 Thus, an ambiguous statute should not be inter­
preted as doing so by implication. Of course, a sound argument does 
not become impermissible "political influence" merely because a mem­
ber of Congress makes it.219 Moreover, prudent administrators strive for 
a good relationship with their congressional overseers, and may often 
be well advised to accept their interpretation of ambiguities in the stat­
ute. Both sides, however, should be encouraged to remember that their 
preferences must operate within whatever framework the statute pro­
vides as a test for the agency's use of discretion. 
The precise legal framework applicable to a given case may be 
subject to intense debate. For this reason ethics rules in this area should 
apply only to manifestly irrelevant arguments.220 In the end, however, 
one should recognize that even broadly worded administrative statutes 
typically have some boundaries written into them. Pure logrolling is un-
215. See Agency Door, supra note 65 (remarks of Rep. Frank); Klaus, supra note 
130, at 36-37. 
216. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in 
Agency Decisionmaldng: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. Cm. L. RBv. 481, 
496-98 (1990). 
217. See id. 
218. A law providing, for example, that "any decision under this section must be 
acceptable to the chair of the relevant appropriations subcommittee" would be in dan­
ger of being held to confer "executive" functions on legislative actors, a practice that 
the Supreme Court regards with considerable disfavor under separation of powers prin­
ciples. See supra note 149 (discussing modem cases on separation of powers). 
219. See DCP Farms v. Yeutter, 957 F.2d 1 183, 1 188 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he force 
of logic and ideas is not our concern [in defining congressional 'interference' and 'po­
litical pressure']. They carry their own force and exert their own pressure."). 
220. When legislators influence an administrative decision by advancing a legal 
interpretation that is erroneous but defensible, the proper remedy is not an ethics sanc­
tion, but judicial reversal of the agency's action. See, e.g., Hazardous Waste Treatment 
Council v. EPA, 886 F.2d 355, 364-66 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam). 
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likely to qualify as the kind of "reasoned decisionmaking" that agen­
cies are expected to display in their exercises of discretion. To return to 
the D.C. Federation example, scholars have made powerful arguments 
that the judiciary has given a narrower construction to the highway stat­
ute involved in that case than Congress ever intended;221 nevertheless, it 
would be a stretch to interpret the law as saying, "Authorize a bridge if 
it will get you a subway." An ·  even more extreme example would be the 
allegation made, but not proven, against Senator Byrd in Sierra Club: 
that he offered to trade support for the SALT treaty for· concessions in 
an EPA rulemaking.222 
4. Threats in General 
The House Ethics Committee suggested a broader formulation in 
the Wright case, which said that an allegation of undue influence should 
not be considered in the absence of evidence of a "reprisal or threat." 
Should there be a general proscription of "threats"? That was the pro­
posal of a study commission that was convened in Maine following the 
Tuttle case,223 although the legislature did not act on this 
recommendation. 
A condemnation of all threats seems overbroad, however. Taken 
literally, it could suppress legitimate oversight.224 A good example is 
suggested by DCP Farms v. Yeutter,225 a case decided in 1992 by the 
Fifth Circuit - the same court that had decided Pillsbury a quarter cen­
tury earlier. The court summarized the background facts: 
This case arises from attempts by the Department of Agriculture to en­
force the statutory limit of $50,000 per "person" in federal crop subsi­
dies against DCP Farms. The three farms, controlled by two families, had 
created 51 irrevocable trusts to maximize the number of "persons" eligi­
ble to receive farm subsidy payments. DCP Farms were slated to receive 
$1.4 million in subsidies for the 1989 crop year.226 
221. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial 
Controls over Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1251 
(1993). 
222. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 409 n.539 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
223. "All legislators, without exception, shall refrain from any threat, or statement 
that could be reasonably construed as a threat, orally or in writing, relating to legislative 
action in communication with a state agency or authority." COMMISSION TO EXAMINE 
ETHICS IN STATE GOVERNMENT, REPORT OF 3 (1988); see Lawrence, supra note 
138, at 448-49. 
224. See Lawrence, supra note 138, at 450 (criticizing the Maine study commis­
sion's proposal on this groilnd). 
225. 957 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1992). 
226. 957 F.2d at 1185. 
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Congressman Jerry Huckaby, chairman of the House subcommittee that 
had sponsored the subsidy limits, wrote to the Department about DCP's 
situation, which had been described in press reports. He declared that 
payment of the full amount would violate the letter and spirit of the 
law. Moreover, "Congressman Huckaby indicated that if the USDA al­
lowed DCP Farms to treat all 5 1  irrevocable trusts as 'persons,' he 
would introduce legislation to revise the definition of 'persons' to ex­
clude trusts entirely. "227 The Department responded that it would take a 
very aggressive enforcement position toward the farms. When it did so, 
DCP Farms sought interlocutory judicial review. A district court en­
joined the proceedings, but the court of appeals reversed. The appellate 
court rejected the notion that a congressman's expression of views 
about how a law should be interpreted injects an extraneous factor 
within the meaning of D.C. Federation, remarking that it "would be 
unrealistic to require that agencies turn a deaf ear to comments from 
members of Congress. "228 
The principals' exchange about the meaning of the statute was 
clearly permissible oversight. More to the point, the congressman's 
statement that he might introduce legislation if the Department did not 
accede to his position, while it could be called a "threat," seems en­
tirely legitimate. It would be excessive hair-splitting to distinguish be­
tween the congressman's expression of opinion as to the meaning of the 
law as it then stood and the congressman's determination to seek 
changes in it if necessary to "clarify" the legislature's intention. The 
latter flows naturally out of the former. It is doubtful that one would 
want to criticize - let alone punish - Huckaby for "threatening" to 
play the very role that the Constitution assigns to lawmakers. 
This issue illustrates with unusual clarity the analytical value of 
Professor Thompson's claim that constituent service activities should be 
evaluated from the standpoint of whether they enhance or impede dem­
ocratic processes.229 Certainly one would not have wanted an influential 
member of Congress to commence efforts to change the statute without 
informing the agency and giving it an opportunity to consider whether 
it wanted to head off possibly unpredictable legislative action by acqui­
escing in the member's interpretation. The participants' interchange 
provided an opportunity for the kind of dialogue over legal and policy 
227. 957 F.2d at 1186 (emphasis added). 
228. 957 F.2d at 1188. 
229. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text 
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issues that ought to take place between the lawmaking and law­
enforcing branches.230 
To generalize, political power touches the relationship between the 
legislative and executive branches on too many levels for one to be able 
to say that congressional "threats" are always out of place. Such a pro­
hibition seems distinctly less attractive than the guideline discussed ear­
lier, which in effect would reach only those threats that would induce 
the agency to act for plainly irrelevant reasons if it acceded to the legis­
lator's demand.231 
5. The Outer Limits of "Undue Influence" Regulation 
The ultimate question about ethics regulation of "undue influence" 
in constituent service is whether a member who does not resort to 
threats should nevertheless be subject to sanctions for exerting inordi­
nate pressure on an agency. During the Keating proceedings, Senator 
Helms - in a statement that borrowed heavily from the recommenda­
tions of the Committee's special counsel232 - tried to articulate such a 
standard: "Even absent . . .  threats, a legislator's pressure on behalf of a 
constituent may lead the administrator reasonably to believe that he or 
she should decide a case not on the merits, but should accede to the leg­
islator's request because of a concern about the ability to deal with the 
legislator on future agency matters. "233 Thus, "Senators must avoid in­
terventions that appear to be improper either because they are not merit­
based or because they are of such a kind or degree that administrators 
reasonably believe that their decisions cannot be merit-based. "234 
Although the Senate Ethics Committee as a whole did not endorse 
that or any other standard to define the limits of permissible pressure in 
senators' interventions with administrators, it was very critical of Sena­
tor DeConcini's aggressiveness toward the bank regulators.235 Neverthe­
less, the Committee, including Senator Helms, drew back from finding 
230. For another recent example, see Jane Fritsch, Senate Aide Uses Budget 
Threat To Intervene in a Pollution Case, N.Y. 'fIMEs, Aug. 24, 1995, at Al (describing 
aide's threat to use appropriations rider to challenge designation of Superfund cleanup 
site if EPA did not reconsider its plan to adopt that designation). 
231. Just as some "threats" should be tolerated, so too should some affirmative 
inducements that are intended to influence administrative action. An example would be 
a member who, in urging the USDA to keep its generous definition of "person," 
promises to oppose any effort by Huckaby to get the statute changed. 
232. See supra note 7. 
233. See KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 97 (separate views of Sen. Helms). 
234. Id. at 98. 
235. See id. at 17 (report of the Committee). 
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an impropriety in his conduct.236 A less forgiving observer might argue 
that the Committee not only should have reached the opposite conclu­
sion on that point, but should have found all five senators guilty of im­
proper pressure tactics in the Keating case. Such a claim might rest in 
large part on the singular fact that the five senators arranged to meet as 
a group with bank regulators on Keating's behalf.237 One could easily 
interpret this coordinated effort as an attempt to make a show of force 
that one or two senators could not have displayed by themselves. An 
application of the Helms standard might also lead to the conclusion that 
the House Ethics Committee should have reprimanded Speaker Jim 
Wright for what it regarded as his "intemperate" advocacy, even 
though it found insufficient evidence of an overt threat or reprisal.238 
Given the unequal power relationship between members of Con­
gress - or at least some well-positioned members - and many agency 
officials, it would be difficult to deny that risks of implicit coercion 
often inhere in the casework situation.239 Agencies understand that they 
incur at least some risk of adverse consequences if they appear too un­
cooperative in their response to a legislator's contact.240 Senator 
Douglas addressed the ethics implications of this dynamic by advising 
legislators that they should not bully or intimidate agency officials and 
should clearly acknowledge that the ultimate decision rests in adminis­
trative hands.241 
In a disciplinary context, however, one may doubt that the ethics 
committees could fairly administer a ban on overly aggressive advo­
cacy.242 Unlike a prohibition on threats of reprisal, which can be framed 
as a more or less bright-line principle, the Helms standard seems ex­
tremely vague. It would provide a member with virtually no guidance 
236. See id. (DeConcini's conduct was "inappropriate" but gave only the "appear­
ance of being improper"). 
237. See Babcock, supra note 182, at A25 (quoting a fonner SEC chairman: "I re­
garded it as highly unusual to have even a single senator come to me. To have five 
come would have seemed extraordinary."). But see 6 Keating Hearings, supra note 129, 
at 193-94 (Jan. 16, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Rudman) (dismissing as "absurd" Common 
Cause's position "that there is improper conduct if a group of Senators intervene with 
an agency on behalf of a citizen even in the absence of political contributions"). 
238. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
239. See, e.g., DOUGLAS REPORT, supra note 134, at 29-30. 
240. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 102-04. 
241. See DOUGLAS, supra note 63, at 90. 
242. Cf. Bloch, supra note 149, at 1 19  n.255 ("An attempt to draw a judicially en­
forceable line between 'strong feelings on the merits' and 'threats' would be arbitrary, 
highly manipulable, and too restrictive."). Professor Bloch maintains that the limits of 
legislative advocacy are best left to be defined by the consciences of individual legisla­
tors, not the courts - although she does not directly address the possibility of regula­
tion by the ethics committees. See id. at 122. 
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as to what kinds of advocacy might be held in a disciplinary proceeding 
to be too aggressive. The problem is not simply with Senator Helms's 
particular formula; indeterminacy seems unavoidable in this area.243 A 
member naturally strives to be influential; at what point does this influ­
ence become undue? Nebulous standards are particularly worrisome 
when they are to be enforced in a political arena, in which damaging 
charges are easy to lodge and in which the adjudicators are elected offi­
cials who themselves are subject to strong political pressures. 
Against the risks of arbitrary and unforeseeable application of an 
"excessive advocacy" standard must be weighed the potential benefits 
of a rule that might constrain overly aggressive behavior by legislators. 
As an empirical matter, however, the magnitude of the undue influence 
problem should not be exaggerated. In his study of constituent service, 
Johannes reported that members and caseworkers almost always hesitate 
to pressure an agency; they , consider the technique ineffective or 
counterproductive in most instances.244 Although he acknowledged in­
stances in which congressional offices have pursued cases with a re­
markable degree of aggressiveness,245 even agencies seemed to agree 
that extravagant pressure is rare.246 Fear of adverse publicity was an­
other constraining factor for members and their staffs247 - and that was 
before the Keating affair, which undoubtedly has led to even more cau­
tion.248 Agencies are in the best position to blow the whistle on heavy-
243. An alternative formula was offered by an ethics consultant, Michael Joseph­
son, when the Senate was considering its new Rule XLill (which will be discussed in 
Part IV, infra). He urged that the rule be amended to provide that congressional inter­
vention must be "neither calculated to, nor reasonably . • . likely to, cause another 
government official to make a decision on any basis other than the appropriate criteria." 
Glenn R. Simpson, Post-Keating-Five Rules Change for Constituent Service Urged by 
Leaders, ROLL CALL. Mar. 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Rollcl File. 
This formulation seems even less clear than the Helms version. Legislators or staffers 
who wished to conform to it would apparently have to predict not only how their words 
would be understood, but also the administrator's likely response to those words - a 
judgment that might require speculation on such matters as the tractability of the partic­
ular agency official contacted. 
244. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 102, 106-07. 
245. See id. at 108 (citing Mary Thornton, Rep. Lott Forcefully Presents His Views 
to the Justice Department, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 1982, at A2 (reporting that then­
Representative Trent Lott "hounded" the Justice Department, senqing it a letter every 
other day)). Lott is now Senate Majority Leader and, in fact, sat on the Senate Ethics 
Committee during the Keating case. 
246. See id. at 102-03; see also Babcock, supra note 182, at A25. 
247. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 107, 126. 
248. See Sara Fritz & Paul Houston, Amid Scandal and the New Accent on Ethics, 
Senators Tread Carefully, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 11 ,  1990, at A26. 
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handed casework tactics.249 They also can strike back in more mundane 
ways, such as by failing to act promptly on other cases or to pass along 
tips about impending federal grants in the district.250 
In short, legislators wield significant power in their contacts with 
agencies, and they have a responsibility to exercise it in an ethical fash­
ion. The ethics committees would do well to follow Senator Douglas's 
lead by admonishing members against heavy-handedness and intimida­
tion in the constituent service realm. Moreover, because the House's ex­
isting guidelines forbid "direct or implied" suggestions of reprisal,251 
they would seem to leave some room for sanctions in a case in which a 
legislator makes perfectly clear, without putting into words, his inten­
tion to retaliate against an agency that does not submit to his demands. 
The Senate should adopt a similar rule. When faced with the possibility 
of attempting to enforce open-ended prohibitions on aggressive advo­
cacy, however, the committees have probably been correct in choosing 
to err (if at all) on the side of underinclusiveness. 
6. Public Disclosure Options 
An alternative, or perhaps additional, means by which Congress 
could take steps to prevent or discourage improper legislative influences 
upon administrative proceedings would be through a disclosure mecha­
nism. Commentators have maintained that problems attributable to con­
stituent service would be reduced if congressional contacts with agen­
cies were logged and regularly disclosed to the public.252 Although this 
is a somewhat indirect method of promoting legislative ethics, the argu­
ments for and against the idea have a considerable overlap with issues 
regarding the substantive content of the legislative ethics rules. The fol­
lowing discussion summarizes the arguments for and against such a 
249. Much of the early reporting on the Keating Five affair itself was based on in­
formation obtained from sources within the FHLBB. See, e.g., Michael Binstein, A 
Study in Power: How S&L 'War' Led Senators To Pressure Regulators, WASH. PosT, 
May 15, 1988, at Hl (relying on internal agency documents). 
250. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 102, 144. 
251. See Advisory Opinion No. l ,  supra note 131 (emphasis added). 
252. See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 28, at 101; Waldman, supra note 73, at 23. 
Professor Schotland has proposed a docketing requirement limited to requesters who 
have given the legislator campaign contributions above a specified amount. See Roy A. 
Schotland, Proposals for Campaign Finance Reform: An Article Devoted to Being Less 
Dull Than Its Title, 21 CAP. U. L. REv. 429, 460 (1992). A difficulty with that plan is 
that caseworkers do not necessarily know which requesters are contributors, see 
JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 125, and the Keating decision in effect cautions against 
the ethical appearances of their making efforts to find out. See infra section IY.E.3. 
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plan, focuses on an intermediate position as a basis for analysis, and ex­
plores some implementation issues. 
Arguments for a logging procedure run something like this: Regu­
lar disclosure of constituent service contacts would permit the normal 
mechanisms of political accountability to supplement, or partially sub­
stitute for, enforcement proceedings by the ethics committees. Armed 
with the facts, the public could make its own assessment of the propri­
ety of individual contacts. The logging procedure would also serve as a 
deterrent to constituent service activities that a member would be em­
barrassed to have on the public record. One would expeet that members 
of Congress would normally welcome public knowledge about the ser­
vices they perform for constituents; if there are situations that the mem­
ber wishes to keep away from the sunshine, perhaps these are contacts 
that deserve to be deterred. For example, if the logs were to disclose 
that a series of interventions by one member was entirely out of keep­
ing with normal patterns, the member could at least be called on to ex­
plain his unusual activity. Finally, a logging requirement would promote 
public confidence in government, because it would provide - even if 
only imperfectly - assurance that members could not intercede for in­
fluential constituents without leaving any fingerprints. At the same time 
it would give legislators of good will a way of saying that they have 
nothing to hide. 
An across-the-board logging requirement would be a costly en­
deavor, however. According to the leading political science study of 
constituent service, the average House office handles about 100 
casework requests per week, and the average Senate office handles 
about 300. This adds up to an annual workload of about four million 
cases.253 The amount of time and energy that would be consumed each 
year in the creation of four million docket entries could be substantial. 
At a time of growing emphasis on the streamlining of government, one 
could wonder whether a new layer of red tape should be imposed with­
out a clear public need in this area. 
The existence of such a need is certainly open to doubt. Political 
science studies do not lend much support to the popular belief, which 
the Keating scandal has no doubt fostered, that attempts to exert undue 
influence in constituent service are commonplace.254 Indeed, if congres­
sional constituent service is a routine and generally appropriate activity, 
as this article has maintained, one can question whether it should be 
monitored as if it were inherently suspicious. Finally, if records of leg-
253. See JOHANNES. supra note 44, at 35. 
254. See supra notes 182, 244-50 and accompanying text. 
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islative interventions were made readily accessible, the impact on public 
debate would undoubtedly prove somewhat mixed. Public logs would 
presumably reveal significant facts in some instances, but they would 
also lend themselves to exploitation and distortions by a member's po­
litical enemies, who could hint at sinister dealings in a manner that the 
member would have trouble rebutting. 
The issue is debatable, but let us suppose, for the sake of analysis, 
that Congress does decide to institute a logging requirement. A plausi­
ble point of departure would be a proposal that Senator Robert Dole 
made while the Keating case was pending in Congress. His plan would 
have required executive-branch agencies to maintain records of their 
contacts with legislators or legislative aides on pending or potential en­
forcement matters or awards of contracts. Written communications 
would have been placed in a public file; oral communications would 
have been logged for publication in the Congressional Record.255 He ex­
.plained this proposal by invoking what he called the "front-page test": 
"if we are not willing to read about an intervention on the front page of 
the newspapers, then we ought to think twice about making that phone 
call or writing that letter. "256 
The theory behind the Dole plan seems to be that disclosure obli­
gations should be limited to particularly sensitive types of cases. Con­
sistently with that theory, Congress might wish, if it decides to create a 
logging regime, to experiment with a system that would follow the gen­
eral outlines of the Dole plan to the extent it would apply to pending or 
potential agency enforcement proceedings.257 In enforcement cases, 
even if the probability of abuse is low, arguably the need for public 
confidence that the rule of law will be maintained is at its zenith. This 
may be one reason why the Keating case, which of course arose in an 
enforcement context, struck a raw nerve. At the same time, a require­
ment limited to enforcement cases would be less unwieldy than an 
across-the-board logging requirement, because members of Congress in­
tervene less often in enforcement proceedings than in situations in 
which a constituent seeks affirmative benefits from government.258 
255. See 137 CONG. REC. S6492 (daily ed. May 23, 1991). 
256. Id. 
257. Senator Dole's proposal for docketing also extended to any agency proceed­
ings "relating to the award of contracts." Id. There is, however, no conspicuous record 
of scandals or undue congressional influence in that context Nor is it intuitively obvi­
ous why contract awards should be deemed more sensitive than, say, awards of licenses 
or of local development grants. Senator Dole himself did not explain why he singled out 
contract awards for special attention. 
258. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 21. As one author put it (somewhat tauto­
logically): "[T]he goal [of the Keating Five] was to get an independent agency to back 
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Who, if anyone, should do the logging - the agency or Congress? 
Senator Dole's selection of the agency as a more logical candidate 
seems correct, for several reasons. First, if the justification for logging 
is to minimize the risks of congressional overreaching, placing the re­
sponsibility for recording these interactions in hands other than those of 
Congress itself seems appropriate. Second, a researcher could more 
conveniently retrieve all records pertaining to a single transaction if 
they were compiled by a single source rather than by multiple congres­
sional offices. Third, agencies have substantial experience maintaining 
similar logs in other contexts: many already possess formal procedures 
for recording or summarizing ex parte contacts that they receive in for­
mal adjudications259 and in rulemaking proceedings.260 Fourth, agencies 
also have broader experience than congressional offices in handling the 
privacy issues (discussed immediately below) that could arise in this 
connection. 
Any proposal for logging of congressional contacts regarding en­
forcement matters must confront some significant privacy issues. Sup­
pose that a legislator visits an agency and argues $at a constituent 
whom the agency is investigating is blameless. Spurred by this visit, the 
agency takes a closer look, concludes that the legislator . was right, and 
drops the investigation. One certainly C!lll doubt the fairness of placing 
on the public record the name of the individual who was investigated. 
The "front-page test" may make sense for members of Congress them­
selves, because they must be accountable for exercises of official 
power; but the now-vindicated citizen is in a different position. Simi­
larly, one could imagine other circumstances in which records of a con­
stituent service contact might contain private information that should 
not be stored in an easily accessible government record.261 
off from an ongoing enforcement proceeding. That's .not only wrong; more unusual for 
Washington, it's rare." Waldman, supra note 73, at 22-23. 
259. Under the APA, ex parte contacts are prohibited in formal adjudication, but if 
they do occur, the official who receives them is expected to place written communica­
tions, and memoranda summarizing oral communications, on the public record. See 5 
U.S.C. § 557(d)(l)(C) (1994). For examples of regulations that individual agencies have 
issued to implement this mandate, see 18  C.F.R. § 385.2201 (1995) (FERC); 47 C.F.R. 
§§ 1.1208, 1.1212 (1995) (FCC). Rules of the Food and Drug Administration refer spe­
cifically to legislative contacts. See 21 C.F.R. § 10.65(c), (i) (1995). 
260. See BENJAMIN W. MlNTz & NANCY G. Mil.LER, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF 
nm U.S., A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 230-32 (2d ed. 1991) 
(describing six agencies' formal procedures for recording or summarizing ex parte con­
tacts in rulemaking). 
261. For example, an agency might be studying the antitrust or tax implications of 
a planned corporate transaction; public disclosure of the existence of those plans might 
thwart their effectiveness. Or an agency's investigation of alleged fraud in _disability 
benefits might implicate highly personal medical information. 
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Although Congress might wish to design a special set of proce­
dures to deal with this tension, probably the simplest solution would be 
to make use of existing laws. Thus, the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA)262 contains a list of types of information that are exempted from 
public disclosure,263 and an extensive case law fleshes out these exemp­
tions so as to reconcile competing impulses toward disclosure and se­
crecy. Every agency has acquired experience applying the exemptions 
that relate most closely to its work. Other provisions protecting individ­
uals from unjustified disclosures of information in government hands 
are found in the Federal Privacy Act.264 Agencies are accustomed to 
working with this Act as well. On the other hand, the FOIA and the Pri­
vacy Act do not apply to Congress. Although proposals to extend those 
laws to Congress are now under consideration, the difficulties of such 
an extension should not be underestimated.265 
The FOIA also contains a well-defined set of procedures for effect­
ing disclosure. Under the FOIA framework, the basic question to re­
solve would be whether agencies should place the logs routinely into a 
publicly accessible database,266 or should instead release information 
from their logs only in response to an aff"mnative request.267 Although 
the former choice would make disclosure easier and quicker for the 
public, it could also force agencies to devote an inordinate amount of 
time to the redaction of entries that no one intends to peruse. Accord­
ingly, the latter approach seems to be the preferable default rule. An in­
dividual agency might well decide, however, in the context of its partic­
ular case load, that the risks of intrusion on legitimate privacy interests 
are so low that routine publication of the logs it maintains would be 
warranted. 
To be sure, the sort of privacy-protection precautions suggested 
here may prove to be unnecessary - or, on the contrary, may mean 
that there would be, in practice, so little disclosure of congressional 
contacts as to cast doubt on the value of the entire logging procedure. 
Congress or the agencies themselves should give due consideration to 
these empirical questions before disclosure measures are implemented 
on any ambitious scale. 
262. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994) (as amended). 
263. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1994). 
264. 5 u.s.c. § 552a (1994). 
265. See James T. O'Reilly, Applying Federal Open Government Laws to Con­
gress: An Explorative Analysis and Proposal, 31 HAR.v. J. ON LEGIS. 415 (1994). 
266. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1994). 
267. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1994). 
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A final implementation issue is suggested by an unusual episode in 
1989, when the Interior Department began to maintain a log of contacts 
between its employees and congressional offices. Congress responded 
with a brief, though ineffective, effort to prohibit the department from 
requiring the logging.268 House members explained that the Depart­
ment's procedure could deter agency whistleblowers from bringing 
questionable administrative behavior to the attention of the legislative 
branch. Although the validity of these fears is unclear, any new propo­
sal to mandate logging of congressional contacts with agencies should 
at least take into consideration, and seek to ameliorate, the potential for 
an adverse impact on valuable communications originating from the 
agencies. 
IV. FAVORITISM AND MONEY INFLUENCE IN CONSTITUENT 
SERVICE 
The Keating Five affair has given rise to an enormous amount of 
discussion about the relationship between constituent service and cam­
paign fundraising. To date, however, the Senate's response to pressures 
for new rules that might allay public fears about money influence has 
been exceedingly cautious, and the House has not responded in any for­
mal fashion at all. This Part begins by describing the limited regulation 
and case law that now exists, including the Keating case and its after­
math. Next the discussion attempts to identify some of the premises that 
should guide the design of further ethical standards in this area. Finally, 
this Part examines several options for new written guidelines, using as a 
vehicle for analysis a set of standards that were proposed during the 
Keating case by the special counsel to the Senate Ethics Committee. 
A. Background 
Financial relationships between members of Congress and their 
supporters and associates are regulated in a variety of ways. For exam­
ple, the Federal Election Campaign Act269 limits the amounts that sena­
tors and representatives may receive for their election campaigns.270 
Moreover, statutes and internal rules in each chamber circumscribe the 
outside income, gifts, travel, and other financial benefits that members 
268. See Susan M. Davies, Comment, Congressional Encroachment on Executive 
Branch Communications, 57 U. Cm. L. REv. 1297, 1297-98 (1990) (describing how 
Congress adopted the prohibition but then retreated due to White House pressure). 
269. 2 u.s.c. §§ 431-455 (1994). -
270. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a-441h (1994). 
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may accept from private parties for personal use. 271 The criminal law 
places other constraints on receipt by government officials of illicit fi­
nancial benefits from outsiders, such as bribes and illegal gratuities.272 
Until recently, however, authorities on legislative ethics had rarely 
addressed the problems generated by links between constituent service 
and financial benefits to members. Senator Paul Douglas, whose writ­
ings on legislative ethics were described earlier, stressed the importance 
of separating fundraising from casework, such as by allowing a "decent 
interval" to elapse between the favor and the request.273 Later, in 1 970, 
House Advisory Opinion No. 1 declared that one "self-evident" princi­
ple to be observed was that "[a] Member's responsibility in this area is 
to all his constituents equally . . .  irrespective of political or other con­
siderations. "274 For the most part, however, the Senate Ethics Commit­
tee had scant official guidance available to it when public pressure 
forced it to confront the Keating Five scandal. In fact, it became fairly 
clear from the early stages of that proceeding that the case implicated 
no violations of specific laws or Senate rules. Consequently, the case 
turned primarily on an application of Senate Resolution 338, a catchall 
provision empowering the Committee to redress "improper conduct 
which may reflect upon the Senate. "275 
B. The Keating Case 
As the reader will recall from our earlier perusal of the proceed­
ings in the Keating case,276 the Committee decided to take no formal ac­
tion against four of the senators. It issued a "reprimand" to Senator 
Alan Cranston, explaining that he had "engaged in an impermissible 
pattern of conduct in which fund raising and official activities were sub-
271. See supra note 32. 
272. The principal criminal provisions are discussed infra text and accompanying 
notes 308-27. 
273. Senator Douglas noted: 
It is probably not wrong for the campaign managers of a legislator before an 
election to request contributions from those for whom the legislator has done ap­
preciable favors, but this should never be presented as a payment for the services 
rendered. Moreover, the possibility of such a contribution should never be sug­
gested by the legislator or his staff at the time the favor is done. Furthermore, a 
decent interval of time should be allowed to lapse so that neither party will feel 
that there is a close connection between the two acts. Finally, not the slightest 
pressure should be put upon the recipients of the favors in regard to the 
campaign. 
DOUGLAS, supra note 63, at 89. 
274. Advisory Opinion No. l ,  supra note 131, at 1078. 
275. S. Res. 338, 88th Cong. § 2(a)(l), 1 10 CONG. REC. 16,939 (1964). 
276. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text 
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stantially linked. "2n In its final decision on Cranston, as well as in its 
earlier report on the other four senators, the Committee was clearly sen­
sitive to the central dilemma of the Keating Five case: articulating a ba­
sis on which to distinguish the five senators' conduct from that of other 
senators who are constantly engaged in both campaign fundraising and 
constituent service, sometimes with the same people. In fact, the com­
mittee labored to write a narrow decision that could justify the repri­
mand of Cranston while reaffirming conventional norms of the Senate. 
Specifically, the Committee defended constituent service as an es­
sential aspect of a senator's job,278 and indeed declared that a senator 
has an obligation to help a campaign contributor with a legitimate 
grievance, although, in such a case, the senator -should "talce special 
care" to avoid harm to the public trust.279 The Committee found that 
none of the senators had lacked a reasonable basis for raising questions 
about the fairness of the Bank Board's treatment of Lincoln;280 when 
considered apart from Keating's contributions to their campaigns, none 
of their interventions with regulators had been improper.281 Conversely, 
none of the contributions they received had been improper when con­
sidered apart from their acts of intervention.282 Thus, in Cranston's case, 
the sole basis for disciplinary action was that his fundraising and offi­
cial actions had been "substantially linked." At the same time, the 
Committee did not say that this "linkage" had been causal; it expressly 
declined to find that there had been _a corrupt bargain, which would 
have constituted bribery.283 The issue, instead, was basically one of un­
seemly appearances. 
What_ was the substance of the "substantial linkage" between 
Cranston's fundraising and official actions? The Committee was delib­
erately indefinite, stressing that its decision was based on ••the totality 
of the circumstances. "284 Nevertheless, two broad areas of improper 
conduct emerge from the Committee's explanation. First, the Committee 
found several instances in which discussions about Lincoln's regulatory 
problems between Cranston and Keating, or their respective staffs, oc­
curred in close contiguity with fundraising activities, sometimes at the 
same meetings or only days apart.285 The magnitude of Keating's contri-
277. KEATING REPORT. supra note 4, at 20. 
278. See id. at 6-7, 12. 
279. See id. at 12. 
280. See id. at 14. 
281. See id. at 14-16. 
282. See id. at 16. 
283. See id. at 29, 36. 
284. Id. at 35. 
285. See id. 
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butions to organizations affiliated with Cranston - nearly one million 
dollars - may also have contributed to the Committee's feeling that the 
financial relationship between the two of them called for an extra mea­
sure of discretion that Cranston did not display. 
The second basis for the Committee's decision was that Cranston's 
office practices resulted in an exceptional blurring of the line between 
fundraising activities and official business. The Committee relied spe­
cifically on the activities of Joy Jacobson, Cranston's chief fundraiser. 
Although she was not a Senate employee and had no substantive re­
sponsibilities, she sat in on meetings on the Lincoln problem, arranged 
some substantive meetings, and so forth. She also sent Cranston memo­
randa indicating a belief that his major financial backers, including 
Keating, were entitled to expect favored treatment, a belief that Cran­
ston apparently never sought to dispel.286 
A critical appraisal of the Committee's rationale leaves one with 
the uneasy feeling that Cranston's misconduct regarding Keating was, at 
most, different only in degree from what other members of Congress 
do. Cranston's bitter "everyone does it" defense287 may not have been 
literally correct, because differences of degree can matter; but the Com­
mittee's reasoning, with its vague central concept of "substantially 
linked" activities and its reliance on the "totality of circumstances," 
had little capacity to provide guidance to other legislators. The finding 
that Cranston's office practices differed from those of other senators 
seems to have rested on a firmer factual foundation;288 yet one can 
scarcely believe that this finding would have led to disciplinary action 
in the absence of the charges relating to Keating. 
C. Rule XLIII 
Whatever the limitations of its ruling as a source of instruction for 
other senators, the Ethics Committee managed to save some face by 
pointing out that guidance might soon be forthcoming from another 
quarter.289 At the Committee's request, the Senate party leaders had ap­
pointed a bipartisan task force the previous April to draft prospective 
rules governing senators' constituent service activities. That task force, 
chaired by Senator Wendell Ford, presented its report the following 
spring in the form of a resolution. In July 1992 the Senate adopted the 
286. See id. at 27-29. 
287. See Kuntz, supra note 7, at 3438. 
288. See KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 31. 
289. See id. at 16, 50. 
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resolution - with an absolute minimum of fanfare290 - as Rule XLill 
of the Senate Code of Official Conduct.291 
Like Advisory Opinion No. 1,  which the House Ethics Committee 
adopted in 1970, Rule XLill begins by affirming the right of a legisla­
tor to assist constituents or other petitioners by communicating with ad­
ministrative officials. The rule lists several types of services that sena­
tors may render, such as "express[ing] judgments" and "call[ing] for 
reconsideration of an administrative response. "292 Then comes the only 
substantive limitation in the rule: "The decision to provide assistance to 
petitioners may not be made on the basis of contributions or services, or 
promises of contributions or services, to the Member's political cam­
paigns or to other organizations in which the Member has a political, 
personal, or financial interest. "293 The rule also declares that senators 
are responsible for the conduct of their staff. 
The rule and the accompanying section-by-section analysis by its 
sponsors are carefully drafted, but the substance of the rule is extraordi­
narily cautious. In fact, the rule really does nothing to upgrade the ethi­
cal standards governing senators' constituent service practices. The 
rule's admonition that decisions about whether to provide service to 
constituents and other petitioners "may not be made on the basis of" 
financial contributions merely restates a proposition that had previously 
been expressed in the House's Advisory Opinion No. l294 and in the 
Keating report.295 At most, therefore, the new rule elevates what had 
290. Senator Ford brought the resolution to the Senate floor "[i]n the dead of 
night"; two senators made brief supporting remarks; the Senate passed the resolution by 
voice vote; and minutes later Congress left for a two-week recess. Glenn R. Simpson, 
Senate Quietly OKs Constituent Service Rule; Votes Just Moments Before Recess on 
Post-Keating Provisions for Handling Requests, ROLL CALL, July 13, 1992, available 
in LEXIS, Legis Library, Rolle! File. Obviously the Senate was not inclined to advertise 
its new rule as a triumph for reformism. 
291. See S. Res. 273, 102d Cong. 138 CONG. REc. S9764 (daily ed. July 2, 1992). 
292. The task force borrowed this list almost verbatim from the House advisory 
opinion. See Advisory Opinion No. 1, supra note 131, at 1078. 
293. SENATE RULE XLll(3), 138 CONG. REc. S9764 (daily ed. July 2, 1992). 
294. "A Member's responsibility in this area is to all his constituents equally • • .  
irrespective of political or other considerations." Advisory Opinion No. 1,  supra note 
131, at 1078. 
295. 
The cardinal principle governing Senators' conduct in this area is that a Senator 
and a Senator's office should make decisions about whether to intervene with the 
executive branch or independent agencies on behalf of an individual without re­
gard to whether the individual has contributed, or promised to contribute, to the 
Senator's campaigns or other causes in which he or she has a financial, political 
or personal interest 
KEATING REPORT. supra note 4, at 1 1-12; see also id. at 30. 
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been a supporting rationale in the Keating case to the status of a 
positive-law requirement. 
Moreover, the rule is actually less stringent than Advisory Opinion 
No. l ,  because it does not endorse the House committee's renunciation 
of suggestions of "favoritism or reprisal." That principle - as well as 
Senator Douglas's advice - presumably would carry some moral au­
thority in any future ethics enforcement proceeding, but, as the Ethics 
Committee itself pointed out in the Keating case, they do not have the 
force of Senate precedents.296 
Finally, although the new rule states a desirable precept as far as it 
goes, its utility as an enforcement mechanism seems quite limited. 
When the Ethics Committee is asked to enforce the rule, it will have to 
make an inquiry into motive, which may be fruitless in the absence of 
unusual "smoking gun" evidence. It is already hard for the Committee 
to reach a consensus on matters that are deeply personal and have such 
obvious partisan implications in the background. Making the operative 
standard inherently conjectural can only aggravate this difficulty. To be 
sure, one could have criticized the parallel language of Advisory Opin­
ion No. 1 and the Keating report on the same ground. The point re­
mains, however, that Rule XLill is unlikely to make any significant dif­
ference in Senate nonns or practice. Presumably the rule would prevent 
an office from overtly establishing a double standard between the ser­
vices it renders to contributors and noncontributors; but it is hard to be­
lieve that any senatorial office has such a policy, at least after the Keat­
ing affair. 297 
Ultimately, each House must strike a balance between a legisla­
tor's freedom to serve constituents and her responsibility to uphold the 
public trust. Given the vagueness of the Keating case's teachings -
combined with the remarkable restraint manifested in Rule XLill -
one can be confident that the Senate's efforts to reconcile these compet­
ing objectives will not be the last word. Accordingly, the following sec­
tions attempt to carry forward the debate where the prevailing ethics au­
thorities have left off. 
296. "[S]ources . . .  such as the writings of Senator Paul Douglas and Advisory 
Opinion No. 1 of the House . . .  have value as helpful guidance • • • .  However, these 
sources, in and of themselves, are not precedential and should not be considered as es­
tablished Senate norms for purposes of discipline." Id. at 14. 
297. Had it been in force at the time of the Keating decision, however, Rule XLID 
would have furnished a straightforward basis for disciplinary action in Cranston's case: 
the Committee found that Joy Jacobson made clear her belief that contributors deserved 
special favors and that Cranston never tried to disabuse her of this understanding. See 
id. at 20. 
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D. Tightening the Rules: Some Normative Premises 
Before turning to specific proposals that are intended to curb fa­
voritism and money influence in constituent service, this section exam­
ines some of the underlying policy considerations that any such reforms 
must take into account. Once again, the subject can be analyzed as in­
volving conflicting responsibilities. Some of those responsibilities lend 
impetus to the argument for stricter regulation; others suggest the need 
for a degree of caution. 
1. The Impulse Toward Stricter Regulation 
In a sense, the case for new ethics rules in this area seems obvious. 
All would agree298 that members of Congress should not intervene in 
administrative proceedings because their services have been purchased 
for money. As noted earlier, most legislative ethics regulation is ad­
dressed to conflicts of interest between a member's self-interest and her 
legislative duties, and the manner in which constituent service can be 
used to promote one's reelection prospects would certainly fit that 
description.299 The weakness of Rule XLill's response to this sort of 
abuse naturally stimulates interest in finding stronger remedies. 
One difficulty in appraising the strength of this rationale, however, 
is that it does not, and apparently cannot, rest on tangible evidence of 
pervasive favoritism in constituent service. Disturbing as the Keating 
episode was, no one has substantiated the frequently encountered accu­
sation300 that it was typical of a large class of cases. Indeed, political 
science accounts of constituent service tend to indicate the contrary. 
John Johannes, in his book on casework (published before the Keating 
scandal), reported that although interventions by congressional offices 
in administrative agency matters were not always free of favoritism, 
most were.301 Nor have other empirical studies of constituent service 
identified favoritism as a significant problem.302 
298. Except, perhaps, Charles Keating. When asked whether he thought his contri­
butions had brought him influence, he responded, "I certainly hope so.'' Terry Atlas, 
Scandal Builds Around Lincoln S&L, Cm. Tum., Nov. 19, 1989, at C7. 
299. See supra notes 31-34, 83 and accompanying text. 
300. See, e.g., Lied!, supra note 73. 
301. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 124-25. Interestingly, Johannes seemed to 
assume that to the extent the offices gave special treatment to anyone, they generally 
did so for a member's personal friends or political allies, or for VIPs from the home 
district; he barely mentioned contributors as potential beneficiaries of such treatment. 
See id. at 123-27. But see id. at 124, 154 (quoting two caseworkers who alluded to fa­
voritism for "big contributors"). 
302. Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina, although generally skeptical about the value of 
constituent service to the body politic, do not mention the issue of favoritism at all. See 
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Members and staff point to several factors303 as militating against 
special treatment for particular requesters, including a sense of profes­
sionalism among caseworkers, their awareness of existing ethics rules, 
and apprehensions about adverse publicity (which may be the greatest 
deterrent factor of all, particularly since the Keating affair304). Political 
logic also lends plausibility to congressional offices' claims that they do 
not confme constituent service to friends and supporters: part of the 
motivation for casework is that the member can use it to reap political 
support from citizens who might not agree with her stands on policy 
issues.305 
• 
Of course, the ethical hazards of special treatment for campaign 
contributors in the constituent service process deserve the ethics com­
mittees' attention even if overt favoritism in that process is not particu­
larly common. Moreover, Congress has at least one other obvious rea­
son to consider tightening existing safeguards against favoritism in 
constituent service: the prevalent public belief that Congress as an insti­
tution has fallen captive to wealthy "special interests." The Keating 
case has become a focal point for public disgust about lobbyists, PACs, 
and other symbols of the dominance of money in the legislature. The 
scramble for campaign donations has become so visible, and the 
amounts involved so large, that corruption seems to many citizens an 
ever-present danger on the legislative scene. Thus, even if stories about 
special favors in the specific context of constituent service are excep­
tional, they loom large when seen through the lens of the widely held 
conviction that people like Charles Keating already enjoy more than 
their share of political influence. 
The House and Senate have recently made efforts to counteract 
these perceptions by voting to overhaul their rules on acceptance of 
gifts and on lobbyist registration.306 Similarly, the shaky state of Con­
gress's reputation for integrity should give impetus to any proposal that 
promises to reassure the public that the legislative branch is striving to 
free itself from the risks of dependency and of "legalized bribery." The 
establishment of visible and relatively objective rules may minimize the 
CAIN ET AL.. supra note 45. Klonoff asserts that constituent service is equally available 
to all citizens. See Klonoff, supra note 46, at 708 n.26. 
303. See JOHANNES, supra note 44, at 125-27. 
304. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text 
305. See PRICE, supra note 63, at 1 19; supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text; 
cf. Lowenstein, supra note 30, at 849-50 (arguing that exchanges of favors between leg­
islators and administrators - so-called "state-bribery" - should not be considered 
criminal bribery, in part because they benefit the affluent and nonaffluent alike). 
306. See Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 
(codified at 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1612 (West Supp. 1996)); supra note 32. 
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chances of incidents that would embarrass their institution in the future. 
Perhaps such rules could also provide something of a safe harbor for 
members whose constituent service or fundraising practices might sub­
sequently be questioned. 
2. Cautionary Factors: Lessons from the Corruption Case Law 
Nevertheless, there are valid reasons to approach proposals for re­
form with circumspection. First, Congress should leave sufficient lati­
tude for members to perform constituent service, which .in and of itself 
constitutes a legitimate feature of the informal checks-and-balances sys­
tem of the government. The executive branch does make mistakes, and 
congressional intervention is often a useful corrective to bureaucratic 
error. This theme has been developed at length in Part II and need not 
be recapitulated here. 
Second, the Senate Ethics Committee was correct when it re­
marked in the Keating case that fundraising for congressional cam­
paigns is "a fact of life."307 Ethics rules designed to prevent special 
treatment for contributors must come to terms with that reality. 
Obviously members of Congress desire latitude for campaign fun­
draising - but should the ethics rules accommodate that desire? One 
way to explore that question would be to examine the attitudes of a rel­
atively disinterested branch of government - the judiciary - in an 
analogous context. Just as the field of administrative law sheds light on 
the proper contours of "undue influence" in legislative ethics, the crim­
inal law offers suggestive lessons about the needs of legislators as can­
didates. The most relevant case law arises under the corruption statutes, 
including those punishing bribery, extortion, and illegal gratuities. 
These provisions raise numerous issues of interpretation that other 
scholarly works have dissected in detail;308 for present purposes only a 
few points from the case law need be mentioned. 
307. KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 16. 
308. See 2 KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY §§ 9:28-
:41 (2d ed. 1993). Regarding the specific problem of applying the corruption laws to 
campaign contributions, see Jmrn T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES 621-51 (1984); Lowen­
stein, supra note 30; ROSENBERG & MASKELL, supra note 130, at 41-62. The last­
cited study includes a discussion of the criminal "conflict of interest" statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 203 (1994), which prohibits members from accepting "compensation" for "represen­
tational services" before federal agencies. See id. at 48-52. Neither that statute nor sev­
eral other obscure criminal provisions analyzed by Rosenberg and Maskell will be dis­
cussed here, because of the absence of case law directly addressing the issue with which 
this section is concerned. Cf. James M. Falvey, Note, The Congressional Ethics Di­
lemma: Constituent Service or Conflict of Interest?, 28 AM.. CRIM. L. REV. 323, 348, 
358-59 (1991) (acknowledging, despite the allure of applying § 203 to facts like those 
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The corruption laws certainly place some outer limits on a legisla­
tor's ability to use constituent service as a fundraising device. Undoubt­
edly, campaign contributions are sometimes bribes,309 and a legislator's 
intervention with an administrative agency is sometimes the considera­
tion for which the forbidden payment is made.31° Furthermore, the 
Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution,311 which prevents courts 
from examining the "legislative acts" of members of Congress, would 
probably not impede a prosecution of a legislator for taldng a bribe in 
exchange for constituent service, because casework is not the kind of 
"legislative act" that the clause shields from judicial scrutiny.312 
Nevertheless, the courts have sometimes taken great pains to avoid 
a reading of the corruption laws that would interfere with the legitimate 
needs of the campaign fmance system. The Supreme Court made its 
clearest statement along these lines in McCormick v. United States.313 
The defendant was a West Vrrginia state legislator who solicited money 
from an organization of foreign-born doctors on whose behalf he was 
sponsoring legislation to liberalize medical licensing requirements for 
organization members. The Department of Justice prosecuted him under 
the Hobbs Act, an extortion statute that applies to "the obtaining of 
property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of ac­
tual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official 
right. "314 McCormick defended his actions on the ground that the pay­
ments he had received from the doctors had been campaign 
contributions. 
The Court found compelling policy reasons to read the statute to 
permit normal solicitation of political contributions: 
Serving constituents and supporting legislation that will benefit the 
district and individuals and groups therein is the everyday business of a 
legislator. It is also true that campaigns must be run and financed. Money 
is constantly being solicited on behalf of candidates, who run on plat­
forms and who claim support on the basis of their views and what they 
intend to do or have done. Whatever ethical considerations and appear­
ances may indicate, to hold that legislators commit the federal crime of 
of the Keating case, the lack of case law defining when, if at all, campaign contribu­
tions can be "compensation"). 
309. See United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 312, 330-31 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Low­
enstein, supra note 30, at 808-09. 
310. See, e.g., United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1990); United States 
v. Podell, 519 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1975). 
311 .  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 ("[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, 
they shall not be questioned in any other Place . • . .  "). 
312. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972). 
313. 500 U.S. 257 (1991). 
314. 18 u.s.c. § 195l(b)(2) (1994). 
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extortion when they act for the benefit of constituents or support legisla­
tion furthering the interests of some of their constituents, sl\ortly before 
or after campaign contributions are solicited and received from those 
beneficiaries • • . would open to prosecution . . • conduct that in a very 
real sense is unavoidable so long as election campaigns are financed by 
private contributions or expenditures, as they have been from the begin.:. 
ning of the Nation.31s 
77 
Therefore, political contributions would be subject to prosecution as 
having been obtained "under color of official right," within the mean­
ing of the Hobbs Act, "only if the payments are made in return for an 
explicit promise or undertaltjng by the official to perform or not to per­
form an official act. In such situations the official asserts that his offi­
cial conduct will be controlled by the terms of the promise or undertak­
ing."316 The Court's requirement of an "explicit promise or 
undertaking" - one form of a "quid pro quo" - was striking because 
of the absence of statutory language on ·which to predicate it.317 Equally 
striking, perhaps, is that even the government essentially agreed with 
this requirement, at least in the abstract; its defense of the verdict in 
McCormick rested on the assumption that the jury had properly found 
that the payments to McCormick were not campaign contributions at 
all.318 
The strained statutory construction to which the Court resorted in 
McCormick319 would not have been necessary if the case had involved a 
315. McCormick, 500 U.S. at 272. Note the Court's suggestion that "ethical con­
siderations" may diverge from the dictates of the criminal law. Still, if the Court is cor­
rect in its belief that the described conduct is "unavoidable," ethics rules must take that 
fact into account, just as the criminal justice system does. 
316. 500 U.S. at 273. 
317. See 500 U.S. at 277 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
318. See Brief for the United States at 29, McCormick (1991) (No. 89-1918) ("If 
this case had involved a campaign contribution rather than a personal payoff, it would 
have been necessary for the government to prove that the contribution was obtained by 
a threat to take unfavorable action or a specific promise to take favorable action, i.e., a 
quid pro quo."). See also Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 286. (1992) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (reasoning that the quid pro quo requirement in McCormick was necessary 
"to prevent the Hobbs Act from effecting a radical (and absurd) change in American 
political life"). 
319. The policy analysis in McCormick may have lost some of its practical impor­
tance in light of a later case, Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992), in which the 
Court apparently adopted a restrictive mental state requirement for all extortion prose­
cutions arising out of the "under color of official right" language of the Hobbs Act -
regardless of whether campaign contributions are involved. See 504 U.S. at 268 n.20. 
The Court defined the requisite state of mind for such prosecutions somewhat more 
broadly than McCormick had: an agreement would not have to be explicit, but could be 
inferred from the official's having "obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, 
knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts." 504 U.S. at 268; see 
also 504 U.S. at 257 (finding that the defendant's acceptance of bribe, with knowledge 
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member of Congress prosecuted under the federal bribery statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 201(b)(2). That statute contains explicit language suggesting a 
quid pro quo requirement: the bribed official must have solicited, ac­
cepted, or agreed to accept something of value "in return for . . .  being 
influenced" in the performance of an official act.320 Moreover, the brib­
ery statute also requires a showing that the official acted "corruptly," a 
criterion that would surely leave room for judicial flexibility if some fu­
ture case were to present a possibility that a member of Congress had 
been convicted of bribery because of normal fundraising actions.321 
Thus, although one reasonably could assume that, on facts like those of 
McCormick, the Court would require at least as strong a showing of a 
guilty mental state under the bribery statute as it has required under the 
Hobbs Act,322 the case law acknowledging a quid pro quo requirement 
under § 201(b)(2)323 is not a particularly illuminating test of the judici­
ary's solicitude for the campaign fundraising process. 
The statute imposing liability for the offense of accepting an illegal 
gratuity, 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2), is a different story. It applies to any of­
ficial who, "otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge 
of official duty . . .  seeks [or] receives . . .  anything of value personally 
for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such 
official. "324 On its face this statute seems to pose a considerable threat 
to routine solicitation or acceptance of campaign contributions, because 
its words do not even hint at a requirement of an illicit bargain or cor­
rupt motive. 
of payor's intent to ensure favorable action, "constituted an implicit promise to use his 
official position to serve the interests of the bribegiver"). Lower courts remain uncer­
tain whether the Court has modified McCormick itself, that is to say, whether a jury 
should be instructed to apply the relaxed Evans state of mind rules even if it finds that a 
payment was a bona fide campaign contribution. See United States v. Blandford, 33 
F.3d 685, 695-98 (6th Cir. 1994) (summarizing competing views}, cert. denied, 115 S. 
Ct 1821 (1995). 
320. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (1994) (emphasis added). 
321. Lowenstein's solution to the problem of potential overbreadth in the bribery 
laws is to define the scope of "corruptness" by reference to "intermediate political the­
ory" - theoretical assumptions about what rules are most conducive to the health of 
the political system. See Lowenstein, supra note 30, at 805-06. That method is roughly 
comparable to the approach used by the McCormick and Brewster decisions discussed 
in this section, although these courts may have reached substantive conclusions that dif­
fer from Lowenstein's. 
322. Cf. United States v. Allen, 10 F.3d 405, 41 1 (7th Cir. 1993) (dictum) (sug­
gesting that bribery statutes should be read consistently with McCormick unless they 
contain language plainly suggesting otherwise). 
323. See, e.g., United States v. Niederberger, 580 F.2d 63, 68 (3d Cir. 1978); 
United States v. Raborn, 575 F.2d 688, 692 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Strand, 574 
F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1978). 
324. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(l) (1994). 
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Nevertheless, in a leading decision, United States v. Brewster,325 
the D.C. Circuit insisted that the gratuity statute, too, must be inter­
preted in light of political reality. Reversing a senator's conviction on 
gratuity charges because of faulty jury instructions, the court pointed 
out the problem: the statute would eradicate the distinction between an 
unlawful gratuity and a legitimate campaign contribution if it were con­
strued to allow liability on the basis of a legislator's mere knowledge 
that a contribution was made because of the legislator's record and 
would probably be followed by further contributions if the legislator 
maintained a similar record: 
· 
No politician who knows the identity and business interests of his cam­
paign contributors is ever completely devoid of knowledge as to the in­
spiration behind the donation. There must be more specific knowledge of 
a definite official act for which the contributor intends to compensate 
before an official's action crosses the line between guilt and innocence.326 
The situation might be different, the court noted, in a prosecution 
against an unelected official, such as an Internal Revenue Service agent. 
In such a case the government might not need to prove any mental 
state; any "tip" paid to the agent as an individual could be considered 
wrongful, as it would compensate him for actions that he is supposed to 
take anyway. But this logic does not work for elected officials, who 
under some circumstances should accept payments of money based on 
the giver's appreciation of the official's past or anticipated actions. 
Therefore, the gratuity offense as applied to an elected official must 
contain an element of criminal intent.327 
For this article's purposes, the significant aspect of McCormick and 
Brewster is not whether they drew lines in precisely the right place -
indeed, both have been criticized.328 More important is the courts' un­
derlying point the criminal law must not be applied in a manner that 
makes political fundraising unworkable. One need make only a small 
extension of this reasoning to arrive at the conclusion that ethics rules, 
325. 506 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
326. 506 F.2d at 81. See also Lowenstein, supra note 30, at 848 & n.237 (agreeing 
that a straightforward reading of the gratuity statute is unacceptable, because it would 
seriously interfere with legitimate campaign finance activities). 
327. See 506 F.2d at 72-73 n.26. See also Note, Campaign Contributions and Fed­
eral Bribery Law, 92 HAR.v. L. REv. 451, 455-58 (1978) (supporting Brewster's dis­
tinction between elected and unelected officials). 
328. See, e.g., James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery­
Extortion Distinction, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1695, 1710-1 1, 1736-38 (1993) (criticizing 
McCormick); William M. Welch II, Comment, The Federal Bribery Statute and Special 
Interest Campaign Contributions, 19 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1347, 1359-65 
(1989) (criticizing Brewster). 
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too, must take account of candidates' legitimate interest in raising 
money for reelection campaigns.329 
3. The Campaign Finance Reform Connection 
The previous section's extrapolation from judicial decisions may 
seem unconvincing, because the legislature - unlike the judiciary -
does not have to take the campaign finance system as a given. Congress 
could alter the system itself. Indeed, the Senate Ethics Committee's re­
port on the Keating case included an "urgent" call for bipartisan cam­
paign finance reform.330 Of course, campaign finance reform is already 
the subject of a vast literature, and this article cannot do justice to its 
complexities. Still, the logical connection between that subject and the 
Keating scandal is too obvious to ignore. The following discussion does 
not argue for any particular reform program; it merely attempts to 
demonstrate that campaign finance reform would not necessarily elimi­
nate, and might not even go far toward ameliorating, the problems of 
ethics regulation examined in this Part. 
In the first place, the need for congressional candidates, including 
incumbents, to raise large sums from private sources is likely to remain 
a ''fact of life"331 even if Congress does enact some form of campaign 
finance reform legislation. For that situation to change, campaign costs 
would have to be either heavily subsidized or drastically reduced, and 
neither is probable. The option of large-scale public financing of Senate 
and Hpuse races appears to lack support from the electorate and has lit­
tle chance of being adopted anytime soon.332 This is not to say that new 
campaign finance legislation is unlikely to draw upon public resources 
329. See CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST, supra note 38, at 180 (noting that, 
unlike other gifts, "campaign contributions are tolerated [in governmental ethics] be­
cause they are a necessary incident of our present electoral system"). 
330. See KEATING REPoRT, supra note 4, at 16-17. But see Glenn R. Simpson, 
Campaign Reform Now Back on Front Burner, RoLL CALL, Mar. 7, 1991, available in 
LEXIS, Legis Library, Rolle! File (quoting Professor Sabato's view that the committee's 
remark constituted "passing the buck"). 
331 .  See supra note 307 and accompanying text 
332. See, e.g., Schotland, supra note 252, at 457; Frank J. Sorauf, Politics, Experi­
ence, and the First Amendment: The Case of American Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. 
L. REv. 1348, 1357 (1994): Gary C. Jacobson, Campaign Finance and Democratic 
Control: Comments on Gottlieb and Lowenstein's Papers, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 369, 
381-82 (1989); Helen Dewar, Stalemate of Survival, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1992, at Al 
(quoting former Representative Al Swift's explanation of the poor prospects for public 
financing: Congress "will never, never, never do what the public doesn't want and it 
doesn't want"); cf. Panel Discussion, Campaign Finance, 8 J.L. & POL. 294 (1992) 
(discussion of taxpayers' declining participation in public funding mechanism for presi­
dential campaigns). 
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at all. For the foreseeable future, however, political realities probably 
dictate that both incumbents' and challengers' campaigns will remain 
primarily dependent on private money. 
At the same time, efforts to overcome the reality that congressional 
campaigning is expensive would likely prove futile or self-defeating. 
Barring a major reappraisal by the Supreme Court of its First Amend­
ment case law, Congress could not impose mandatory limits on spend­
ing without inviting a strong constitutional challenge.333 Moreover, the 
weight of the political science literature indicates that stringent limits on 
campaign spending would be ill-advised as a matter of policy, because 
they would handicap challengers and entrench incumbents.334 Challeng­
ers generally need generous funding if they are to have a serious chance 
of overcoming the advantages of incumbency - one of which, as we 
have seen, is the incumbent's record o� constituent service itself.335 Per­
haps there is a case for some spending limits, particularly if they are 
made voluntary and set at relatively high levels. Much less acceptable, 
however, is the notion that a serious reform program would or should 
limit expenditures to such an extent that members would lose the incen­
tive to exploit constituent service for the sake of campaign 
contributions.336 
Even if one accepts the thesis developed to this point - that one 
should not count on campaign finance legislation to eliminate the need 
333. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,  54-59 (1976). In view of the Court's recent 
reaffinnation of First Amendment limits on regulation of election-related spending in 
Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 1 16 S. Ct 2309 (1996), the pros­
pects for such a retrenchment seem remote at best Although Congress could presuma­
bly overcome the constitutional difficulty by making spending limits voluntary and of­
fering incentives to induce candidates to comply With them (as it has done with public 
financing of presidential campaigns, see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 90-108), generous incen­
tives would revive the probler of taxpayer resistance to the funding of elections from 
the public treasury. 
334. Gary Jacobson is the leading exponent of this thesis. See, e.g., Gary C. Jacob­
son, Enough Is Too Much: Money and Competition in House Elections, in ELECTIONS 
IN .AMERICA 173 (Kay Lehman Schlozman ed., 1987). Scholars in this field widely ac­
cept his view. See, e.g., HERBERT E. ALExANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, 
ELECTIONS, & PoLmCAL REFORM 173-74 (4th ed. 1992); Schotland, supra note 252, 
at 452-56; Norman J. Ornstein, Reforming Campaign Reform, N.Y. T!MEs, June 25, 
1991, at A25 ("Virtually every academic expert on campaign finance dismisses limits 
as unfair impediments to unknown challengers seeking to unseat well-financed incum­
bents."). For a dissent, see Jonathan S. Krasno & Donald Philip Green, Stopping the 
Buck Here, BROOKINGS REv., Spring 1993, at 17. 
335. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text 
336. The discussion in the text has assumed for the sake of argument that efforts 
to curb the money flow would actually be effective, but that premise is open to doubt 
Experience testifies to candidates' ingenuity in finding ways to circumvent legislative 
ceilings on their campaign spending. See, e.g., ALExANDER, supra note 334, at 170. 
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for extensive political fundraising - one might expect that such legisla­
tion would at least improve the ethical environment for congressional 
constituent service. But even that proposition is open to doubt. As 
scholars have repeatedly observed, the history of campaign finance re­
form is a "classic illustration of the law of unanticipated conse­
quences."337 Future measures could easily meet a similar fate.338 
The difficulties can be explored in connection with a few reform 
proposals that respond directly to problems that the Keating scandal 
highlighted. Charles Keating's ability to generate huge contributions to 
the five senators was a direct result of his assiduous 'exploitation of 
loopholes that permitted "bundling" (aggregation of contributions from 
many donors for a single candidate) and "soft money" donations (con­
tributions to party activities, such as voter registration and get-out-the­
vote drives).339 Current campaign finance reform bills contain provi­
sions that would curb these practices,340 and Congress should give these 
proposed measures due attention.341 
As intrinsically attractive as these proposals may seem, however, 
their significance for the ethical climate of Congress should not be eval­
uated in a vacuum. A crucial question is whether the avenues for fun­
draising that would exist under the new regime, taken as a whole, 
would be less likely to lead to abuse than the avenues available under 
the old system. This question cannot be answered with much confi-
337. Sorauf, supra note 332, at 1365; see Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance 
Reform: Specious Arguments, Intractable Dilemmas, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 1258, 1276, 
1279 (1994); Schotland, supra note 252, at 437 & n.16. 
338. See Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 
CoLUM. L. REv. 1390, 1400, 1411  (1994) (warning of this possibility). 
339. See Simpson, supra note 330. See generally Peter H. Stone, Labyrinth of 
Laopholes, NATL. J., Nov. 25, 1995, at 2912 (documenting continued prevalence of 
bundling and soft money practices). 
340. The leading bill of the 104th Congress was a "bipartisan" package that, 
among other things, would have established "voluntary" spending limits and offered 
various incentives to induce candidates to accept them. It also would have imposed se­
vere restrictions on bundling, soft money contributions, and PACs. See S. 1219, 104th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). In June 1996 the Senate sponsors lost in an attempt to over­
come a filibuster, and essentially conceded that the bill would not be enacted during the 
104th Congress. See Adam Clymer, Senate Kills Bill To Limit Spending in Congress 
Races, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1996, at Al. 
341. Both of the practices under discussion have their defenders. See Beth 
Donovan, Much-Maligned 'Soft Money' Is Precious to Both Parties, 51 CONG. Q. 
WKLY. REP. 1 195 (1993) (noting support among political scientists for parties' liberal 
access to soft money); Robert Alan Dahl, 'Bundling' Political Expression, LEGAL 
TIMES OF WASH.. Sept 20, 1993, at 23 (opposing ban on bundling). The basic question 
for Congress is whether it can preserve the beneficial aspects of bundling and soft 
money while preventing them from being used to undermine the fundamental purposes 
of election regulation. 
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dence. Reforms such as curbs on bundling or soft money would pre­
sumably have the effect of increasing the pressure on members to solicit 
from a larger number of donors. It is at least plausible to suppose that 
this pressure could actually intensify incumbents' temptations to exploit 
constituent service as one means of winning support from these 
donors.342 
Other components of a reform package might augment those temp­
tations even further. For example, one of the most popular proposals, 
which stands a good chance of becoming part of any overhaul of cam­
paign finance laws,343 is to eliminate or sharply reduce the amounts that 
candidates may accept from political action committees (PACs). 
Whatever the overall merits of this idea,344 it seems inapt as a cure for 
the problems of the Keating case.345 By definition, PACs tend to be 
broad-based. They are likely to be much more interested in a member's 
legislative record than in, say, the member's willingness to intervene in 
an agency enforcement proceeding brought against an individual.346 In­
deed, PACs have seldom if ever been accused of attempting to subvert 
congressional constituent service functions. Perhaps, as some argue, 
tighter constraints on PACs are essential because of their corrupting in­
fluence on congressional lawmaking;347 nevertheless, a shift in the rela­
tive influence of PACs and individuals in the financing of congressional 
campaigns would not seem likely to improve, and might actually aggra-
342. Cf. Sorauf, supra note 332, at 1365 ("[T]he danger of making the supply of 
money too small for the candidate demand [is that] the 'value' of contributed money in­
creases and thus its political leverage."). 
343. See supra note 340. 
344. Much of the scholarly literature suggests that the case against PACs is not as 
strong as the public usually assumes. See ALExANDER, supra note 334, at 171-72; 
Larry J. Sabato, PACs and Parties, in MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND DEMOCRACY: RE­
FORMING CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE 187, 187-90 (Margaret Latus 
Nugent & John R. Johannes eds., 1990); Sorauf, supra note 332, at 1364-65. 
345. Cf. Simpson, supra note 330 (debunking Common Cause advertisements that 
cited the Keating scandal in support of proposals to ban PACs, even though Keating did 
not operate through a PAC). 
346. Agency rulemaking proceedings may occupy a middle ground between these 
poles: one can easily envision a PAC attempting to induce a member of Congress to be 
"helpful" in such a proceeding, but at the same time rulemaking proceedings are con­
sidered among the most appropriate for legislative participation. See supra note 179. 
347. In one of the more ambitious efforts to document the corrupting power of 
PACs, Lowenstein claims that PACs tend to promote their ends by using a "legislative 
strategy" - that is, trying to use donations to win the passage of statutes that favor 
their interests. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root 
of All Evil ls Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 301, 308-13, 329-35 (1989). He 
does not assert that they similarly corrupt constituent service. 
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vate, the political context within which casework occurs.348 This might 
become one of the "unanticipated consequences" of campaign finance 
reform. 
Finally, even if Congress could somehow manage to devise a 
workable and politically acceptable method by which its members could 
run for office without any major donors, the ethics issues examined in 
this Part would not disappear entirely. Although lavish political support 
like Keating's triggers the most intense apprehensions about congres­
sional favoritism, much smaller contributions - which would continue 
to exist under any plausible campaign finance regime - sometimes 
touch a raw nerve in public opinion as well.349 Regardless of the fate of 
campaign finance reform, ethics authorities must think through the man­
ner in which they will respond to those sentiments. 
E. Reform Proposals and New Approaches 
Against this background of competing tensions, Congress should 
look with an open mind at suggestions for further ethical limitations on 
constituent service. Perhaps the rules can be refined in a way that would 
provide greater reassurance of members' integrity without unduly bur­
dening their ability to perform the ordinary functions of their offices. 
Moreover, even members who oppose further restrictions on their free­
dom of action should appreciate the desirability of making existing ex­
pectations more explicit. Clarification of what is now the "unwritten 
law" might make it easier to follow, more predictable in its application, 
and more reassuring to the public than is now possible under the pre­
vailing, open-ended "improper conduct" standard, a criterion that the 
chairman of the Senate Ethics Committee, Senator Heflin, aptly de­
scribed as a know-it-when-you-see-it test.350 
If Congress does reopen serious consideration of the ethics issues 
surrounding constituent services for contributors, what new standards 
should it adopt? Analysis could begin with some of the ideas for regula­
tion that emerged during the Keating proceedings themselves. During 
348. See Two Cheers for PACs, ROLL CALL, May 10, 1993, at 4 ("Our own work 
at this newspaper has shown, time and again, that truly unsavory donors are not PACs, 
but individuals [such as Keating]."). ' 
349. See, e.g., Contributions and Constituent Service, ST. Lams POST-DISPATCH, 
Oct 16, 1993, at 14B (editorial criticizing a state legislator who wrote to a state agency 
on behalf of a day care home and soon afterwards accepted a $250 campaign contribu­
tion from the home's owners). 
350. See Kuntz, supra note 7, at 3432. 
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the Ethics Committee's hearings, Special Counsel Bennett proposed 
four principles for the Committee's consideration:351 
1. A Senator should not take contributions from an individual he 
knows or should know is attempting to procure his services to in­
tervene in a specific matter pending before a Federal agency. 
2. A Senator should not take unusual or aggressive action with regard 
to a specific matter before a Federal agency on behalf of a contrib­
utor when he knows, or has reason to know, the contributor has 
sought to procure his services. 
3. A Senator should not conduct his fundraising efforts or engage in 
office practices which lead contributors to conclude that they can 
buy access to him. 
4. A Senator should not engage in conduct which would appear to be 
improper to a reasonable, nonpartisan, fully informed person. 
The Committee's ultimate decision did not expressly endorse any of 
these principles, but its reasoning contained echoes of all of them. The 
Bennett standards deserve attention here because, although each can be 
criticized, they do pose the right issues for consideration: (1) simultane­
ity of constituent service with solicitation or acceptance of political con­
tributions; (2) intervention on behalf of contributors; (3) office prac­
tices; and ( 4) discipline based on the appearance of impropriety. 
1. Simultaneity of Campaign Contributions and Intervention 
a. The "Decent Interval" Test. Up to a point, Bennett's principle 
that "[a] Senator should not take contributions from an individual he 
knows or should know is attempting to procure his or her services to in­
tervene in a specific matter pending before a Federal agency" bears 
comparison with the first prong of the Ethics Committee's ruling on 
Senator Cranston's conduct. Both start from the premise that, even if a 
legislator's decision to press an individual's cause before an agency is 
not actually influenced by the individual's campaign support, the risk of 
influence becomes intolerably high when these two events occur close 
together in time, and public appearances can suffer as a result. Thus, 
both Bennett's and the Committee's positions recall Senator Douglas's 
advice that "a decent interval of time should be allowed to lapse" be­
tween a favor and solicitation of a campaign contribution.352 At the 
same time, large differences of degree separate Bennett's proposed rule 
351.  See 1 Keating Hearings, supra note 129, at 57-58 (Nov. 15, 1990); 6 Keating 
Hearings, supra note 129, at 152-53 (Jan. 15, 1991). 
352. See supra note 273 and accompanying text 
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from the Committee's holding: the Committee went to great lengths to 
portray the Keating-Cranston connection as extreme, but Bennett's rule 
would govern a broad class of situations. 
Bennett claimed that his rule could be deduced from extant Senate 
precedents,353 but that proposition was shaky. Collection of campaign 
donations and representation of constituent interests before federal 
agencies are legitimate and, in many cases, routine events. For the Eth­
ics Committee to have treated the confluence of these two common 
events as unethical simply because they occurred at about the same · 
time would have required a considerable extrapolation of precedent -
an extension that probably would have been too zealous in the context 
of a disciplinary proceeding, in which considerations of fair notice loom 
large. 
That conclusion, however, does not mean that the Senate or House 
should not adopt the Bennett rule, or something like it, as a prophylac­
tic measure, aimed at preventing the kind of unseemly appearances that 
the Keating Five case generated. 
If one thinks about Bennett's principle this way, it actually seems 
underinclusive. First, it refers only to taking a contribution, as opposed 
to solicitation,- surely, however, any circumstances that would foreclose 
an ethical member from passively accepting a contribution must like­
wise prevent that member from actively requesting it. Second, Bennett's 
rule would discourage contributions while a constituent is seeking inter­
vention; yet potentially troublesome appearances do not evaporate in­
stantly once a legislator accedes to such a request. Perhaps, therefore, 
the ethics committees should explicitly endorse Senator Douglas's sug­
gestion that the legislator who intervenes with an agency on a constitu­
ent's behalf should wait for "a decent interval of time" before soliciting 
or accepting a campaign contribution from the beneficiary. To date the 
committees have never endorsed that notion, even as an aspirational 
matter.354 
353. See 1 Keating Hearings, supra note 129, at 58 (Nov. 15, 1990). 
354. The suggested rule would address only simultaneity between political contri­
butions and intercession with administrative agencies. It would not, for example, speak 
to the situation in which a member arranges to hold a fundraising event at just around 
the time when he expects to be making decisions on a bill that will vitally affect some 
of the persons whom he has invited to the event That situation is not uncommon. See, 
e.g., David E. Rosenbaum, Defying Odds, New Yorker Saves Milk Subsidies, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 6, 1995, at Al; Moynihan Holding Well-Timed Party, N.Y. TIMES, June 
11 ,  1993, at A20. Nevertheless, until Congress finds a way to avoid conducting legisla­
tive business during campaign season, it probably cannot adopt a categorical ban on 
such "well-timed" events. 
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The purpose of this guideline would be to erect a temporal buffer 
between casework and donation, so as to reduce the risk, and minimize 
the appearance, of a bargain between legislator and petitioner. To be 
sure, the very fact of mutual benefits between the two, even if separated 
in time, will strike some external observers as suspicious. That kind of 
appearance, however, is not avoidable at reasonable cost. As discussed 
above, our campaign system runs on private donations, and it would be 
perverse to try to make sure that a donor has no reason for his or her 
gift. Thus, the rules should not seek to prevent contributions that are 
motivated by a�·,preciation for the member's services. Rather, the limited 
goal of the suggested rule would be to give the public a degree of as­
surance that a donation and an intervention have stemmed from two 
separate decisions, rather than from a direct exchange of benefits be­
tween legislator and constituent. 
· 
Although individual members would no doubt feel that such a 
measure would be a considerable intrusion on their autonomy, they 
probably would be able to live with it. After all, the Committee hear­
ings elicited testimony from senators who claimed that they already op­
erate under self-imposed restraints of this kind.355 The Keating episode 
may have made such self-restraint more common. To the extent that 
members are already living by the suggested principle, the case for cod­
ifying it becomes all the stronger.356 
355. Senator Inouye testified that he returns contributions that he receives within a 
few days after assisting the donor. See 3 Keating Hearings, supra note 129, at 46 (Dec. 
3, 1990). Two of the Keating Five senators testified more generally that they keep dis­
cussions of casework and contributions separate. See 5 id. at 177 (Jan. 4, 1991) (Sen. 
Glenn); id. at 20 (Jan. 9, 1991) (Sen. DeConcini). In addition, Senator Riegle testified 
that he had returned contributions generated by Keating because he was troubled by 
their proximity in time to the fateful April 1987 meetings. See id. at 81-82 (Jan. 7, 
1991); see also Charles R. Babcock & Helen Dewar, Keating Fallout: Senators Draw 
Own Lines on When To Intervene, WASH. PosT, Jan. 16, 1991, at A17 (noting Senator 
Rudman's policy against "accepting substantial contributions from any company during 
a period in which the company is facing a 'major confrontation' with regulatory 
agencies"). 
356. The committees would need to resolve various implementation issues, includ­
ing the length of the waiting period and the advisability of exempting contributions be­
low a certain sum. They might also consider exempting solicitations effected on a mass 
basis, such as direct mail or phone banks. 
In addition, the committees would need to take account of the fact that some ad­
ministrative transactions can run for years and go through various stages before a result 
is reached. Indeed, Charles Keating's case is illustrative: his feud with the FHLBB 
lasted for many months, and he drew upon congressional assistance frequently during 
that period. See KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 21-27. There may be no entirely 
satisfactory way to write a rule to deal with such a situation, but one option would be to 
declare that a member must not accept a contribution from a constituent, who has 
benefitted from casework unless the member waits for a "decent interval of time" after 
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A rule codifying the Douglas "decent interval" principle should 
disapprove contributions from persons who the member knows are seek­
ing or have recently sought constituent service - but not, as in 
Bennett's proposal, from persons who the member "should know" have 
sought such service. If the member who receives a contribution does 
not actually know that the contributor had recently sought the legisla­
tor's help in a dispute with a federal agency, then by hypothesis there 
was no illicit barg&in or understanding between the two. Indeed, the 
logic behind the "should" in Bennett's principle is difficult to pene­
trate. The Keating decision teaches that members who want to play it 
safe should, to the extent feasible, separate the processes of casework 
and fundraising; this lesson is not easy to harmonize with Bennett's im­
plication that members of a fundraising staff should make it their busi­
ness to find out the identities of current requesters of the office's con­
stituent services. 
Moreover, although this qualification would limit the scope of the 
rule, that consequence is attractive, because it would tend to protect leg­
islators from becoming embroiled in enforcement proceedings because 
of a minor transgression. Many of the transactions addressed by the rule 
may involve mundane casework activity and small donations, where the 
possibility of an innocent misunderstanding is significant. The rule 
should not be so stringently worded as to invite the use of ethics com­
plaints as a tool of harassment - an ever-present risk in the high­
stakes, sometimes hardball, world of congressional politics. 357 On the 
other hand, the very existence of the rule would demonstrate that solici­
tation of contributions during or immediately after discussions with a 
congressional office about constituent service is disfavored. 
b. Illustrative Controversies. 1\vo post-Keating controversies illus­
trate the scope and limits of the suggested rule. The first example stems 
from one of the charges leveled at Representative Newt Gingrich soon 
after he became Speaker of the House. He reportedly wrote to the Food 
and Drug Administration to urge approval of a home testing kit for the 
lilV virus. The kit's manufacturer, Direct Access Diagnostics, had re­
quested this letter. A week later the president of Direct Access contrib-
taldng any steps to help the constituent with her problem. This solution would not nec­
essarily foreclose the possibility of the member's soliciting or accepting campaign sup­
port from the constituent, because even protracted struggles with the bureaucracy typi­
cally have lengthy periods of "down time" in which no member is actively working on 
the matter. 
357. See Peter W. Morgan, The Appearance of Propriety: Ethics Reform and the 
Blifil Paradoxes, 44 STAN. L. RBv. 593, 607-10 (1992) (developing this point in the 
specific context of the Keating case); Symposium, Partisan Influences on Ethics Investi­
gations, 1 1  J.L. & POL. 41 1 (1995). 
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uted $5000 to a foundation that has close ties to Gingrich and funds his 
speeches and educational activities. The company itself contributed 
$25,000 a few months later.358 The House Ethics Committee dismissed 
the charge,359 perhaps because it believed the company's assertion that 
these contributions were unsolicited.360 
· • 
The Committee may have reached the right disposition under the 
House's current rules, but under the rule suggested here the first dona­
tion, if not the second, would presumably have been impermissible.361 
The suggested rule would be a prophylactic measure and would not turn 
on whether or not one believed the company's claim. The premise 
would be that donations in the immediate wake of constituent servfoe 
should be banned on an across-the-board basis, because they pose unu­
sual risks of an impermissible bargain between the two parties, and en­
forcement authorities cannot feasibly identify which specific incidents 
have actually involved an improper exchange. At the same time, the 
rule would not seriously interfere with legitimate fundraising, because 
the Speaker could still accept a donation if the company were to remain 
appreciative at the end of the "cooling off period." 
The second illustrative controversy developed out of.memos writ­
ten by an aide to Senator Frank Lautenberg during the senator's 1994 
reelection campaign. Addressed to the senator's fundraising staff, the 
memos mentioned several individuals for whom the senator had re­
cently done favors and lirged the fundraisers to invite these individuals 
to make contributions to the senator's reelection campaign.362 The 
memos were leaked to the press and led to charges that the senator had 
acted improperly by "targeting" beneficiaries of constituent service.363 
358. See Patrick J. Sloyan, Corporate Gifts to Gingrich Group: Critics Target 
Foundation Run by Associate, NEWSDAY, Jan. 29, .1995, at A5. 
359. See Panel To Hire Special Counsel in Gingrich Investigation, 53 CONG. Q. 
WKLY. REP. 3761 (1995) (text of Committee letter). 
360. See Sloyan, supra note 358. 
361. This discussion assumes that Representative Gingrich could not have exoner­
ated himself by merely showing that the foundation to which the donations were made 
was not directly involved in his reelection campaign. Cf. Senate Rule XLIII(3) (deci­
sions to provide assistance may not be based on contributions given to "organizations 
in which the Member has a political, personal, or financial interest"); KEATING RE­
PORT, supra note 4, at 1 1-12 (same). In the Keating case itself, the Senate Committee 
treated Keating's contributions to voter registration organizations and the California 
Democratic Party as being tantamount, for purposes of that proceeding, to political con­
tributions to Cranston himself. See id. at 21-23. 
362. See Glenn R. Simpson, Second Memo Links Official Act, Support, ROLL 
CALL, Apr. 1 1 ,  1994, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Rollcl File [hereinafter Sec­
ond Memo]; Glenn R. Simpson, Cash and Aid Linked in Lautenberg Memo, ROLL 
CALL, Mar. 31, 1994, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Rollcl File (misdated 1993). 
363. See Simpson, Second Memo, supra note 362. 
90 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:1 
The Senate Ethics Committee examined the situation and found no im­
propriety, but added that the "appearance created by the memoranda 
entries is troubling. "364 
This situation would entail no violation of the rule proposed here, 
and the Ethics Committee's refusal to find a violation of the Senate's 
current rules also seems sound. Even Senator Douglas's classic mono­
graph on government ethics says that it is "probably not wrong" to so­
licit contributions from past beneficiaries of constituent service - pro­
vided fundraisers wait a "decent interval" before making their 
appeal.365 No one seems to have claimed that the solicitations proposed 
in the Lautenberg memos would have offended this temporal limitation; 
rather, critics suggested that the senator should not have "targeted" 
beneficiaries of constituent service at all. Yet, to repeat, it is natural and 
appropriate for an incumbent officeholder to seek contributions from 
persons who have identifiable reasons to appreciate his record. Accord­
ingly, if a member of Congress has reason to believe that a potential 
donor was grateful for advocacy performed on her behalf and regards 
the legislator as the kind of conscientious advocate of district or state 
interests who deserves to be returned to office, solicitation of a cam­
paign contribution from her would be legitimate. This is not materially 
different from a member's decision to seek contributions from people 
who approve of or believe they have benefited from the member's re­
cord as a lawmaker.366 
364. Glenn R. Simpson, Ethics Finds No Wrongdoing in Lautenberg Memos but 
War.ns of 'Appearance' Created, ROLL CALL, July 21, 1994, available in LEXIS, Legis 
Library, Rolle! File. 
365. See supra note 273. 
366. Professor Thompson appears to argue that campaign contributors given in re­
sponse to constituent service activities do deserve less accommodation than contribu­
tions based on a member's voting record, because in the former case the contributor and 
candidate may not even share ideological positions. A contribution "given to support a 
candidate with whom a citizen shares a general political orientation or agrees on issues 
that he or she thinks salient • . . directly serves a political function: its aim is to help a 
candidate get elected, and works through the political process." THOMPSON, supra note 
28, at 1 13-14 (footnote omitted). In contrast, a contribution resulting from constituent 
service "serves no public political function. A contribution given without regard to the 
political positions of the candidate only incidentally provides political support; its pri­
mary aim is to influence the candidate when in office." Id. at 1 13. This statement seems 
not even to acknowledge the possibility of a contributor who genuinely appreciates the 
member's efforts and believes that the member's helpfulness and responsiveness entitle 
him to another term. Of course, some contributions that follow in the wake of constitu­
ent service are actually payoffs for services rendered, and therefore corrupt - but one 
could equally well say that some contributions from a legislator's ideological soulmates 
are actually payoffs for his having been "helpful" on a pending bill. The question then 
becomes why one should presume corruption, or the subversion of democracy, more 
readily in the casework situation than in the lawmaking situation. Perhaps Thompson 
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The newspaper Roll Call, which broke the Lautenberg story, ac­
knowledged in an editorial that senators routinely "target" contributors 
who have interests before their committees. The newspaper thought 
Lautenberg's case was different because the memos had been "citing 
specific acts the Senator had taken and seeking to capitalize on 
them."367 This focus on "specific acts" would be reasonable in a case 
in which a legislator or his fundraisers "cited" those acts to the 
targeted individual. Under those circumstances it would be arguable, 
though by no means self-evident, that the solicitation embodied a subtle 
element of pressure, a low-level type of extortion that could properly 
concern ethics authorities.368 But to assume that anyone used or in­
tended improper appeals in the Lautenberg situation would have been 
pure speculation. The memos - which apparently were the sole basis 
for the allegations against the senator - merely referred to the "spe­
cific acts" as reasons why the fundraisers should approach the individu­
als in the first place. A plan to approach potential donors who have 
only one or two known reasons to support the candidate seems indistin­
guishable, in ethics terms, from a plan to approach potential donors 
who have a wide range of reasons to do so. 
The Lautenberg controversy illustrates the confusion that was easy 
to predict from the Keating decision, which condemned Cranston for 
means to contend that citizens have no valid reasons to contribute to a political cam­
paign except to advance their positions on policy issues. Yet many voters consider their 
representative's stands on issues less important than his helpfulness as an advocate for 
the people of the district. See CAIN ET AL., supra note 45, at 37-43. Intellectuals may 
not agree with these voters' priorities, but the prevalence of this attitude in the electo­
rate is undeniable. It is by no means clear that incumbents undermine the democratic 
process when they seek financial support from voters who hold this view. 
To some extent Thompson may be arguing that donations stimulated by casework 
are illegitimate beacause congressional intervention in the administrative process is it­
self ethically dubious: 
[C]itizens should influence their representatives and representatives should influ­
ence policy only in ways that can be contested through public deliberation and 
political competition in a democratic political process. • . . When legislators 
help private interests use public authority- without submitting their claims to the 
full test of the democratic process, they are agents of corruption. 
THOMPSON, supra note 28, at 1 1 4. This suggestion reopens the policy debate, can­
vassed in Part II, about the overall merits of constituent service. One response to 
Thompson is that congressional intervention can actually strengthen the democratic pro­
cess by bringing the perceptions of popularly elected officeholders to bear on adminis­
trative conduct that might otherwise escape effective external review. 
367. The Lautenberg Memo, ROLL CALL, Apr. 4, 1994, at 1 .  
368. A thin line may separate merely "referring" to past favors from "pressuring" 
beneficiaries or depicting the requested contribution as "a payment for services ren­
dered," practices that Douglas opposed. See supra note 273. On the_ other hand, 
Douglas's general support for solicitation of contributions from recipients of favors in­
dicates that he would not have dismissed all such solicitation as "inherently" coercive. 
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having "substantially linked" fundraising and official actions, without 
fleshing out the contours of that vague term. Close analysis shows, 
however, that Lautenberg did not engage in the kind of linkage that the 
Committee had denounced or had reason to denounce. The Committee's 
refusal to impose sanctions was correct.369 
2. Intervention on Behalf of Contributors 
As we saw earlier, efforts to regulate legislators' "pressure" or 
"aggressiveness" toward administrative agencies are fraught with com­
plexities. This section considers the specific question whether legisla­
tors providing constituent service ought to approach agencies with spe­
cial restraint if the intended beneficiary is a contributor. Bennett's 
second proposed rule gave an affrrmative answer: "A Senator should 
not take unusual or aggressive action with regard to a specific matter 
before a Federal agency on behalf of a contributor when he knows, or 
has reason to know, the contributor has sought to procure his services." 
Although the Senate Ethics Committee did not directly endorse 
Bennett's principle in the Keating case, it did acknowledge concerns 
similar to his. In particular, the Committee cited Keating's contributions 
to Senator DeConcini's campaigns as one reason why the senator 
should have investigated the issues in Lincoln's case more thoroughly 
before pursuing it so aggressively. 370 
Bennett's proposed rule seems awkwardly worded. A legislator 
working on behalf of a noncontributor may have legitimate reasons for 
displaying "unusual or aggressive action" toward an agency - for ex­
ample, if the agency behaves in a particularly uncooperative way. To 
the extent that Bennett's rule can be read to imply that a contributor 
should be entitled to less active representation, it seems manifestly un­
sound - one should not incur a penalty for supporting a political cam­
paign. The last clause of Bennett's proposed rule is also puzzling, be­
cause the purity or lack of purity of the constituent's motives would 
seem to have little if anything to do with whether the member may 
properly be "aggressive" on his or her behalf.371 
369. As will be discussed later, however, the Committee deserves less praise for 
adding that the incident created a troubling "appearance" of linkage. See infra notes 
417-19 and accompanying text. 
370. See KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 17. The Committee criticized Sena­
tor McCain for poor judgment on similar grounds, although it did· not characterize his 
conduct as overly aggressive. See id. at 18-19. 
371. This analysis assumes that Bennett used the word "procure" in a pejorative 
sense (i.e., as equivalent to "purchase"). If, instead, he used the word in a more neutral 
sense (i.e., as equivalent to "enlist"), the last clause of his rule would be trivial, be­
cause it would always be satisfied. 
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Nevertheless, the Bennett proposal points toward a valid criticjsm 
of the new Senate Rule XLID. That rule , calls for senators to treat con­
tributors and noncontributors equally in deciding whether to intervene 
with an agency, but not in regard to the manner in which they inter­
vene. A logical and probably desirable extension of Rule XLID would 
provide that a member should pursue casework as aggressively for peti­
tioners who do not contribute to the member's campaign as for simi­
larly situated petitioners who do contribute. In a sense this principle 
would represent a partial codification of the teachings of House Advi­
sory Opinion No. 1,  which declared years ago that "[aj Member's re­
sponsibility in this area is to all his constituents equally and should be 
pursued with diligence irrespective of political or other 
considerations. "372 ' 
· 
Actually, the House advisoiy opinion seems to reach much further 
than the suggested rule, because it rejects "favoritism" of all kinds, not 
just favoritism as between contributors and noncontributors. Moreover, 
as previously noted, the broad notion that congressional ombudsman 
services should be available to all constituents on an equal basis is part 
of the ethic of professionilism to which congressional offices claim to 
aspire.373 One can question, however; whether the ethics committees 
should undertake to enforce this norm with the threat of disciplinary 
sanctions. After all, society does not expect legislators to observe the 
same strict standards of impartiality that it expects from the judiciary.374 
Indeed, there is probably no member of Congress who does not some­
times make special efforts for personal friends.375 Since the driving 
372. Advisory Opinion No. l, supra note 131, at 1078. The House Ethics Manual 
already states: "considerations such as political support, party affiliation, or campaign 
contributions should not affect either the decision of a Member to provide assistance or 
the quality of help that is given." HOUSE Ennes MANuAL, supra note 133, at 250. 
373. See supra notes 301-05 and accompanying text. 
374. In the lawmaking sphere, one obviously could not expect legislators to pro­
vide "representation" to all constituents on an equal basis. Allying oneself with some 
interests, to the detriment of others, is part of the essence of political competition. In 
theory the constituent service side of a member's job would be more amenable to a 
strict policy of evenhandedness, but as a practical matter the feasibility of keeping the 
two spheres completely separate is open to doubt. See also .Lawrence, supra note 138, 
at 447 n.157 (questioning the wisdom of a rule confining casework to a legislator's own 
constituents, because a citizen of a given district may feel that she would not get ade­
quate support from her own representative and should be free to request help from 
another). 
375. See supra note 301 and accompanying text For example, the Senate Demo­
cratic leader, Senator Thomas Daschle, was .criticized for intervening with federal avia­
tion inspectors on behalf of a South Dakota friend whose air charter company had failed 
safety inspections. The Senate Ethics Committee, however, found that the intervention 
was routine and proper constituent service. See Neil A. Lewis, Panel Clears Senate Mi-
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force behind current reform efforts is to address public apprehensions 
about the excessive role of money in politics, limitation of the discipli­
nary rule to inequities that occur in the specific context of campaign 
contributions seems defensible. 
Even with regard to a rule that requires only equal treatment be­
tween campaign contributors and noncontributors, the ethics committees 
should probably limit their enforcement activity to relatively clear-cut 
and serious violations. In many cases, disparities that apparently reflect 
favoritism could have valid explanations: the facts of individual cases 
vary
' 
different staff members handle different cases, and office priorities 
evolve over time. But this does not mean the suggested rule would be 
useless. It could still serve a legitimate precautionary function. Moreo­
ver, it would at least encourage legislators to instruct staff not to give 
contributors special treatment in either the initial decision to intervene 
or the methods used in pursuing a case. 
The Senate Ethics Committee took a somewhat different approach 
to the issue of providing constituent service for a contributor. In such 
circumstances, the Committee said, a senator "must be mindful of the 
appearance that may be created and take special care to try to prevent 
harm to the public's trust in the Senator and the Senate."376 One way in 
which senators may do so, the Committee suggested, would be "by es­
tablishing office practices indicating that only constituent cases that 
they or their staffs reasonably believe have merit will be pursued. "Jn 
The Committee's criticism of Senator DeConcini was consistent with 
this analysis: casework for a contributor is appropriate if the senator has 
made sure that the underlying case is sound. This recommendation 
seems attractive as an advisory standard, although it does not seem 
amenable to use as a disciplinary rule. Another solution would be for 
the congressional office to emphasize that its request is only for fair 
consideration of the petitioner's situation, and that the agency should 
make its decision on the merits. That advice, which Senator Douglas 
recommended to legislators who wish to be "very correct, "378 might be 
nority Leader on an Ethics Complaint, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1995, at A24. His fonner 
Republican counterpart, Senator Robert Dole, reportedly used his influence with the 
Small Business Administration to help a fonner aide (and constituent) obtain a military 
food service contract through the minority set-asides program. Yet a House committee, 
controlled at the time by Democrats, examined the incident and found no reason to criti­
cize the senator. See Ruth Marcus, Dole Pursued Set-Aside for Ex-Aide, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 23, 1995, at A9. 
376. KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 12. 
377. Id. at 30. 
378. DOUGLAS REPORT, supra note 134, at 29. 
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especially good practice for legislators who are acting on behalf of 
contributors. 
3. Office Practices 
Bennett's third principle was that " [a] Senator should not conduct 
his fundraising efforts or engage in office practices which lead contribu­
tors to conclude that they can buy access to him." Presumably this rule 
was intended to address contributors' apparent ability to buy "access" 
to a legislator's services, not "access" in the more limited sense of an 
ability to obtain an audience with the legislator.379 So interpreted, it di­
rectly foreshadowed the second supporting rationale for the Senate Eth­
ics Committee's reprimand of Senator Cranston. As already explained, 
the "substantial linkage" that the Committee discerned between 
Cranston's fundraising and constituent service activities consisted in 
part of improper office practices. 
The Committee focused on the activities of Joy Jacobson, the sena­
tor's chief fundraiser.380 Although she was not a Senate employee and 
had no legislative responsibilities, her conduct was incompatible with 
that nominal limitation. For example, she attended a meeting with econ­
omist Alan Greenspan (in order to understand contributors' problems 
better, the senator later explained); she arranged substantive meetings; 
and she acted as an intermediary between Cranston's legislative aide 
and Keating or his staff. In addition, she herself did not keep fundrais­
ing and legislative issues separate, raising both in a single conversation 
with one Keating aide. She also wrote memos evincing an understand­
ing that contributors were entitled to favored treatment. The Committee 
found that Senator Cranston was aware of her actions and attitude and 
never attempted to correct her understanding. 
The basic idea behind Bennett's and the Committee's positions was 
sound. In fact, authoritative ethics pronouncements in closely related 
contexts have already endorsed the general principle that legislators are 
379. To be sure, a lobbyist's opportunity to spend a few minutes with a busy 
member of Congress during a frenzied legislative session can be a coveted asset, and 
much of the literature on corruption expresses dismay that PACs seem able to purchase 
this asset through campaign contributions. See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 28, at 1 17; 
Lowenstein, supra note 30, at 827-28. But see United States v. Carpenter, 961 F.2d 824, 
827 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a legislator's meeting with a lobbyist is not an "offi­
cial act," and therefore a legislator may use campaign contributions to ration such ac­
cess without violating the Hobbs Act; the court relied on a McCormick-like rationale 
that such rationing is normal and inevitable). Nevertheless, Bennett probably did not in­
tend to address this sort of "access," which was never at issue in the Keating case. 
380. See KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 27-29. 
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responsible for their aides' conduct.381 .Making members accountable for 
their offices' routine practices creates desirable incentives for members 
to think about the appearances that those practices convey, and also 
about their own roles as supervisors of a staff. 
However, the wording of Bennett's suggested standard seems 
flawed - over and above its ambiguity about the meaning of "access." 
It would apparently turn on the actual perceptions of contributors. To 
enforce such a standard, ethics committees apparently would have to 
survey campaign supporters to ask them their impressions of the mem­
ber's integrity. Loyal supporters might thwart disciplinary actions by 
swearing that they had discerned no corrupt tendencies (an act of sup­
port that might make the legislator feel all the more indebted to them). 
Disgruntled former supporters might exact revenge by testifying to the 
contrary. 
To minimize these problems, the committees could revise Ben­
nett's rule to refer to practices that "would reasonably lead" contribu­
tors to conclude that they can buy access. Under this standard, testi­
mony from actual contributors would be relevant but not dispositive. 
Even that version, however, could be criticized for its vagueness and, 
consequently, its failure to give fair warning to the regulated as to what 
conduct is proscribed. An even better solution, therefore, would be for 
the committees of both chambers to identify particular fundraising or 
office practices that they believe will reasonably cause contributors to 
believe that they can buy access.382 Existing rules already limit offices' 
ability to assign substantive and fundraising tasks to the same staff 
member383 - the Joy Jacobson problem - and could be strengthened. 
On the other hand, the ethics committees should not feel com­
pelled to accept every attack on office practices at face value. For ex­
ample, recall the case of Senator Lautenberg's chief of staff, who was 
criticized for advising fundraising staff to solicit contributions from 
381. See Senate Rule XLIII(4); Advisory Opinion No. l, supra note 131,  at 1078. 
382. Although it was suggested above, see supra note 379 and accompanying text, 
that Bennett's proposed rule was not intended to address "access" in the sense of mere 
meetings at the Capitol, the committees could, if they wished, take further steps to regu­
late "linkage" between contributions and that sort of access. For example, they could 
formalize the now-recognized norm that a solicitation letter should never explicitly state 
that contributors will receive special access to the member. The classic example is Sen­
ator Lloyd Bentsen's invitation to supportel'S to join a weekly "breakfast club" by con­
tributing $10,000 apiece. The senator dropped the idea when it was criticized, and he 
iater admitted in his vice-presidential campaign debate that it was "a doozy" of a mis­
take. See INTERPRETATIVE RULINGS, supra note 184, No. 427 (declaring practice 
improper). 
, 
383. See, e.g., Senate Rule XLl(l) (no Senate staff, other than three aides who 
have been specially designated by the senator, may engage in fundraising). 
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constituents for whom the senator had recently done favors.384 Critics of 
the incident seem to assume that fundraising staff should not only re­
frain from doing legislative business themselves (the Joy Jacobson situ­
ation), but also should be forbidden to obtain leads from aides who do 
have substantive responsibilities. It seems hypersensitive to recoil 
against so small a concession to the reality that members of Congress 
are ultimately dependent on outside sources for financial support in 
their reelection campaigns. Members and their staff cannot be expected 
to solicit contributions purely at random. Despite today's climate of 
mistrust of Congress, the committees must struggle to keep the focus on 
the impressions that office practices reasonably convey. 
4. The Appearance of Impropriety 
Bennett's fourth proposed principle - that a "Senator should not 
engage in conduct which would appear to be improper to a reasonable, 
nonpartisan, fully informed person" - stirred up a lively controversy 
within the Ethics Committee as to whether senators may be disciplined 
for creating an "appearance of impropriety. "385 In the end, Senator 
Helms expressly endorsed Bennett's position that they may.386 The ma­
jority refrained from adopting an appearance standard; indeed, it 
pointed out that "the Senate has not to date disciplined a member solely 
on the basis of the appearance created by his or her conduct. "387 
On the other hand, a desire to maintain appearances manifestly 
played a major role in the Committee's conclusions. The report con­
tained pointed admonitions that senators should avoid the appearance of 
impropriety.388 Indeed, the logic of the Committee's reprimand of Sena­
tor Cranston plainly rested to some extent on distress over the appear­
ances created by his "linkage" of campaign contributions and official 
actions.389 Moreover, in declining to recommend formal proceedings 
against Senators DeConcini and Riegle, the Committee upbraided each 
senator for conduct that, it said, "gave the appearance of being im-
384. See supra notes 362-69 and accompanying text. 
385. See Phil Kuntz, Senators Ponder How To Treat Appearance of Wrongdoing, 
49 CONG. Q. WEEK. REP. 228 (1991). 
386. See KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 14-16 (separate views of Sen. 
Helms). As previously noted, Helms's report was a slightly revised versiOn of a draft 
prepared by Bennett himself. See supra note 7. 
387. Id. at 6. 
388. See id. at 12-13 ("B�ause Senators occupy a position of public trust, every 
Senator always must endeavor to avoid the appearance that the Senator, the Senate, or 
the governmental process may be influenced by campaign contributions or other bene­
fits provided by those with significant legislative or governmental interests."). 
389. See supra notes 283-86 and accompanying text. 
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proper. "390 In short, the Committee evinced a concern for public percep­
tions, yet it apparently lacked a precise theory about how to take them 
into account.391 
Appearance standards have played a prominent role in the public 
discourse on government ethics since at least the Watergate era.392 His­
torically, however, congressional endorsements of the appearances 
theme have been aspirational in character393 or have served as fleeting 
supplemental arguments in ethics committee decisions that primarily 
rested on findings of actual impropriety. 394 The Keating case was the 
390. See KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 17, 19. 
391. The Keating case arose under a Senate resolution that prohibits "improper 
conduct which may reflect upon the Senate." S. Res. 338, 88th Cong., § 2(a)(l), 110 
CONG. REc. 16,939 (1964). Read literally, this rule seems to foreclose an appearance 
standard, because it suggests that the challenged conduct must be both detrimental to 
the Senate's reputation and improper in some separately defmed sense. On the other 
hand, the corresponding House provision does not support the same limiting argument, 
see House Rule XLID, cl. 1 ("A Member . . • shall conduct himself at all times in a 
manner which shall reflect creditably on the House."), yet no one asserts that the Sen­
ate and House should take different approaches to "appearances" liability. Accordingly, 
the following discussion treats the debate over an appearance standard as a question of 
policy and politics, not of finely nuanced readings of the relevant provisions. Neverthe­
less, one implication of this article's analysis is that, in any future overhaul of congres­
sional ethics rules, the House should adopt a provision like the Senate's, and both 
chambers should apply this wording according to its natural meaning. 
392. See Morgan, supra note 357, at 598-602. 
393. In an effort to demonstrate that an appearance-of-impropriety standard was 
already an established norm in congressional ethics regulation, Senator Helms laid par­
ticular stress on language from the Code of Ethics for Government Service. See H.R. 
Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong. at <JI V  (1958) (admonishing against acceptance of "favors or 
benefits under circumstances which might be construed by reasonable persons as influ­
encing the performance of • . •  governmental duties"); KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, 
at 15 & n.94 (separate views of Sen. Helms). Historians agree, however, that the Code 
was originally considered purely hortatory. See CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 
17, at 147; Baker, supra note 17, at 24. Although, as Senator Helms noted, the Senate 
Ethics Committee's charter authorizes it to enforce the Code, that authority does not 
oblige the Committee to give binding force to any particular Code provision. No one 
claims that members of Congress must suffer discipline if they fail to comply with such 
Code platitudes as "Give a full day's labor for a full day's pay" or "Seek to fmd and 
employ more efficient and economical ways of getting tasks accomplished." H.R. Con. 
Res. 175, at 'fflI m, IY. 
394. For example, Bennett strained a point when he argued that the Senate had al­
ready endorsed the appearance standard in its denunciation of Senator David 
Durenberger the year before the Keating decision. See Kuntz, supra note 385, at 229. 
The appearances rationale was clearly not the primary basis for that action. In fact, the 
Ethics Committee's detailed report, supporting its recommendation that Senator 
Durenberger's conduct be deemed "clearly and unequivocally unethical," made no allu­
sion to an appearance standard. See S. REP. No. 101-382, at 14 (1990). The basis of 
Bennett's claim was that the Committee also adopted in full, see id. at 4, the 106-page 
report of its special counsel (Bennett himself), which contained a single paragraph al­
luding to a duty to avoid the appearance of impropriety. See id. app. C, at 106. 
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first in which congressional ethics enforcement authorities have paid se­
rious attention to the possibility of imposing sanctions predicated 
squarely on an appearance standard. 
Nor has society at large reached a consensus on the role of appear­
ances in ethics regulation. The American Bar Association's Model Code 
of Judicial Conduct contains an explicit appearance of impropriety stan­
dard,395 and so do the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) regulations 
governing the executive branch - although the OGE standard takes 
such a diluted form that it might be better described as presenting only 
the appearance of an appearance standard.396 On the other hand, the 
ABA abandoned its commitment to an appearance standard as a tool of 
attorney discipline when it promulgated the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct in 1983.397 One reason for this decision was that scholars had 
sharply attacked the "appearance of impropriety" language of the pre­
vious code as vague and misleading.398 
a. Critique of the Appearance Standard. Admonitions to legislators 
that they have an ethical obligation to avoid actions that could result in 
public disapproval fit naturally into discussions of congressional ethics. 
One of the central goals of the ethics codes, after all, is to promote pub­
lic confidence in the legislative branch and thereby to reinforce the le­
gitimacy of government.399 The same point can be put in terms of insti­
tutional loyalty and responsibility: unseemly behavior by a few 
members makes it harder for their colleagues to do their own jobs.400 
Professor Andrew Stark, in an illuminating analysis, has explained the 
rationale for subjecting officeholders to the constraints of an appearance 
of impropriety disciplinary standard: its purpose is "to heighten their 
democratic representativeness - in order to ensure that officials per-
395. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(A) (1989). 
396. See infra note 407. 
397. See Morgan, supra note 357, at 602. The 1983 Model Rules superseded the 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which provided in Canon 9 (but not in its 
Disciplinary Rules) that "a  lawyer should avoid even the appearance of impropriety." 
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1980). Even the Model 
Code cautioned that a lawyer's duties to clients or the public should never be subordi­
nated merely because of possible public misunderstanding or criticism. See id. EC 9-2. 
398. See, e.g., CHARLES w. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL Ennes § 7.1.4, at 322 
& n.47 (1986). In some states and specialized practice areas, ethics rules or cases still 
admonish lawyers to avoid the appearance of impropriety. See, e.g., United Steelwork­
ers of America v. Lampl, 67 B.R. 151, 157 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986) .(bankruptcy 
practice). 
399. See KEATING REPORT, supra note 4, at 12; id. at 14-15 (separate views of 
Sen. Helms); cf. Nolan, supra note 33, at 77-78 (developing same point in executive 
branch ethics context). 
400. See Ennes OF LEGISLATIVE LIFE, supra note 17, at 41-42. 
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ceive reality the way the public does and are sensitive to norms that the 
public harbors. "401 
The problems inherent in treating an appearance standard as a ba­
sis for disciplinary action are formidable, however. A central difficulty 
is the stan�d's failure to provide regulated individuals with fair notice 
of what is proscribed. "Because it is subjective and amorphous, the ap­
pearance standard provides little guidance for assessing individual con­
duct. Moreover, an appearance is in the eye of the beholder and thus 
not entirely within the control of the one charged with conforming her 
conduct to a particular standard. "402 
More specifically, the appearance-of-impropriety test is elusive be­
cause, as ordinarily understood, 403 it predicates liability on perceptions 
of improper conduct, instead of on conduct that is improper as such. 
This baseline is unwieldy under any circumstances,404 and is especially 
so in a political climate in which deep suspicion of legislators' motives 
is pervasive. At a time when many people casually speak of the entire 
Congress as corrupt, a guideline that looks to maintaining public confi­
dence in Congress can scarcely be applied at face value. Nor would 
such a straightforward application be desirable, because popular atti­
tudes toward Congress often suffer from misinformation, unrealistic ex­
pectations, and failure to appreciate the tradeoff s that legislators must 
make among their constituents' many incompatible demands.405 
Some proponents of "appearances" liability seem to recognize this 
problem, because they define the relevant perceptions as those of so­
phisticated citizens. Bennett's reliance on the perceptions of the "rea­
sonable nonpartisan, fully informed person" is typical.406 The durability 
401. Andrew Stark, The Appearance of Official Impropriety and the Concept of 
Political Crime, 105 ETHICS 326, 349 (1995). 
402. Nolan, supra note 33, at 78; see Saxon, supra note 21, at 206-10. 
403. Professor Dennis Thompson favors a quite different approach to the appear­
ance standard, which will be considered below. See infra notes 424-28 and accompany­
ing text 
404. See WOLFRAM, supra note 398, § 7.1, at 320. 
405. See supra section II.D; cf. Gary C. Jacobson, Political Action Committees, 
Electoral Politics, and Congressional Ethics, in REPRESENTATION AND REsPONSIBIL­
ITY, supra note 17, at 41, 49-50 (arguing that popular demand for changes in campaign 
finance laws is not a suitable guide to reform, because the general public lacks suffi­
cient information to make reliable judgments on the subject); see also United States v. 
Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (rejecting enforceability of House 
conflict-of-interest rules in criminal trials, in part because lay citizens such as jurors 
may not understand the unique convergence of official and personal activities in the life 
of a member of Congress). 
406. Indeed, Bennett explained that "the concept of the informed person means 
someone who understands and appreciates that Senators can pressure regulators, that 
Senators can act on behalf of people who give them political contributions." 1 Keating 
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of this distinction remains open to question, however. After all, literal 
adherence to the benchmark of a "fully informed" citizen's viewpoint 
would make enforcement of the appearance standard meaningless: to an 
observer who knows all the relevant facts, "appearance" and "reality" 
are identical.407 Thus, an ethics committee that wishes to pursue appear­
ances liability in a serious way must, at a minimum, adopt the frame of 
reference of a person who knows fewer facts than the committee itself 
does. Furthermore, one of the main goals cited to justify the appearance 
standard is the preservation of public confidence. Yet the objective of 
honoring - or appeasing - public sensibilities stands in unavoidable 
tension with a commitment to rely on '·'informed" or sophisticated 
judgment.408 The more firmly an ethics committee declares that it will 
punish members whose conduct impairs public confidence, the more it 
creates a dynamic that presses it toward responding to the perceptions 
of citizens who are not "reasonable, non-partisan, and fully informed." 
The appearance standard also seems overbroad in another way. 
Congress's reputation is threatened by many varieties of ethically dubi­
ous behavior that the .disciplinary rules 
"
cannQt feasibly address and that 
ethics committees cannot feasibly police.409 Thus, vices such as duplic­
ity, indolence, grandstanding, meanness, pandering, and browbeating 
Hearings, supra note 129, at 58 (Nov. 15, 1990); see also id. at 63, 79. The fraction of 
the electorate that is "informed" in this sense may be quite small. 
407. See Stark, supra note 401, at 336. OGE's version of the appearance standard 
provides a tangible illustration of this difficulty. The rule requires executive branch em­
ployees to avoid actions creating the appearance that they are violating the law of ethics 
regulations "[as] determined from the perspective of a reasonable person with knowl­
edge of the relevant facts." 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(14) (1995). In a famous OGE ruling 
stemming from the Whitewater controversy, the issue was whether Treasury Department 
officials had improperly disclosed nonpublic· information for the purpose of furthering 
the private interests of the President or others - and also whether they had created the 
appearance of having done so. Ultimately, OGE found that the officials' conduct had 
not appeared improper on essentially the same grounds that it used to decide that their 
conduct had not been improper. See OFFICE OF GOVT. ETHICS, REPORT TO THE SEC­
RETARY OF THE TREASURY 8-10, 19 (July 31, 1994). In effect, the appearance stan­
dard became superfluous - not because the report's authors were careless, but because 
of the nature of the test they ·were asked to apply. 
However, if the "fully informed" observer is not to be the test, what criterion will 
be used? "Mostly informed"? "As informed as possible given the inherent limitations 
of their position" (as intimated in THOMPSON, supra note 28, at 127)? "As informed as 
people who watch C-SPAN"? The difficulty, and perhaps impossibility, of defining the 
relevant perspective coherently is one of the reasons why adjudication under the appear­
ance standard has proved so impressionistic in practical application. See infra notes 
410-13 and accompanying text 
408. See Stark, supra note 401, at 335-37. 
409. See Jennings, supra note 24, at 161-62 (question of what to codify "turns 
largely upon issues of enforceability, equity, and clarity of interpretation"); Saxon, 
supra note 21, at 213-16; Vogelsang-Coombs & Bakken, supra note 18, at 94-95. 
102 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:1 
deserve condemnation but are not considered "improper" as ethics 
committees use that term. Still, many people, including "reasonable" 
people, might say that these sins look improper. This is not to suggest 
that ethics committees ever would, or should, impose liability for such 
conduct, but rather that the perceptions rationale proves too much and 
cannot provide legislators with meaningful guidance about what behav­
ior the test actually serves to forbid. 
By its nature, the appearance standard is an open invitation to find­
ings of liability supported by superficial reasoning.410 Adjudicators who 
are not sure whether conduct really is improper can shore up a dubious 
analysis by asserting that the conduct at least appears to be improper.41 1 
As political c ommentator Michael Kinsley has written, 
" '[A]ppearances' can . . .  be a way of accusing someone of wrongdo­
ing without saying what, if anything, is really wrong. It is a shortcut to 
moral outrage, for those who are in a hurry to get there. "412 Scoffing at 
the Keating decision for its criticism of DeConcini and Riegle for "con­
duct that gave the appearance of being improper," Kinsley continues: 
"It hardly requires the elaborate and costly proceedings of the Senate 
Ethics Committee to determine that there has been an appearance of im­
propriety . . . .  The appearance of impropriety is precisely why the Eth­
ics Committee was convened. What we want to know is: Was there 
impropriety ?"413 
In the specific context of congressional ethics, use of an appear­
ance standard as a disciplinary standard poses special hazards. The 
charges are likely to be highly visible and subject to intense public con­
troversy before the ethics committee even begins its inquiry. Moreover, 
the adjudicators are not Article ill judges but elected officials who are 
410. Experience in the realm of attorney discipline supports this fear. See 
WOLFRAM, supra note 398, § 7.1, at 320 n.38 (noting that appearances notion "appears 
in opinions . . .  in an incantational, intuitive way, and its use is hardly ever defended"); 
cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Professional Responsibility, Fonnal Op. 342, at 5 n.17 
(1975) (concluding that inclusion of appearance standard in disqualification rule would 
likely cause application of that rule to "degenerateD . . .  into a detennination on an in­
stinctive, ad hoc or even ad hominem basis"). 
411. Although not an ethics case, Pillsbury Corp. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 
1966), is sometimes held out as a principal precedent supporting an appearance stan­
dard. See Kappel, supra note 130, at 162. If so, it is a tarnished precedent. Even though 
the ex parte contacts rule announced in that decision has met with general acceptance, 
the court's discernment of an "appearance of partiality" on the specific facts of that 
case was exceedingly strained. See supra note 153. 
412. Michael Kinsley, Reality Check, NEW REPUBLIC, July 8, 1991, at 4. 
413. Id. 
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themselves highly accountable to the public.414 Under these circum­
stances, an appearance standard, if taken seriously, would virtually 
guarantee a finding of liability. How can a member of the ethics com­
mittee say to his or her own constituents that the conduct does not ap­
pear improper, if they think it does? Indeed, such a standard could give 
rise to an insidious circularity: hostile editorials might not only trigger 
an ethics investigation of a member, but also become conclusive evi­
dence that a sanction should be imposed. The distinction between ethics 
regulation and public disapproval would then be totally erased. 
Special Counsel Bennett apparently tried to avoid this problem by 
suggesting that appearances be assessed from the perspective of a "rea­
sonable nonpartisan, fully informed person." Aside from the fact that 
these qualifications tend to sever the link between the appearance stan­
dard and its theoretical justification of respecting public opinion, the ad­
ditional criteria are not a realistic solution to the dilemma. They would 
put the ethics committee member in the hopeless position of saying to 
constituents, "Well, if you disagree with me, you must either be unrea­
sonable, uninformed, or have a political ax to grind." 
Finally, some might argue that the appearance standard is attractive 
precisely because of its stringency: even if it is overbroad, the argument 
might run, congressional ethics is in such a deplorable state that mem­
bers should be encouraged to err, if at all, on the side of self-restraint. 
An in terrorem standard may be appealing where the conduct to be de­
terred involves only the member's self-interest, as is arguably true of 
limitations on outside income, gift restrictions, and the like. Constituent 
service, however, has affirmative value to the political system, and the 
realities of campaign finance make fundraising at least a necessary evil. 
Overdeterrence of casework or of normal solicitation of political sup­
port should not be shrugged off as cost-free.415 
This last point reminds us that the mission of the ethics commit­
tees is not merely to mete out sanctions and issue denunciations, but 
also to advise members about what they may do.416 Because legislative 
functions such as constituent service require members to strike a bal-
414. Cf. Bauer, supra note 20, at 481-82 (condemning the Keating proceedings as 
a "show trial" in which political demands, rather than Cranston's actual culpability, be­
came the Committee's principal concern). 
415. Peter Morgan argues that the appearance standard has still another cost. He 
contends that the mantle of legitimacy that ethics authorities have conferred on the ap­
pearance standard puts an undeserved weapon in the hands of political actors: it enables 
them to hurl flimsy but colorable charges at opponents, and also to distract attention 
from other problems, including other ethics problems, that deserve greater attention. See 
Morgan, supra note 357, at 607-18. 
416. See Ennes OF LEGISLATIVE LIFE, supra note 17, at 52-53. 
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ance between conflicting responsibilities, the committees have a contin­
uing obligation to help members identify the boundaries that separate 
permissible from impermissible means of pursuing these functions. The 
committees also should strive, on behalf of their chambers, to educate 
the public about the locations of these boundaries. One can question se­
riously whether a committee can successfully play these exculpatory 
and educative roles if it must also enforce a liability standard that con­
demns members merely because some fraction of the public would 
think that their actions were improper. 
As an example of how the appearance standard can undercut de­
bate about the limits of propriety, consider the Senate Ethics Commit­
tee's equivocal response to the flap involving internal memos written by 
Senator Lautenberg's chief of staff.417 The Committee found no evi­
dence of an actual linkage between fundraising and official actions, nor 
of any other wrongdoing in this incident. Nevertheless, it stated that 
"the appearance created by the memoranda entries is troubling to the 
Committee," because the language of the memos "tends to create an 
appearance that campaign solicitations could have been linked to offi­
cial actions taken by the Senator on behalf of prospective contribu­
tors. "418 One might have supposed that if the senator and his aide did 
nothing wrong, as the Committee found (and as this article has main­
tained), the Committee should have exonerated him and declared that 
his critics were mistaken, instead of blaming him for the critics' having 
jumped to an erroneous conclusion.419 
b. An Alternative Approach. The preceding critique of the appear­
ance standard of liability is not intended to deny the desirability of new 
rules to bolster public confidence in Congress. Indeed, one of the major 
premises of this article, particularly in its treatment of money influence, 
is that Congress should give further, serious consideration to adopting 
417. For the particulars of this incident, see supra notes 362-69, 384 and accom­
panying text. 
418. See Simpson, supra note 364. 
419. The Committee was not alone in neglecting its educative function. Comment­
ing on the same episode, a New York Times editorial acknowledged that "there is no ev­
idence that Mr. Lautenberg granted any legislative favors with fund raising in mind," 
and that his aide's memo probably broke no Senate rules. Nevertheless, the editorial 
criticized the Ethics Committee for its failure to embrace an appearance standard, sug­
gesting that the aide would not have written the memo had that test been in effect. A 
Fund-Raising Folly, N.Y. TIMES. Apr. 1 1, 1994, at A18. Should not a major newspaper 
strive to educate citizens about what it regards as the real boundaries of legislative pro­
priety, instead of blaming legislators for public misconceptions that the newspaper itself 
has not sought to counteract? See Kinsley, supra note 412, at 4 ("[I]t is the function of 
The New York Times to bring perceptions into line with reality, not the other way 
around."). 
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measures that may help to dispel the public's doubts about the integrity 
of the legislative branch. What is needed is an approach that serves this 
end without the substantial drawbacks of the appearance-of-impropriety 
standard of liability. 
One reason that the appearance standard is so attractive to its sup­
porters is its recognition that the legislative branch needs ethics rules 
that prohibit some conduct that is not intrinsically unethical. In other 
words, prophylactic rules should be part of the congressional ethics en­
forcement scheme. Indeed, probably most conflict of interest rules are 
written with this strategy in mind. 
Prophylactic rules aimed at incipient or potential improprieties are 
attractive on several grounds. The opportunity to intercept some other­
wise unprovable misbehavior is one such ground. Moreover, the rules 
can be written in objective terms. Objective rules can strengthen ac­
countability by setting up visible standards by which citizens can evalu­
ate officials' performance.420 In this respect, they compare favorably 
with rules that allude to legislators' motives; the latter sort of rules may 
have a closer link to ethical norms, but constituents cannot readily 
judge whether their representatives have obeyed them. Prophylactic 
rules can also counteract rationalizations. As the ABA Committee on 
Government Standards has noted, "ethics regulation can make its most 
meaningful contribution by helping government employees to recog­
nize, and take steps to defuse, situations that invite compromised behav­
ior. "421 Finally, although these rules should not make public perceptions 
germane to the resolution of individual cases, the very existence and en­
forcement of these rules could be expected to bolster public confidence 
indirectly. 
A focus on corrupting tendencies can make a useful contribution to 
the continuing evolution of ethics regulation, even if the appearance 
standard itself is renounced. This is essentially the position advocated 
by the ABA committee just mentioned. In its 1993 report on govern­
ment ethics, the committee said that "appearance" concerns were perti­
nent to conflict-of-interest rules in the sense that such rules should ad­
dress "the potential for (i.e., the 'appearance'), as well as the fact of, 
impropriety." Beyond this role in the delineation of basic rules in the 
area, however, " 'appearance of impropriety' is too vague and contesta-
420. See THOMPSON, supra note 28, at 126-27. 
421 .  Keeping Faith, supra note 33, at 297; cf. DENNIS F. THOMPSON, POLITICAL 
ETlilcs AND PUBuc OFFICE 1 1 1-13 (1987) (arguing that, because legislators tend to 
rationalize their conduct, efforts to detennine whether they acted for legitimate reasons 
should focus not on motives, but on the objective circumstances, such as campaign con­
tributions, that may have corrupted their judgment). 
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ble a concept to function effectively as an independent benchmark in a 
system of ethics regulation," in the committee's view.422 
Extrapolating the same logic, the House and Senate should con­
tinue to develop rules to regulate practices that, although not inherently 
improper, tend to be associated with improper behavior. At the same 
time, however, such a rule-writing process can and should take account 
of countervailing values, such as the need to leave room for beneficial 
constituent service and reasonable political fundraising opportunities. 
An example of this sort of balancing is this article's proposal for a re­
quired "decent interval" between acceptance of a campaign contribu­
tion and performance of constituent service. That proposal is predicated 
on the assumption that, although simultaneity of contributions and ser­
vices is not intrinsically corrupt, a prohibition on such temporal over­
laps will tend to discourage improper bargains and will not cause sub­
stantial interference with normal campaign fundraising.423 
The ABA Committee's approach provides a useful lens through 
which to examine a variant on the appearance-of-impropriety test, pro­
posed by Professor Dennis Thompson. Acknowledging some of the lim­
itations of a test rooted in perceptions, he contends that "the more judi­
cious versions of the appearance standard do not refer to appearances at 
all. "424 "Properly interpreted," he says, the test "would be better called 
a tendency standard because it presumes that under certain institutional 
conditions the connection between contributions and services tends to 
be improper."425 In particular, "a connection between contributions and 
services should be regarded as corrupt if it takes place under conditions 
that would lead citizens reasonably to believe that the contributions are 
causing services to be provided without regard to substantive merit or 
appropriate fairness. "426 
One has to wonder why Thompson characterizes his proposed rule 
as an "appearance of impropriety" test at all, as he acknowledges that 
422. See Keeping Faith, supra note 33, at 296-97; see also Nolan, supra note 33, 
at 77-78 (arguing in executive branch ethics context for use of appearance considera­
tions as a basis for writing rules, but not as a test for judging individual conduct). 
423. An extant measure that has similarly been established for prophylactic pur­
poses is Senate Rule XLI, which provides that only three employees of a Senate staff 
may engage in campaign fundraising. Although perhaps not classifiable as an ethics 
rule, this requirement does serve to reinforce the line of separation between election­
eering efforts and official business. See also 18 U.S.C. § 207(e)(l) (1994) (members 
may not lobby Congress for one year after leaving office). 
424. THOl'vfPSON, supra note 28, at 124. 
425. Id. 
426. Id. at 125. 
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his proposal does not really depend on appearances. 427 Retention of the 
familiar language can only serve . to maintain continuity with conven­
tional interpretations of the standard - and with those interpretations' 
many pitfalls. His proposal is perhaps best understood as a suggestion 
that the ethics committees should continue to develop rules to forbid ac­
tions that have unhealthy "tendencies." This idea, which is substan­
tially equivalent to the ABA Committee's recommendation, deserves to 
be pursued.428 Much less attractive, however, is his implication that the 
committees should issue a generalized warning to members that they 
will face sanctions if they engage in actions that tend to be associated 
with impropriety. Using this statement as a vague in terrorem threat 
would pose the risks of overdeterrence mentioned above. Thompson 
does not address those risks at all, and his analysis remains somewhat 
one-sided as a result. 
· 
In the end, it is worth recalling that the ethics enforcement system 
does not exist in a vacuum. According to the harsh rules of political 
life, members of Congress who fail to heed - or to anticipate changes 
in - political morality risk repudiation at the ballot box. Their political 
accountability gives them strong incentives to avoid unseemly appear­
ances. Yet the imprudent and the unethical are not necessarily the same. 
Apprehensions about the legitimacy of legislators' behavior should be 
addressed through new categorical rules, such as those discussed in pre­
vious sections of this· article, rather than through a standard that is as 
open-ended and difficult to contain as "the appearance of impropriety." 
427. Although he does phrase the critical inquiry in tenns of objective facts that 
would "lead citizens reasonably to believe" the legislator has acted corruptly, this is in 
effect no different than an inquiry in which adjudicators ask whether they themselves 
believe that the facts would reasonably support that conclusion. In other words, when 
one turns from asking what citizens do believe to asking what they should believe, the 
citizens become superfluous to the analysis, and allusions to their beliefs become only a 
rhetorical device. Thompson could escape this logical dilemma if he were to posit that 
the citizens whose conclusions matter under his test possess fewer facts than the ethics 
committees do. But he insists that his proposed test revolves around well-informed and 
reasonable perceptions. See id. at 127, 129. He also argues that the ethics committees 
could elaborate on the meaning of his standard through case law over time, thus imply­
ing that the standard would not depend in any substantial way on "perceptions" at all. 
See id. at 128-29. 
· 
428. Even in this context, however, the slogan "appearance of impropriety" seems 
unhelpful and could even hamper the full development of the kind of strictures that 
Thompson envisions. The phrase connotes conduct that, in the view of infonned observ­
ers, is probably associated with impropriety - the member is "apparently" acting im­
properly. Yet the rationales for prophylactic rules, as described above, do not suggest 
that they must be so confined. In some circumstances such measures could legitimately 
be used to reach conduct that is occasionally or possibly associated with impropriety, if 
ethics authorities see little or no reason to protect the conduct from overregulation. 
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CONCLUSION 
This article began with an assertion that the ethical dimensions of 
congressional constituent service give rise to an exceptionally complex 
set of issues. The breadth of these issues should now be evident in light 
of this article's lengthy tour through such disparate topics as representa­
tion theory, ethics theory, empirically oriented political science, and the 
case law on administrative law and criminal corruption. Yet the scope 
of the article's discussion has largely been driven by its premise that 
proposed refonns in this area would touch upon some of the central re­
sponsibilities of congressional life. At least some of the time, legisla­
tors' advocacy of constituents' interests before administrative agencies 
serves as a beneficial check on executive branch indifference or over­
reaching. Similarly, the acquisition of campaign contributions is an in­
escapable incident of the political competition in which elected office­
holders must regularly participate. Although both casework and political 
fundraising involve elements of self-interest that invite continuing scru­
tiny by the ethics committees, their respective roles in the political pro­
cess give the committees good reasons to remain circumspect about reg­
ulating them. 
The tension between ideals of legislative ethics and the legitimate 
needs of the political system leads naturally in the direction of compro­
mise solutions and narrow distinctions. The foregoing pages have sug­
gested a few ways in which a balance might be struck in specific con­
texts. One suggested principle would normally preclude a member of 
Congress from exerting strong pressure on an agency when fonnal ad­
ministrative proceedings have commenced or are about to commence, 
or when the member tries to induce the agency to act on grounds that 
controlling law renders impermissible. In other situations, however, 
pressure generally should be tolerated. Another suggestion was that the 
ethics rules should forbid a member from soliciting a campaign contri­
bution from a constituent at about the same time, or immediately after, 
she intercedes with an agency on the constituent's behalf; but if she 
waits for a "decent interval of time" before seeking the contribution, 
no violation should be found. 
This article's specific appraisals of current and potential ethics 
rules are certainly debatable, depending as they do on contestable fac­
tual assumptions and a pragmatic process of reconciling competing in­
terests. The principal aim here, however, is not to supply definitive an­
swers to particular controversies but, instead, to explain and exemplify 
a general approach to thinking about issues of legislative ethics. This 
approach maintains that it is not enough to leap directly from the reali­
zation that a given legislative practice can be abused to the conclusion 
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that it should be suppressed. One must also go on to explore, to the ex­
tent possible, the workability of rules that would regulate the practice, 
the prevalence of the abuses, and the consequences of suppressing the 
practice for the political system as a whole. 
General acceptance of this analytical approach might at least facili­
tate resolution of some of the unsettled questions in this area. Hair­
trigger suspicion of the normal processes of constituent advocacy and 
campaign fundraising is a common enough feature of popular debate on 
congressional ethics, but it is hardly a constructive response to the com­
plex issues that the Keating case raises.429 Perhaps, if thoughtful mem­
bers of Congress and thoughtful segments of the general public could 
mutually agree to consider the issues from the more comprehensive per­
spective offered here, they could improve the chances that their solu­
tions to these problems would be both wise and broadly acceptable. 
APPENDIX 
As a result of the project for which this study was prepared, the 
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association endorsed the fol­
lowing recommended guidelines regarding congressional constituent 
service on February 5, 1996:430 
BE IT RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association recom­
mends that * * * 
2. In order to obtain the benefits to American citizens of constitu­
ent service contacts with administrative agencies by individual Mem­
bers of Congress, while minimizing the risk that agencies will be in­
duced to violate the substantive arid procedural statutes that govern their 
decisions, Members of Congress and their staffs should: 
A. comply with legal restrictions on ex parte contacts in formal 
proceedings by avoiding communications with the responsible agency 
decisionmakers that bear on the merits of pending cases; 
B. observe special restrictions on ex parte contacts in informal pro­
ceedings set forth in statutes or agency regulations; 
429. 
A genuine commitment to improving ethics in government . . • requires resisting 
the simple, and popular, assumption that more regulation is better regulation. 
Those who shape public policy must summon the diligence and fortitude to take 
on the difficult, and seldom applauded, task of thoughtfully identifying not only 
the areas that need more rules, but also the areas that need fewer rules and the 
areas that need different rules. 
Keeping Faith, supra note 33, at 340; see Abner J. Mikva. From Politics to Paranoia, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1995, at C2 (decrying excesses in policing of ethics). 
430. Part I of the resolution, which concerned the procedures by which the House 
and Senate enforce their ethics rules, is not reprinted here. 
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C. cooperate with efforts of agencies, as required by statute or reg­
ulation, to maintain logs that detail contacts between their personnel 
and persons outside the agency, including the Members and staff of 
Congress; 
D. refrain from asking agencies to consider factors that are not per­
missible under the statutes that govern their programs; 
E. work with staff of the agencies to ensure that oversight proceed­
ings consider general issues of law and policy and avoid reference to 
any particular pending formal proceeding before an agency; 
F. avoid advocating a constituent's position before an agency with­
out knowledge of its merits; 
G. for investigations in which an agency is actively considering in­
itiation of civil or administrative enforcement proceedings or referral 
for criminal prosecution: 
i. avoid any contacts that are relevant to the merits with agency of­
ficials who may later serve in an adjudicative role, and 
ii. for contacts with agency personnel who have investigative or 
enforcement responsibilities, ensure that any advocacy of a constituent's 
claims is well-founded. 
H. minimize the risks of undue linkage between contributions and 
constituent service by: 
i. neither soliciting nor accepting a substantial campaign contribu­
tion from an individual who the Member knows is currently attempting 
or has recently attempted to induce the Member to intervene before a 
federal agency, and 
ii. varying neither the initiation nor the vigor of a constituent ser­
vice contact with an agency according to the status of the requester as a 
contributor. 
I. These guidelines do not require Members of Congress and their 
staffs to refrain from: 
i. making a referral of a constituent's inquiry, with a request that 
the agency give it due consideration, and 
ii. urging prompt conclusion of a matter in whatever manner the 
merits justify. 
